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Note to readers: 
 
 These lectures were given in Spring 2014 at Oxford University.  They incorporate 
material that was later included in my book, The Guardians:  The League of Nations and 
the Crisis of Empire, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2015.  That 
book is a history of the origins and workings of the mandates system of the League of 
Nations and its impact on the international and imperial order as a whole.  These lectures 
concentrate more narrowly on Britain’s involvement in the construction of that system 
and on its unexpected effects on British strategy and power.  The fourth lecture, on 
British dilemmas around the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, has not been published elsewhere; the 
third lecture (and to a lesser degree the first and sixth lectures) also incorporate material 
not found in that book.  A fully international account of all the themes discussed can be 
found in The Guardians. 
 
 The lectures are based largely on politicians’ private papers, especially those of 
Leo Amery, Maurice Hankey and Philip Noel-Baker (held at the Churchill Archives 
Center); William Ormsby-Gore (National Library of Wales); Robert Cecil and Eric 
Drummond (British Library); Alfred Milner and Arnold Toynbee (Bodleian Library); 
Lord Lugard, J.H. Oldham, and the Anti-Slavery Society (Rhodes House Library); 
Samuel Hoare (Cambridge University Library); and Winifred Holtby (Hull Central 
Library).  They also drawn on National and Foreign Ministry archives of Britain, France, 
Germany, and Namibia; on the archives and records of the League of Nations; and on the 
Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem).  These and other primary sources are cited fully; 
secondary authorities are cited only when directly quoted or relied upon.   A fuller 
discussion of the historiography surrounding the mandates system of the League of 
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Turning to Geneva 
Lecture 1 (January 31, 2014) 
 
 In February 1919, Sir Maurice Hankey was offered the job of first Secretary 
General of the League of Nations.  Hankey, 42 years old, a naval officer, had had a good 
war and an even better peace conference.  Secretary of the Committee of Imperial 
Defense from 1912, in 1916 he had become Cabinet Secretary and Lloyd George’s right 
hand man.  Highly efficient, he managed the British Empire delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference and then much of the conference itself, imposing a modicum of order on its 
shambolic proceedings.  President Wilson, South African Premier Jan Christiaan Smuts 
and British internationalist Lord Robert Cecil – the ‘big three’ of the Commission to draft 
the League of Nations Covenant – thus thought him the ideal person to become the new 
organization’s head.  Hankey, however, felt ‘very skeptical’ about the whole matter and 
asked the opinion of his sometime mentor from the Committee of Imperial Defense, Lord 
Esher. 
 Esher advised against it.  The League would necessarily be a plant of slow 
growth, and if Hankey chose to devote himself to its cultivation he would ‘be a wasted 
force for England.’  This would be tragic, for ‘the Empire has come of age.’  ‘I fervently 
believe that the happiness and welfare of the human race is more closely concerned in the 
evolution of English democracy and of our Imperial Commonwealth than in the growth 
of any International League,’ Esher wrote his friend. He was skeptical too of the 
emphasis on public opinion and open diplomacy on which the new League planned to 
rely. The Secretary General might ‘build a huge megaphone, though which he will blow 
across the continents and the oceans,’ but ‘power to influence great events does not reside 
in megaphones but in the still small voice that whispers in the ear of the Wilsons and the 
Lloyd Georges of this world.’  The League, in other words, was too public.  Secrecy was 
essential to the effective operation of power.1 
 Hankey’s thoughts ran along the same lines, and a trip back to London sealed it.  
‘They are a sane sound nation over there – the sheet anchor of the world,’ he wrote in his 
diary on April 18.  ‘The British Empire is worth a thousand Leagues of Nations.’2  
Concluding that he ‘could do more for the peace of the world there than in Geneva,’ 
Hankey wrote to Cecil that same day to turn the post down.  American collaboration was 
looking increasingly unlikely anyway, and with plans for the institution moving ‘steadily 
in a direction contrary to my conception,’ he felt he was well out of it.3 
                                                
1 Churchill Archives Center (CAC), HNKY 4/11, Esher to Hankey, 19 Feb. 1919.  This episode is covered, and 
much of the correspondence reprinted, in Stephen Roskill, Hankey:  Man of Secrets, vol. 2, 1919-31 (London: 
Collins, 1972), 64-80 passim. 
2 HNKY 1/5, Diary, 18 Apr. 1919. 




 Why begin with this episode?  First, because it is illuminating.  It brings 
something out – a presumed tension between the League and the Empire – that troubled 
politics between the wars and will absorb us in these talks.  For what Esher suggested, 
and what Hankey came to believe, was that the League and the empire were not just 
alternative possible career paths for the ambitious and talented, but alternative and indeed 
competing ways of ordering the world.  They were different, and operated in different 
and even antagonistic ways.  At points, then, not only individuals but states might have to 
choose – choose, let’s say, between imperial and international loyalties, choose whether 
imperial interests must bend to international norms.  I’ll return to this point in few 
minutes. 
But I begin with this episode for a second reason too: because it was 
consequential.  For Hankey, having turned down the League, turned against it; and once 
he was out of the picture, it could develop on quite un-Hankey-like lines.  True, the man 
chosen instead as Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, a forty-three year old career 
foreign office official and Arthur Balfour’s wartime private secretary, seemed no more of 
a radical.  A gangly, droopy-eyed Scottish aristocrat, he was, to one catty observer, the 
only man he’d ever met who looked entirely natural in plus-fours.  In public Drummond 
was self-effacing to a fault, much more the secretary than the general (as the joke went).  
Yet his diffident mien was deceptive, for he proved hard-working, meticulous, good at 
selecting staff, and quietly ruthless about disciplining them.  Subject to intense political 
lobbying, his aloofness and caution (which was not servility) served him well.  He left his 
office with a higher reputation than when he assumed it. 
 Moreover, that summer, Drummond had his own Wilsonian moment.  Before he 
had turned the Secretary-Generalship down, Hankey had mapped out a plan for the 
Secretariat.  He imagined it as a coordinating apparatus for the great powers.  There 
would be separate bureaus for French, British, American, Italian and Japanese 
undersecretaries; each would bring their own national staff.4  But Drummond, sitting in 
rooms near Whitehall, broke with that statist vision.  Rather than structure the Secretariat 
by nation, Drummond organized it by function, with sections to deal with political 
questions, economics, legal issues, social questions, mandates, minorities, information, 
and so forth.  Second, and even more boldly, instead of relying on seconded civil 
servants, Drummond decided to create a genuinely international officialdom, a body of 
men and women owing loyalty to the League alone.  Not that that Secretariat was 
‘neutral’ exactly, for Drummond brought in a group of tried allied officials to provide its 
spine, and in later years revisionist states would insert political appointees and even spies 
within its ranks.  Yet, the knowledge that they were serving the League and not their state 
                                                
4 HNKY 8/13, [Sir Maurice Hankey], ‘the League of Nations:  Sketch Plan of Organisation,’ printed 31 Mar. 
1919. 
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attracted men of a new type – idealistic, internationalist, and overwhelmingly 
progressive.  Legions of well-educated Englishwomen with wartime experience in 
Whitehall begged Drummond for jobs too, and if he shunted most off into the clerical 
services, by doing so he secured the secretariat an enviable reputation for accuracy and 
professionalism.  As anyone who has used League publications knows, it is almost 
impossible to find so much as a missing comma in the millions of pages that rolled off its 
presses. 
At the end of October 1920, that incipient bureaucracy, complete with baggage 
and children, climbed aboard a special hired train at Victoria Station and set off for 
Geneva.  Relocation to a placid Swiss town reinforced the Secretariat’s sense of 
distinction and election.  A League school and a League radio station were founded; 
affairs and marriages bloomed; international humanitarian lobbies and technical 
organizations moved their offices to Geneva; a Geneva press corps mushroomed.  Each 
fall, delegations from some fifty member states took over the grand lakefront hotels for 
the extravaganza of the Assembly, turning Geneva, for three weeks, into the world capital 
of diplomacy and style.  Even the Conservative Leo Amery, who loathed the League, 
remembered this ‘esprit de Genève’ fondly, recalling the Spanish delegate exclaiming, 
when a champagne cork went off with a loud pop at one festive lunch, ‘Voila l’artillerie 
de la Société des Nations!’5  That was true:  the League’s power lay, not in arms, but in 
the simple fact that it brought the statesmen of the world, well-oiled by drink, into a 
public arena where they had to perform civility, whatever their private or even political 
inclinations. 
Of course League politics had a hard edge as well.  The League Council, 
dominated politically if not numerically by the great powers, met four times a year and 
decided which issues would be addressed – and, more particularly, not addressed. The 
scramble to secure Council seats among those states that weren’t great powers, but 
sometimes thought they were, was brutal.  Only the Scandinavians amicably rotated 
seats; other states refused to accept that they could be represented by another – to distant 
eyes almost interchangeable – country.  Spain and Brazil both threatened to leave the 
League if they weren’t given permanent seats when Germany got one on entry in 1926 
(and Brazil did so); hyper-sensitive Poland retained a seat under various ruses for the 
whole of the League’s life.  Drummond, who thought the Council unquestionably the 
nerve center of the whole project, wearied himself with these negotiations, the Council 
growing larger and perhaps losing power as it grew.6   But in truth the Secretariat was 
Drummond’s real achievement, for endemic problems with spying notwithstanding, by 
the early twenties he had created something entirely new:  a truly international 
bureaucracy, functionally structured, mostly loyal to an international charter, and with an 
                                                
5 Leo Amery, My Political Life, vol. 2, War and Peace, 1914-29 (London:  Hutchinson, 1953), p. 332. 
6  See BL, Add Ms. 51110 and 51112 for Drummond’s correspondence with Cecil about various states’ requests 
for seats and Secretariat positions. 
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efficient multinational and multilingual staff capable of managing a complex program.  
This is the structure of the United Nations secretariat today. 
Hankey, in London, watched the rise of what he called ‘Drummond’s League’ – 
and, still more, of Drummond’s salary – with resentment.  The League was to be a tool 
for great-power negotiation, but with the US and the Soviets outside, the Germans 
excluded at French insistence, and people Hankey considered pacifists and ‘cranks’ 
holding the reins, he thought it could hardly play that role.  ‘The real League of Nations 
will be the present Council of Three (or Four) and I shall always be its secretary,’ he had 
written to his wife right before the Treaty of Versailles was signed; he now tried to 
combat what he saw as ‘the dangerous tendency of the League secretariat to arrogate to 
itself too much power.’7  Lloyd George was an ally:  by late 1920 he too thought the 
League was ‘more likely to become a centre of intrigue than a real benefit to the peace of 
the world.’8  The two floated schemes to replace it with a new great-power-centered 
organization and sought to bypass it through the ‘diplomacy by conference’ of those 
years – the Washington Conference, the Genoa Conference, and so forth. 
Yet the League could not be sidelined.  Partly this was because it had the only 
competent international staff around, so much so that Drummond, in 1922, was belatedly 
asked to dispatch his teams of translators and typists and précis-writers to Genoa to 
manage the conference that had tried to exclude them.  Partly it was sustained by the 
hopes of so many people – by the millions who joined the organizations founded to 
support it, who signed petitions or protested when their governments violated its norms, 
who studied the Covenant text or went to lectures about its work, who reverently toured 
its headquarters in Geneva. 
But the League also survived because it addressed – indeed, was forced by its 
member states to address – issues no government would or could take on alone.  As I will 
be talking about this institution quite a lot over the next six weeks, let me remind you of 
what the League did.  The Swiss League official William Rappard put it best in 1925, 
when he explained that there were really three separate Leagues of Nations.9  The first 
was what he called the League to outlaw war.  This was the League whose provisions 
absorbed governments and international lawyers, as they sought to give teeth to the 
Covenant, that brought statesmen and officials together to discuss disarmament, and that 
intervened with more or less success in territorial conflicts – between Sweden and 
Finland, Greece and Bulgaria, Columbia and Peru, and a host of others – before 
succumbing under the triple blows of the Manchuria Crisis, the Second Disarmament 
Conference, and the Italo-Ethiopian war.  It is this League on which such hopes were 
pinned, that E.H. Carr pilloried, and that people today still have in mind when they say 
that the League ‘failed.’ 
                                                
7 Quoted Roskill, v. 2, p. 88, and HNKY, 1/5, diary entry Oct. 21, 1922. 
8 HNKY 1/5, Diary, Dec. 29, 1920. 
9 William E. Rappard, International Relations as viewed from Geneva (1925; rpt. New Haven:  Yale University 
Press, 1975). 
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But there was a second League, the one that worked to promote international 
cooperation.  This League set standards for air traffic, radio transmission and child 
welfare, organized the Austrian bailout and standardized economic data, combated sexual 
and drug trafficking, dealt with Russian refugees and negotiated the Greece-Turkish 
population exchange, pioneered development missions to China and Liberia, set up 
research stations to track epidemic diseases, and ran institutes and conferences to 
promote economic and intellectual cooperation.  This League never ‘declined’ and only 
expanded, steadily promoting the authority and elevating the role of those new 
international actors: the ‘expert,’ and what we would today call the NGO.  The political 
scientist David Mitrany had this League in mind when he crafted his ‘functionalist’ 
theory of how cooperation on mundane activities might create networks that would 
promote peace.  It is this League that laid the foundation for the institutions of global 
governance we have today, and that is now the focus of so much historical interest. 
And, finally, there was a third League, which Rappard titled inelegantly, ‘the 
League to execute the Peace Treaties.’  That League ran plebiscites in or attempted to 
adjudicate certain disputed areas (Memel, Silesia, Vilna, Mosul, Alexandretta) and 
administered others (Danzig, the Saarland).   It also ran two enormously consequential 
regimes set up to stabilize and legitimate the territorial decisions reached in Paris and 
Lausanne.  One of these was the minorities regime, a system through which the League 
Council, guided by Secretariat officials, sought to hold a dozen new or reconstituted East 
European or Balkan states to promises of minority rights they had made as the price of 
sovereignty.  The second was the mandates regime, that system of rudimentary 
international oversight grudgingly accepted by the allied powers as the price of retaining 
Ottoman provinces and German colonies in Africa and the Pacific seized in the war.  That 
League, like the others, changed over time, especially in response to Germany’s entry and 
then exit.  It became, in the eyes of some of its members, the League to overcome the 
peace treaties, with not only Germany but also other states and internationalists trying to 
use those regimes to change the territorial settlement.  By the mid-thirties the minorities 
regime had crumbled under that revisionist onslaught but the mandates system continued, 
reemerging in 1945 as the United Nations Trusteeship System. 
 
II 
I’m interested primarily in this third League, and especially in its mandates 
system, because I want to understand what the project of internationalism meant for the 
workings and stability not only of those specific territories but also of the interwar 
imperial settlement more broadly.  Britain had much to do with setting the rules for that 
system, for it fell to Lloyd George to mediate between Wilson’s determined anti-
annexationism and the allies’ desire to hang on to their conquests.  We know quite a lot 
about how and why British statesmen agreed to accept that principle of anti-annexation, 
and to cede to the League the role of overseeing imperial powers’ administration of 
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transferred territories:  this has been much studied.  And yet, for all that, we know much 
less about how regimes nominally established in Paris actually worked, and still less 
about how they came reciprocally to affect British policy.  I think that is because we’ve 
examined the creation of the League and its regimes largely from the standpoint of 
national politicians and statesmen, following the record found in national archives, 
without paying enough attention to the aims, actions, and rich archival records of the 
League itself.  I don’t intend so much to reverse that optic – say, to write the history of 
British politics from Geneva – as to make the case for an approach that begins from the 
complex dynamic between the national and the international.  For, if British statesmen 
disproportionately shaped the character of the League, which is something many 
historians have noticed, the institutions, practices and sheer noise in Geneva also shaped 
and constrained Britain’s opportunities and choices – especially in the realm of imperial 
politics. 
The statesmen who outlined the mandates regime – Smuts, Lloyd George, and 
especially the former South African High Commissioner and now Colonial Secretary 
Alfred Milner – did not imagine this outcome.  They had their doubts about the League – 
Milner especially had doubts – but so long as they had the Americans with them, they 
were willing to give it a try.  Only the Chamberlainite imperialist Leo Amery, now 
Milner’s undersecretary at the Colonial Office, thought the very idea of an institution in 
which ‘every state is represented as an equal because it is a state and irrespective of its 
size or civilization’ was all wrong.  The only functioning ‘League,’ he thought – and in 
this respect his ideas prefigure those of Carl Schmitt – would be one composed of 
roughly equal ‘blocs,’ each with a major power exercising dominance – whether through 
empire or through diktats such as the Monroe Doctrine – within their sphere.  Since 
Germany would always be such a power, Amery thus favored allowing her to rebuild 
hegemony over a Mitteleuropa from the Rhine to the Volga, provided Germany was first 
‘thoroughly beaten’ and then kept away from Britain’s imperial sphere.10  Through the 
Peace Conference Amery pleaded with his chief to bind German East Africa into a new 
British East African federation, to resist Belgian claims to retain Rwanda and Burundi, 
even to try to hang on to Damascus, and to limit the League’s authority over transferred 
territory as much as possible.11 
What is interesting, though, is how little headway Amery made.  Not even Milner 
really listened.  British statesmen had often made flexible and pragmatic arrangements 
over sovereignty, conceding nominal independence to protectorates or princely states so 
long as British hegemony was secured.  They expected the new enthusiasm to work in 
their favor – even Curzon expected that.  For they believed that British rule was not only 
effective but desired:  as one Foreign Office official put it, the main problem the British 
would face, would be that ‘we cannot hope to take into the British sphere all the peoples 
                                                
10 Leo Amery, letter to Reading, n.d. [probably 1918], quoted in My Political Life, vol. 2, p. 162. 
11 This correspondence is in CAC, AMEL 1/3/42. 
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in the world who would doubtless like to enter it.’12  But mostly they were willing to 
gamble on the League because it was an Anglo-American project:  the vehicle through 
which the two states would set the terms on which peoples would become nations, and 
nations would interact.  The League could work, Milner told Lloyd George, only if it 
became the vehicle through which to ‘extend the pax Britannica into a pax mundi.’ 13  
They didn’t need to press Britain’s own imperial claims, in other words, because ‘the 
British Commonwealth of Nations’ was, as Smuts put it, the embryo for the League of 
Nations anyway. 
But what would that new dispensation look like?  Smuts, of course, thought of it 
in racial terms.  Peoples left adrift by the dissolution of the great European land empires 
would become nations, associating through the League, but most non-white peoples 
would not.  Those in the ex-Ottoman Middle East would be governed in trust and taught 
the ways of civilization, but Germany’s African and Pacific territories, being ‘inhabited 
by barbarians,’ would simply be annexed.14  Wilson, of course, did not agree:  the 
proscription on annexation and League supervision had to apply to those territories as 
well.  Not, though, because the Americans had any more faith in the capacity those of 
non-whites.  As Wilson’s colonial advisor George Louis Beer, the man slated to run the 
mandates regime, put it:  ‘The Negro race has hitherto shown no capacity for progressive 
development except under the tutelage of other peoples’; the task was thus to provide 
such tutelage.15  And who could better provide that than the British?  Beer took it as 
axiomatic that ‘native rights were most carefully and effectively protected’ in the British 
colonies, and approved Britain’s commitment to free trade as well.16  The mandates 
regime could be used to generalize the empire’s excellent practices. 
The promise that ‘internationalization’ would extend and not constrain British 
norms and British power forced the reluctant dominions premiers in January 1919 to 
allow their conquests in the Pacific and South West Africa to come under the mandates 
regime.  As Robert Cecil put it during those acrimonious meetings, Britain had nothing to 
fear from League oversight because the standards to be imposed were those prevailing in 
British colonies anyway:  the system might, however, force reform on ‘the badly 
governed colonies of France and Portugal.’  The French, obviously, did not think their 
colonies badly governed; small wonder they considered the system a Trojan horse, one 
aimed at forcing other imperial powers to live by British rules.  The proscription on 
military recruiting was especially resented, since the French recruited their troops in West 
Africa, whereas Britain, with India as their military reserve, could piously abstain. 
                                                
12 NA, FO 608/215/955, Comment by Spicer, 29 Jan. 1919. 
13  Bodleian, MSS Milner dep. 46, ‘Extract from a letter written by Lord Milner of August 14th, 1919.’ 
14 Jan Christian Smuts, The League of Nations:  A Practical Suggestion (1918). 
15 Beer, George Louis, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, (London:  Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968), 
179. 
16  Beer, African Questions, 182. 
 12 
The problem was, if the League system was to generalize Anglo-American 
preferences, its implementation would depend on Anglo-American power.  The mandates 
regime was agreed to in January 1919, early in the peace conference, when Wilson’s 
power was greatest:  as it declined, the future of imperial oversight became much less 
certain.  Only the German territories were actually allocated during the conference, and 
while texts outlining common administrative rules were supposed to have been included 
in the Treaty, disagreement made that impossible.  The French objected to the ban on 
military recruiting and the Belgians to prohibitions on forced labor – and both understood 
that the tide was finally turning in their favor.  By the end of the summer, the French 
were boycotting meetings with Milner and refused to discuss the Middle East settlement 
at all.  ‘The French are determined just to be squatters,’ Milner reported to Foreign 
Secretary A.J. Balfour in August, and ‘like other squatters they will, by mere lapse of 
time, become owners.’17  Lord Robert Cecil had appealed to Milner to set an example by 
putting Egypt under mandate, but Milner was at the end of his patience.  American 
support had evaporated, and, he wrote, ‘we really cannot go on playing at this game of 
mandates all by ourselves.’  ‘At present, it is not too much to say that nothing has been 
done to make [the system] a reality except what we have done (I might almost say what I 
have done), and that we have not succeeded in imposing its restrictions upon anybody but 
ourselves.’  He was not willing to put any British territory under mandate, he told Cecil 
shortly, until he felt much more certain that the system would survive.18  In October, 
Milner gave up and sailed for Egypt, leaving the mandates system nothing more than an 
article in a treaty that, it was becoming clear, no-one much liked. 
Let me be clear:  by the end of 1919 the mandates project as an official Anglo-
American endeavor, was over.  And yet – and this is the paradox – the system of League 
oversight emerged anyway.  Not, certainly, because of the force of anti-colonial 
sentiment, for by 1920 the crackdown on colonial nationalism was in full swing, and 
colonized peoples weren’t clamoring for ‘tutelage’ anyway.  Instead, the mandates 
system survived because of what I have called today the ‘turn to Geneva’ – a turn 
engineered by British internationalists and humanitarians over the objections of men like 
Esher and Amery and Hankey, but with the cautious toleration of Balfour and of the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices.  Believing in the power of public opinion, and eager to 
force colonial administration along what they considered progressive lines, British 
supporters of the League allied with Drummond’s officials to make international 
oversight a reality.  But the regime they created was not what Smuts or Milner had 
imagined.  It was not a structure for imperial collaboration but rather a polyvalent force-
field of talk, one that amplified the voices of non-imperial states and even of colonized 
peoples.  And while Britain was initially able to dominate that discursive arena, ‘talk’ 
would in time undermine the legitimacy and standing of the imperial order itself. 
                                                
17 NA, FO 608/152/17580, Milner to Balfour, 8 Aug. 1919. 
18 LNA, R13, 1/1970/1970, Milner to Cecil, 2 Nov. 1919. 
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These lectures will elaborate these points.  I shall describe the construction of that 
oversight regime during the rest of my time today.  I shall turn next week to how the 
Geneva apparatus and various colonial scandals were exploited by Sir Frederick Lugard 
to promote his colonial ideals and to burnish Britain’s reputation as the model colonial 
power.  Yet that British advantage inevitably came under pressure when the force-field of 
Geneva shifted and Germany entered the League and, with Italy, tried to use its position 
to challenge the imperial settlement reached at Versailles.  Henceforth, just as Hankey 
had feared and Amery had predicted, Britain would increasingly find itself caught 
between imperial and international ideals, League and empire loyalties.  Lectures three 
through six will thus examine four such dilemmas.  The third lecture will treat how the 
apparatus of League oversight was used during the League’s ‘German period’ to set 
limits on imperial sovereignty, a battle fought out over Leo Amery’s ambitious plans for 
imperial federation in East Africa.  Yet, as the world economy faltered and once 
Germany left the League, revisionist powers turned their back on that goal of limiting 
imperial sovereignty, instead demanding sovereign territories of their own.  The fourth 
and fifth lectures track Britain’s incoherent response to these demands, examining how, 
first, the failed attempt to grant Italy concessions in Ethiopia without conquest, and 
second the failed effort to lure Germany into a new project of colonial cooperation, 
eroded the authority of the League, the empire, and ‘white civilization’ alike.  But it was 
the experience governing Palestine in the late thirties, which I’ll discuss in the last 
lecture, that ultimately convinced British statesmen that the regime they had created had 
turned against them:  international norms and British interests could no longer be 
reconciled.  This lesson – that the League, contra Smuts, was not the ‘Anglosphere’ writ 
large, that the imperial and the international were not one and the same – is, I think, one 
British historians have also been slow to learn.  I’ll thus close my last lecture with a few 
words about what the story of Britain’s experience in Geneva might tell us about the 
practice of international history today. 
 
III 
So let’s return to that moment in 1919 when Milner gave up on the mandates 
system and headed for Egypt.  Worse was to follow.  In Spring 1920, the United States 
Senate would finally reject the Treaty of Versailles.  As the US retreated, Britain, hitherto 
the League’s main support, turned sharply pragmatic, for the French alliance now became 
essential.  In a series of acrimonious private meetings in late 1919 and early 1920, the 
two squabbling imperial powers came to terms.  At San Remo in April 1920, the 
Supreme Council finally allocated the Middle East mandates, with France tolerating 
Britain’s Zionist pledge in Palestine and agreeing to British control in Iraq, and Britain 
confirming its disengagement from Syria.  The swift creation of ‘facts on the ground’ 
followed.  That summer, France ousted Faysal’s fragile Syrian state, while Britain’s 
Indian army put down a fierce rising in Iraq. 
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Yet, even amidst this violence, Wilsonian ideas in their British-inflected form 
began reasserting themselves.  Through 1920, the Lloyd George government was 
buffeted by a wave of criticism for its seeming abandonment of the League of Nations.  
True, it paid homage to its promise to Sharif Husayn, and saved itself a great deal of 
money, by deciding, to France’s outrage, to offer Faysal the throne of Iraq.  But the 
apparatus laid out in Article 22 still hadn’t been constructed.  The oversight regime 
intended to absolve the allies of the sin of annexation was nowhere to be seen.  And no 
national government would build it. 
But a non-governmental alliance might.  For new ties were forming, ones binding 
London to Geneva not Washington, and composed of international officials and activists, 
not national premiers.  Let me pick out four figures.  The first is John Harris, the 
indefatigable Organizing Secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society, age 45 in 1919.  Harris 
had come to his humanitarian convictions and learned his political skills in the campaign 
against Leopold’s horrific regime in the Congo, where he and his wife Alice had served 
as missionaries.  Harris had been persuaded during the war that Germany’s colonies 
could not be returned, not because he thought German conduct any more egregious than 
Belgian or French, but rather because he feared that the Germans would retaliate against 
those Africans who had risen when the allied armies had invaded.19  From 1917, the Anti-
Slavery Society urged that those territories be placed under international supervision, 
with prohibitions on slavery, forced labor, military recruitment and the liquor traffic.20  
1919 saw Harris pushing that agenda at the Peace conference – trying his best, one civil 
servant sourly remarked, to have the Anti-Slavery Society recognized as a great power.21  
The Society’s ties to African churchmen and traders also turned Harris into the conduit 
for African grievances coming in thick and fast.  ‘We were expecting the League of 
Nations will send delegates out to ascertain our wishes but they have not done so,’ the 
Duala leader Joseph Bell wrote from Cameroon in October 1919; Togolese traders too 
reported threats of deportation for failing to support French rule.22  League oversight, 
Harris thought, should be established as quickly as possible. 
Harris’s most loyal ally and my second figure was the Conservative MP William 
Ormsby Gore, age only 34 in 1919.  Ormsby-Gore had served with the Arab Bureau in 
1916 and 1917 and the experience had been transformative.  ‘We rule here by fear & not 
by love or gratitude or loyalty,’ he wrote to his mother from Cairo, but his work building 
the alliance with Husayn convinced him that a new approach was possible.23  The secret 
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, through which the British and French marked out their 
spheres of influence, profoundly shocked him.  ‘We make professions of defending and 
                                                
19  RH, Brit. Emp. S22, G423, Harris to Lowes Dickinson, 27 June 1917. 
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terms,’ G128. 
21  For Harris’s work at the peace conference, see esp. Brit Emp. S22, G401. 
22 RH, G401, Bell to Anti-Slavery Society, 30 Aug. 1919. 
23 National Library of Wales, Brogyntyn manuscripts, PEC 10/1/11, Ormsby-Gore to his mother, 2 Feb. 1918. 
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helping small & oppressed nations,’ he protested to one of his superiors.  If then ‘we 
parcel out between our allies and ourselves vast tracts of countries which do not want 
us,…we shall have to admit that the Ramsay Macdonalds, Trevelyans & Shaws at home, 
and our doubting Indian critics in India, knew us better than we knew ourselves.’  Britain 
should win friends by embracing self-determination, and should do so, he thought warm-
heartedly, for both Arabs and Jews.24  Recalled back to London as Milner’s 
Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1917, he became part of the circle that crafted the 
Balfour declaration and in spring 1918 was sent with Chaim Weizmann as liaison officer 
to the Zionist Commission to Palestine.  1919 found Ormsby-Gore, of course, in Paris, on 
the fringes of the British delegation.  Back in London in 1920, he too saw the West 
African protests through his ties to Liverpool merchants.  As chairman of the ‘Mandates 
Committee’ of Cecil’s exploding new League of Nations Union, he teamed up with J.H. 
Harris to press the government to get the mandates system going. 
In the Secretariat, there were allies.  Drummond cared little about the principle of 
international trusteeship, but he was concerned about the League’s credibility should 
Article 22 become a dead letter.  In October 1919, when the American Beer refused to 
return to London to restart Milner’s abandoned negotiations, and then suddenly died, 
Drummond turned for help to a third figure – a bright young official (and later Labour 
MP and Nobel Peace Prize laureate), named Philip Baker (later Noel-Baker).  Baker, just 
thirty in 1919, a Cambridge graduate and an Olympic runner, had been decorated for 
valor while serving with the Friends ambulance brigade in the war.  Brought into the 
Foreign Office, he had been at Lord Robert Cecil’s side during the peace conference and 
retained a filial devotion to the older man.  Baker was far to the left of Drummond (a 
‘wild enthusiast’ according to Hankey25), but Drummond knew he could be trusted to 
respect the enabling fiction of British government:  that politicians take decisions and 
officials merely provide technical aid.  None of the key documents about the mandates 
regime issued by the League in the early twenties carry Baker’s name.  In the archives, 
his initials are on every draft. 
But Baker was only a stop-gap, since Drummond (unlike Milner) thought a Briton 
could hardly help oversee British rule.  In late 1920 Drummond thus appointed our fourth 
co-conspirator, William Rappard, a liberal and perfectly trilingual young Swiss-American 
professor, as Director of the Mandates Section.  Rappard protested that he knew nothing 
at all about ‘backward peoples,’ but with Baker to help him, he learned fast.  France and 
Britain were using the excuse of American obstruction to avoid finalizing the mandates 
texts, and were creating regimes in Syria and Palestine that were directly opposed to the 
spirit of Article 22.  Deluged with protests from Arab nationalists, it didn’t take Rappard 
long to realize that British internationalists that were the best – almost the only – allies he 
had. 
                                                
24 Ibid., PEC 11/1, Ormsby-Gore, Note, n.d. 
25  HNKY, 1/5, Diary entry for Oct. 17, 1920. 
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Not Smuts, not Lloyd George, not Milner, but these four men, rescued the project 
of international oversight.  By cleverly exploiting their political contacts, the British 
press, and the opportunities for trouble making offered by open international meetings in 
Geneva, Baker, Rappard, Harris and Ormsby-Gore slowly brought the oversight 
apparatus into being.  Note the following stages.  First, when it became clear that France 
would never come to terms in private or bilateral talks, in the spring of 1920 Baker 
persuaded Drummond to use the League Council to force France and Britain to speak 
with small states in the room.  An uncharacteristically sharp directive from Drummond 
(drafted by Baker) thus instructed the Council to set up the oversight regime;26 two 
months later a set of rules, also drafted by Baker, were approved.27  True, the American 
withdrawal dictated many concessions.  The responsibility for drafting the mandate texts 
was ceded to the allied powers, and the League Council, not the more progressive 
Assembly, was charged with oversight.  Behind the scenes, though, Baker mobilized 
Cecil to challenge the Council’s exclusive authority at the first League Assembly that 
November, a public fracas that – to the delight of the packed Assembly – pitted Lord 
Robert Cecil (for the Assembly) against his cousin A.J. Balfour (for the Council).  
Balfour, unsurprisingly, won, but a precedent had been set.  The Assembly would insist 
on publicly discussing the work of League oversight each year – a decision that allowed 
delegates – including the few nonwhite delegates – to criticize the imperial powers. 
Our group of four also colluded to force publication of the mandate texts, for with 
the Americans out of the picture, every mandatory power was dragging their feet.  The 
days were long past when Cecil could suggest that the first clause of the Middle East 
mandates read that the country was constituted as an independent state under guarantee of 
the League of Nations.  By 1920, France had decided to create a morass of statelets in 
Syria, and Britain to administer its strips of Togo and Cameroon from neighboring 
colonies, while Belgium had sneaked changes into its Rwanda and Burundi mandate to 
allow their incorporation into Congo.  Such moves compromised any future 
independence, but Drummond would not intervene.  The Council had stated that the 
mandatory powers could set the terms, and he forbade Rappard from sharing the drafts of 
the mandate texts outside the Secretariat at all. 28  But Rappard could ask Harris’s advice 
about what provisions those texts should contain (and did so),29 and he could share his 
worries about the imperial powers’ intentions.  ‘Never more than at the present moment,’ 
                                                
26  LNA, R1, 1/4862/161, The Responsibility of the League of Nations arising out of Article XXII of the 
Covenant:  Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Council Doc. 48; the jacket indicates the author as Baker, date 
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17 Sept. 1920, and P.J. Baker, ‘Mandates Commission:  Basis of Discussion,’ 23 Oct. 1920. 
28  LNA, S1608 No. 1 (1920-1939), Rappard, ‘Relations between the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the 
Permanent Mandates Commission,’ 3 Mar. 1921, and LNA, R7, 1/11502/248, Ormsby-Gore to Rappard, 8 Mar. 
1921, and Drummond to Rappard, 14 Mar. 1921. 
29  For this correspondence, RH, Brit Emp. S22, G401, Rappard to Harris, 2 Jan. 1921, and Harris to Rappard, 6 
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he wrote Ormsby-Gore in March 1921, ‘have I felt that the future of the mandatory 
system and of the League of Nations as a whole rests primarily on the shoulders of their 
friends in Great Britain.’30  Harris and Ormsby-Gore took the hint, swiftly organizing a 
public conference which called on the British Government to publish the mandate texts.31  
A circular pattern emerged, in which Secretariat officials shared confidential information 
with British League supporters, who then mobilized ‘public opinion’ to put pressure on 
their government. 
And, finally, Baker and Rappard used their positions in the Secretariat to shape 
and alter the Permanent Mandates Commission, the body that was to advise the Council 
on how the imperial powers were doing.  The American Beer had envisaged a group of 
government representatives, just as Hankey had done for the Secretariat.  But Baker, 
drafting its constitution in November 1920, broke – as Drummond had before him – with 
that statist model.  The Commission’s nine members were to be appointed as ‘experts’ 
and were barred from holding government office; a majority must hail from states 
without mandates; and their proceedings would be published. 32  Their establishment, 
Rappard told the first meeting, marked ‘the beginning of an epoch in colonial history,’33 
and he colluded with Harris to put controversial questions – land rights, petitioning – 
squarely on the agenda.  It was thanks to Rappard, the Italian chairman quipped, that they 
‘had enjoyed such a terrible visit in the beautiful town of Geneva, where his tireless 
activity had not given them a single day’s respite, but had supplied them every day with a 
newly prepared task.’34 
Rappard’s efforts paid off, for the Commission asserted its independence from the 
start.  This was not because it was a haven for humanitarians or anti-colonialists:  to the 
contrary, the Council appointed mostly former colonial officials or seasoned diplomats.  
Yet, precisely for that reason, the Commission proved hard to contain.  Colonial 
governors were accustomed to give orders, not to take them, and their mutual jealousy 
made them voluble critics of other administrations.  Members from non-mandatory states 
– who included one woman – were eager to show they took the work seriously.  With a 
fine disregard for the mandatory powers’ sensitivities, at that first meeting the 
Commission chose a president and vice-president from states without mandates, closed a 
textual loophole that would have allowed forced labor for private enterprises, came up 
with a comprehensive list of questions they thought the mandatory powers should 
answer, and gave the Australian representative a distinctly hard time over his country’s 
administration of Nauru. 
The British member setting that critical tone, quite probably to his own surprise, 
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was none other Ormsby-Gore.  He had not been the Colonial Office’s choice.  They had 
wanted the Council to appoint Sir Frederick Lugard, the renowned former governor of 
Nigeria, now retired but itching for the job.  By the time the appointment came up, 
however, Churchill was Colonial Secretary, and needed to shore up support among those 
disgruntled young Conservatives on the back-benches, of whom Ormsby-Gore was one.  
It seems to have escaped Churchill’s notice that ‘Billy Gore’, as he was known, hardly 
shared his hardline imperial ideals.   ‘You will probably think my ideas…revolutionary,’ 
Ormsby-Gore had told Rappard eight months earlier, but he thought each imperial power 
‘merely the temporary guardian or trustee exercising such trusteeship on behalf of the 
League, with a view to the development of each mandatory area into an independent 
state’ – a future he insisted was perfectly realizable in Africa as well.35 
Ormsby-Gore, together with Rappard, also crafted the one mechanism that made 
the League accessible to those peoples under mandate:  the petition process.  No right of 
petition was foreseen in the Covenant; indeed, the ministers Milner consulted explicitly 
turned the idea down.  If inhabitants had the right to appeal against governments, the 
French colonial minister objected, ‘all administration would be impossible.’36  Having 
read the protests arriving from Africa and the Middle East, however, Baker, Harris, 
Ormsby-Gore and Rappard were all determined they be heard.37  Any resident of a 
British colony had a right to appeal to the Privy Council, Ormsby-Gore said; surely, then, 
an inhabitant of the mandated territory had the right to appeal to the League!38  Ormsby-
Gore then persuaded officials in the Colonial Office to draft a process they could tolerate 
and staged a discussion in the Second League Assembly to force the French to agree to it.  
True, that process was highly restrictive:  petitions from a territory’s inhabitants could not 
be anonymous, could not call the mandate itself into question, and had to be sent through 
the mandatory administration itself – a provision that, as the Haitian representative 
Dantès Bellegarde acerbically noted, meant that petitioners had to ‘communicate their 
grievances to the very persons of whom they complain.’39  Yet petitions could also be 
sent directly from persons outside the territory, a provision that turned Harris into a 
persistent and effective petitioner. 
The petition process was, quite possibly, the single most important innovation of 
the mandates regime.  This is not because it offered a medium for redress; it didn’t.  
Rather, it is because it expanded the sphere of international politics.  Petitioning taught 
the skills of organizing, networking and claim-making; it brought the voices of the 
system’s subjects, however distorted, into the rooms in which their fates were decided.  
Duala elites in Cameroon, disaffected traders in Togo, Kurds and Assyrians in Iraq, South 
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West Africa’s Rehoboth Basters, all manner of political factions in Syria and Palestine, 
and virtually the entire population of Western Samoa, as well as various Western 
humanitarian, political and revisionist lobbies, brought their grievances to Geneva.  No 
innovation did more to open up imperial rule to scrutiny. 
In 1922, Ormsby-Gore was appointed a junior minister in Bonar Law’s 
Conservative Government and resigned from the Commission.  Philip Baker headed back 
to London that year too, disappointed not to have been given charge of the disarmament 
section.  But by the time they left the scene, the mandates system had become just that – a 
system.  All but the Middle East mandates had been approved (and those were finally in 
process), the mandatory powers were submitting annual reports, the Mandates 
Commission was meeting.  The League published all reports and minutes, distributing 
them to governments, libraries and journalists around the world.  A petition process was 
in place, and the Commission’s discussions of those appeals were published as well.  The 
Council and the Assembly were watching the Commission’s work, and newspapers 
around the world were publicizing it. 
Remember what Esher told Hankey when he advised him not to take on the 
Secretary-Generalship?  He said that the Secretary-General’s powers would be only 
propagandistic; he might ‘build a huge megaphone,’ through which to broadcast the 
League’s work.40  But what was built at Geneva was not so much a megaphone as what 
one might call a force field, with different nodes and centers of power, shifting alliances, 
overlapping jurisdictions, and a cacophony of talk.  The Secretary-General presided over 
that cacophony but did not control it.  No-one did:  that is the whole point. 
The project of overseeing empire would be carried out within this force-field and 
by the institutions of the League.  This is certainly not what Smuts or Lloyd George or 
Milner had imagined.  They had in mind a vehicle for inter-imperial collaboration, one 
that would be in the hands of government officials, not activists or international officials 
or even retired governors, one that would generalize British norms.  But those ostensible 
founders had lost interest after the Americans pulled out, and may never have even 
noticed the system’s emerging shape.  Smuts, its ostensible founder, never attended either 
a Council or an Assembly session.  Lloyd George fell from power in 1922.  Milner died 
in 1925.  Of the British giants of the peace conference, only Balfour and Cecil played 
major roles in Geneva. 
So the mandates system emerged, as so many League institutions did, not 
according to the founders’ dictates, but out of a far messier process of argument, 
campaigning and negotiation one level down.   It was much less statist and much more 
open to lobbying and pressure from below than anticipated.  It was more dependent on 
the Secretariat than expected, and that Secretariat was more independent than expected as 
well.  In telling the story of that system’s construction, I’ve focused on six British figures 
– the sagacious and self-effacing Drummond, the skeptics Hankey and Amery, and the 
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triumvirate of Baker, Harris and Ormsby-Gore.  I did this not only because they were the 
main architects; I also did it because, unlike our retreating founders, these six will be with 
us through the whole of these lectures.  Two remained at the head of international and 
national bureaucracies:  Drummond at the League Secretariat until 1933, Hankey at the 
Cabinet Secretariat until 1938.  Two helped run the most important lobbying groups:  
Baker helping Cecil set the course of the League of Nations Union; Harris running the 
Anti-Slavery Society until he dropped dead in 1940.  And two were in government.  
Amery and Ormsby-Gore would move through the Colonial Office, in harness and in 
tension, for much of the interwar period. 
These men disagreed in the early twenties about the relationship between 
internationalism and empire, and the League’s oversight of the imperial settlement was 
shaped by that disagreement.  They would continue to disagree – over federation in East 
Africa, over the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, over returning colonies to Germany, over policy in 
Palestine.  What they would discover, however, was that the apparatus they built in 
Geneva, at a moment of risk and freedom, would affect their options, choices, and even 
the way they thought.  Recall Esher’s other argument about why Hankey should turn the 
League down – because ‘power to influence great events does not reside in megaphones 
but in the still small voice that whispers in the ear of the Wilsons and the Lloyd Georges 
of this world.’41 But Esher was wrong.  The power to set terms and norms, to compel 
public speech, is also a form of power, albeit one that Hankey, ‘man of secrets,’ never 
understood and certainly never mastered.  But this was the power that the League had, 
and it came to affect what states and statesmen could say, and sometimes even could do.  
And that’s why we can’t understand their actions without sometimes turning to Geneva. 
But how did that system of discussion, oversight and publicity affect British 
imperial ideals and policies?  Did it work to ‘improve,’ legitimate, or undermine the 
imperial settlement?  We have five more lectures in which to explore these questions. 
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Lugard Sets the World To Rights 
 
Lecture 2 (7 Feb. 2014) 
 
In my first lecture I traced how a coterie of British internationalists, often 
involved in the war and the Peace Conference and mostly young, worked in Geneva and 
London to construct a set of institutions that opened up imperial rule to scrutiny, 
comment, and contestation.  They did this because they believed in the internationalist 
project.  If statesmen had to discuss problems openly, with experts to help them and 
democratic publics watching, they would choose collective benefit over narrow self-
interest, the slow work of mutual collaboration over the quick fix of territorial conquest.  
But they also turned towards Geneva because they were certain that the British Empire 
had nothing to fear and much to gain from openness.  Not only Milner and Cecil, but 
equally humanitarians like J.H. Harris of the Anti-Slavery Society and young League 
enthusiasts like Philip Baker and William Ormsby-Gore thought that Britain could act as 
‘tutor’ not only to those ‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world’ but also to less internationally-minded and less 
progressive empires.  The ‘Geneva system’ could be used to spread what they thought to 
be Britain’s excellent practices to the rest of the world. 
 For half a dozen years, the mandates regime worked very largely as its creators 
had hoped.  It worked, that is, to legitimate the dispositions reached at Versailles in the 
eyes of Western publics, to constrain other mandatory powers’ behavior, and to enhance 
Britain’s imperial reputation.  Simple good luck and the fact that British officials had 
authored the rules to which they held contributed to that success, but it also owed much 
to the industry and ability of the man appointed to succeed Ormsby-Gore as the British 
member of the Mandates Commission.  This was none other than Sir Frederick Lugard, 
64 years old in 1922, now retired from his last and grandest imperial appointment as 
Governor-General of Nigeria, and the man the Colonial Office had intended for the post 
all along.  Lugard served on the Mandates Commission from 1923 until 1935 – that is, for 
about two-thirds of the League’s effective life.  And for that dozen years, no-one did 
more to define the principles and practices, the scope and the limits, of what I’ve called 
the project of ‘internationalizing’ empire.   
Lugard’s authority owed something to his nationality, for as Ormsby-Gore told 
his successor privately, ‘the whole Commission took anything from the British member 
largely because he was the British member.’ 42 His personal qualities helped too, for his 
colleagues found the famous governor courteous, industrious, circumspect and 
disarmingly modest.  As late as 1933, with Hitler newly in power and Germany attacking 
the League at every turn, the German member of the Commission still thought Lugard the 
epitome of ‘absolute impartiality, equity and justice.’43    But the most important basis for 
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Lugard’s authority was that he gave the Commission a doctrine and a cause.  For Lugard 
saw imperial administration primarily in moral terms, an approach that dovetailed nicely 
with the language of the Covenant, reassured humanitarians growing skeptical of empire, 
and provided the Commission with a coherent rationale for their work.  The essence of 
Lugard’s approach was laid out most clearly in his master work, The Dual Mandate in 
British Tropical Africa, published one year before his appointment.44 
 The Dual Mandate is usually read as the classic statement of the doctrine of 
‘indirect rule’ and as the blueprint for interwar British administrators throughout the 
empire.  Yet to read it that way is, as Véronique Dimier has argued, to ignore the fraught 
international moment in which it was written and to overlook its very obvious political 
and international aims.  For The Dual Mandate was more than a synopsis of Lugard’s 
programmatic ideals.  It was also a pitch for their extension throughout the globe, and – 
since Lugard was under consideration for appointment to the Commission when he wrote 
it – perhaps the longest job application in history.  Many things about the book – its 
appropriation of the word ‘mandate,’ the date of publication, its extensive discussion of 
the emergence of the League regime, and especially its persistent denigration of French 
colonial practices and elision of British and international ideals – show how it worked to 
establish Lugard’s leadership over the mandate project. 
Note, for example, that Lugard identified the ‘dual mandate’ – the principle that 
African administration could at once promote the happiness and well-being of the 
inhabitants (the first mandate) and develop the continent’s natural resources for the world 
as a whole (the second mandate) – as a ‘European’ and not specifically British project, 
tracing its roots to such international agreements as the Berlin and Brussels Acts.45  Yet 
the international aspect of the mandates regime, Lugard made clear, was and should be 
limited to standard setting and oversight.  The actual work of government must be left in 
national administrations’ capable hands.  And no country, Lugard transparently felt, had 
better claim to take on that work than the British.  The system of ‘indirect rule’ – of 
administration through native chiefs and ostensibly along ‘traditional’ lines – that he had 
introduced in Nigeria was, Lugard insisted, the model best in line with the principles and 
obligations of the ‘sacred trust.’46  The British Empire provided the blueprint for what 
should become League-sanctioned imperial ‘best practice.’ 
There was, obviously, a good deal of selectivity in all this, for Lugard’s model 
hardly reflected governance across British Africa.   In Kenya and Rhodesia, a very 
different type of settler-dominated rule had evolved, complete with the massive land 
alienation, coercive labor laws, and restrictions on African movement characteristic of 
South Africa.  Even in West Africa, ‘tribal’ authorities were invented and reshaped as 
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much as discovered. 47  Yet if ‘indirect rule’ was more ideal than real, William Rappard, 
Director of the Mandates Section in Geneva, was already a convert.  The Dual Mandate 
had been ‘the bible of the Mandates Section ever since its publication,’ he wrote Lugard 
enthusiastically. 48  Nothing would boost the Commission’s prestige like the famous 
governor’s collaboration.  This was correct, but not, obviously, because the Commission 
embarked on a diligent reading of Lugard’s tome, which sold a grand total of 2,242 
copies over fifteen years.  Lugard’s effect, rather, was established through argument and 
practice, especially as the Commission scrambled to define its doctrine and respond to 
crises of governance in several territories in the 1920s.  If we track Lugard’s actions in 
Geneva, first over the inquiry into South Africa’s handling of its mandate in 1923, then in 
attempting to articulate international standards in the mid-twenties, and finally when 
confronted with claims to self-determination in Syria and Western Samoa in the late 
twenties, we will see how assiduously and successfully he used the new apparatus of 
imperial oversight to elevate the authority of the League and the British Empire alike. 
 
Let me begin with the first real crisis of mandatory oversight, which was played 
out mostly in London and Geneva, but dealt with events that took place in the windswept 
scrubland just over the Orange River in South West Africa, many thousands of miles 
away.  That South Africa would prompt that first crisis should not surprise, for of all 
mandatory powers it was the most bent on territorial expansion.  War with Germany 
offered South Africa a great opportunity, for German South West Africa – enormous, 
thinly-settled – looked like the ideal territory, a potential ‘fifth province,’ on which to 
settle its troublesome ‘poor whites.’  A joint British and South African force seized the 
territory in 1915, but once Wilsonian sentiment swept the globe, Smuts understood that 
he would need to make a moral case to retain this prize.  The territory’s military 
Administrator, Sir E.H.L. Gorges, thus repealed the most draconian German laws 
allowing ‘paternal chastisement’ (that is flogging) of Africans and restricting African 
movement and stock-holding; Gorges also compiled the notorious ‘Black Book,’ a 220-
page heavily illustrated indictment of Germany’s harsh, even genocidal regime.  Released 
in January 1918 and printed as a Parliamentary Paper, its revelations helped solidify 
sentiment against any return of Germany’s colonies.  Yet Gorges, by that time, was 
suffering pangs of conscience.  ‘To my amazement and dismay,’ he wrote Pretoria, he 
had discovered that his own officers were ‘dropping into the same reprehensible ways.’49  
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They too routinely took the side of the white farmers; they too felt all Africans needed 
occasional whippings.  Much use was being made in Paris of his report, Gorges wrote in 
despair in April 1919, but what would happen if it were discovered that South Africa too 
was governing through ‘chains and the liberal use of the sjambok’?50 
 Once the Peace Conference confirmed South African control, the squeamish 
Gorges had served his purpose.  Gysbert Hofmyer, a close friend of Smuts, replaced him, 
and Smuts himself traveled up to Windhoek to urge the remaining German settlers to 
stay.  Hofmeyr’s administration swiftly began demarcating landholdings, arranging loans, 
and advertising for South African settlers.  Within a year millions of hectares of land had 
been handed over on generous terms, and a white population estimated at 15,000 in 1913 
(half of which then left during the war) had grown to 20,000, or nearly 10% of the total 
population.51  Those settlers were soon desperate for labor, and Hofmyer set to work 
constructing a mesh of legal, financial and bodily controls to force Africans into their 
service.  Although ‘native reserves’ were set aside, those were often too small and too 
arid to support flocks, and in 1921 Africans’ ability to live off the land was further 
curtailed by an enormously punitive tax, set at more than a man could earn in a month, 
for each of the dogs Africans used for herding and hunting.52  Yet, when Africans did 
accept labor contracts, they found cash-strapped farmers very unwilling (and sometimes 
unable) to pay their wages at all.  If they deserted, though, they could – in a particularly 
Orwellian stroke – be arrested for breach of contract or vagrancy (both of which were 
criminal offences) and ordered to serve out their sentences in unpaid labor on 
Government projects or on individual white farms. Hofmyer, like the administrators who 
came after him, considered this system entirely appropriate. As he told the Mandates 
Commission in 1924, the territory had to be developed, and whites needed African labor 
to develop it.  It was his job to inspire natives ‘with that measure of respect for the 
supremacy of the white man which is essential in a land the vast majority of whose 
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inhabitants are as yet uncivilized.’53   
 By 1922, such policies had left the Bondelswarts, a group of Nama pastoralists 
near the Orange River, desperately poor and resentful.  They remembered the era before 
the Germans, when they had controlled large herds and called no man master.  Now their 
lands were being turned over to whites, and more than a hundred members of the tribe 
had been fined or imprisoned for failing to pay the dog tax.  Worst of all, the 
administration insisted that they turn over one Abraham Morris, a renowned 
Bondelswarts fighter who had helped lead a failed African rising against the Germans 
early in the century, and who had returned from the Cape Colony with some companions 
and a few rifles in April 1922.  Hofmeyr, aware of Morris’s reputation as the doughtiest 
living Bondelswarts commander – indeed, the South Africans had used him as a scout 
during the 1915 campaign – sent police to arrest him.  When the tribe refused to give him 
up, Hofmyer concluded they were bent on rebellion, assembled a posse of four hundred 
whites and rode out to force submission.  In a move designed to foster terror and break 
the Bondelswarts’ will, airplanes sent up from South Africa bombed their encampment, 
killing some women and children and maddening the corralled animals.  The next 
morning, most of the population surrendered, and Hofmeyr’s men burned their huts to the 
ground. Under cover of darkness, however, Morris and perhaps 250 men with some 
dozens of rifles set off for the Orange River. Not without difficulty, they were tracked 
down and when their ammunition ran out defeated.  Morris and some hundred other 
Bondelswarts fighters lost their lives.  Two were killed on the Government side.54 
 Southern Namibia was a thinly populated frontier landscape of isolated 
farmsteads and scattered native settlements, but when South Africa dropped those bombs, 
the explosions were heard around the world.  The London Times printed a brief article on 
the bombing sent by their correspondent in Cape Town within the month.  Newspapers 
from Ireland to India would then pick up the story.55  Smuts, too, found himself facing 
sharp questions in the South African parliament.  Worried of a coming storm among 
those who ‘favour native interests & in League of Nations,’56 in July he told his old 
friend not to seize the Bondelswarts’ land (which Hofmyer had planned to do) and to 
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prepare for an inquiry.57  By August, a three-member Commission was in Windhoek 
interviewing witnesses.  Its minutes of evidence would run to some 1200 pages. 
 But the scandal spread anyway.  By July, J.H. Harris of the Anti-Slavery Society 
had arranged for a Parliamentary question, a deputation to the South African High 
Commissioner in London, a blistering article in the New Statesman, and a formal letter to 
Sir Eric Drummond requesting a League investigation.’58  When the Assembly opened in 
Geneva that September, Dantès Bellegarde of Haiti, one of the very few black delegates, 
rose to denounce South Africa.  The Bondelswarts, he said, had been harassed by the 
government but had not rebelled; nevertheless the administration had sent ‘all the 
materials of modern warfare – machine-guns, artillery, and aeroplanes’ against them.  
‘That women and children should have been massacred in the name of the League of 
Nations and under its protection is an abominable outrage which we cannot suffer,’ he 
declared, to prolonged applause.59 Thanks to Smuts’ quick action in setting up the South 
African inquiry, the South African High Commissioner Sir Edgar Walton could reply that 
the incident was under investigation, but the galvanized Assembly agreed that the 
Mandates Commission needed to look into the whole sorry situation.60 
 The Mandates Commission was meeting only annually in the early twenties, so 
that investigation had to wait almost a year, until the summer of 1923.  That gave 
everyone time – Hofmyer to organize his defense, and the Anti-Slavery Society to 
organize the prosecution.  For more than a year, the Society’s speakers and publications 
harped on the scandal of the bombing of the Bondelswarts.  ‘I think we can fairly say that 
it is due to this Society that attention was drawn to this matter,’ its President said at the 
annual meeting in 1923.61  Arnold Toynbee, Gilbert Murray and other internationalists 
jumped on the bandwagon; so too did progressive African-American intellectuals; so too 
did those American academics who were finding the League such a fruitful subject for 
career advancement.  The global web of ‘talk’ I described last week was expanding fast, 
even lapping beyond the circle of those who believed in the progressive potential of 
‘trusteeship’.  If anything, Johannesburg’s communist paper, The International, 
editorialized that May, South Africa’s handling of the Bondelswarts had proven that 
imperialists, driven into a corner, would always ‘drop that cant’ and bring out the guns.62  
Many eyes turned to Geneva when the Commission finally convened on July 20, 1923. 
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That session was Lugard’s first.  He arrived with his wife, the renowned journalist 
and African traveler Flora Shaw.  He didn’t like to be apart from her, and thought he 
might need help with the French that was the Commission’s lingua franca.  But he found 
he could handle the mix of French and English that was spoken, and Flora found herself 
‘more of a luxury than a necessity.’63  ‘Fred is in his element on this Commission,’ she 
reported.  He was deeply interested in the subjects discussed, and didn’t mind the long 
working days – from 10 to 1 in the morning, 3:30 to anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00 in the 
evening, and then another three hours or more of reading and correcting proofs at night.  
He liked his new collaborators, finding Rappard zealous and uniformly helpful and the 
Belgian member Pierre Orts ‘clear-headed, well-balanced, shrewd and just in his 
judgments and views.’64  Already, what would become a twelve-year alliance between 
Orts, Rappard and Lugard was forming. 
That session had to review all but the Middle East territories.  But, no doubt to the 
relief of the other colonial officials cooling their heels in the corridors, almost half the 
commission’s time was spent interrogating High Commissioner Walton and Major 
Herbst, Secretary of the South West African administration and part of the band that had 
carried out the campaign against the Bondelswarts.  Those debates – published in full – 
deserve scrutiny, for through them we can see how hard Lugard worked both to constrain 
the South West African government and to promote the authority of the League and his 
own model of imperial administration. 
Lugard’s first act was to define and restrict the Commission’s powers.  It was not 
a court of law, able to place the mandatory power in the dock; nor was it a Commission 
of Inquiry, for it had no access to the kind of on-the-ground information essential to such 
a task.  It could only examine the administration’s own claims and justifications, and then 
advise the Council on whether these conformed to the Covenant and the mandate text.  
To make that decision, however, the Commission had to understand exactly what the 
South Africans thought their obligations were.  Did the South African government 
consider Hofmyer’s actions justified? 
Smuts, of course, thought they were.  But he was far too adroit a politician to say 
so publicly and make South Africa’s name, as one of his parliamentary opponents 
pungently put it, ‘stink in the nostrils of the countries of the world.’65  So he dispatched 
Walton and Herbst to Geneva bearing the weighty but divided report by the South 
African Commission of Inquiry but without any statement about whether his government 
accepted the critical majority opinion and intended to change course.  That prevarication 
annoyed the Commission and led it to try to elicit the government’s opinions through 
discussion – a task that Lugard, at least, embraced.  He and the Dutch member together 
drew up a comprehensive list of questions and over two weeks the Commission subjected 
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Walton and Herbst to a comprehensive grilling.  The details of the expedition were gone 
into, with Hofmeyr’s decision to call in airplanes sharply questioned (Britain was 
bombing tribesmen in Iraq as well, Herbst retorted).66  Lugard also dragged forth a 
detailed portrait of the whole of the territory’s native policy.  All of it came out:  the pass 
laws, the dog tax, settlers’ steady encroachment on African land, the utter lack of schools, 
the avidity with which farmers hung around magistrates’ offices hoping to pick up 
convict labor, the ‘general feeling of the ignorant farmers…that the natives were there 
chiefly as laborers for themselves.’ (Educated farmers thought that too, Major Herbst 
helpfully corrected.67)  The Commission dutifully asked (as the Assembly had requested) 
what steps the government had taken to relieve and restore the Bondelswarts?   Herbst 
confirmed that beyond telling the surviving men to seek work, nothing had been done.68  
Nor did the Government propose to reconstitute tribal institutions or transfer the officials 
involved in the repression.  It was settled policy that all tribes in areas open to white 
settlement be ‘broken’, that is governed entirely by white officials, and public opinion 
would stand no censure of them.69 
When the South African representatives left the room, the Commission began to 
discuss what to make of it all.  Virtually all members agreed that there had been no mass 
insurrection and that the repression had been unnecessary and brutally severe.  Only the 
Portuguese member, the former Governor of Mozambique Alfredo Freire d’Andrade 
insisted that when whites were in the minority, such punitive measures were necessary.  
When it grew clear he was outnumbered, he registered his dissent, leaked the 
Commission’s views to the South Africans, and returned to Lisbon.  But then a second 
disagreement arose – this one having to do with how the Commission should understand 
the standard to which Hofmyer ought to have adhered.  That is, had Hofmeyr and his 
associates erred because they had treated the territory as if it were a colony when a 
mandated territory needed to be governed differently?  Or had they erred because they 
had fallen below the standard to which the best colonial administrations adhered?  Was 
mandatory administration, in other words, different in kind from colonial rule?   
Unsurprisingly, men who had spent their lives governing colonies (and especially 
Lugard) were reluctant to say that it was.  One, however, did so:  the Commission’s 
Chairman, the Marquis Theodoli, a politician and banker, rather younger than most of his 
peers, who had served in Nitti’s liberal government and on the Commission on Ottoman 
Public Debt.  And Theodoli insisted that the mandate regime was something entirely new.  
In a colony, Theodoli argued, the administration could pursue its own interests if it liked.  
In a mandated territory, however, the Covenant of the League ‘has profoundly and 
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substantially altered colonial law and colonial administration,’ laying down the principle 
that the interests of ‘less advanced peoples’ were paramount.  ‘First in importance come 
the interests of the natives, secondly the interests of the whites,’ he wrote.  ‘The interests 
of the whites should only be considered in relation to the direct or indirect exercise of 
protection over the natives.’ Yet the South West African administration had entirely 
ignored this new standard, governing through a policy of force, ‘conceived and applied in 
the interests of the colonists rather than in the interests of the natives.’70 
 Lugard didn’t disagree with Theodoli’s condemnation of Hofmyer’s policy.  He 
too thought that the root cause of the affair was ‘the practically universal feeling of the 
white population that the natives were to be regarded as their serfs and helots’.71  What 
Lugard objected to, rather, was Theodoli’s claims that incidents like the repression of the 
Bondelswarts had always occurred and would always occur in colonies precisely because 
they were not governed on the principle that indigenous rights came first – a statement 
that, Lugard protested, ‘constituted a charge against every nation possessing colonies.’  
The mandates system was not based on a new principle, Lugard insisted; the requirement 
to protect the native population was one to which many colonial empires, and notably the 
British Empire, subscribed.72  The League thus merely needed to generalize those 
excellent British practices.  That the League might have constructed a superior and 
different system could not be contemplated. 
 Theodoli, however, would not recant.  It was inconceivable, he stated, that the 
policy laid out in Article 22 was not ‘an entire departure from precedent.’  Theodoli 
would play many less principled roles within the League in future years.  He would grow 
inured to the brutality of South West African policies; he would defend Italy’s conquest 
of Abyssinia.  In 1923, however, something – what he, a papal count, called his 
conscience – drove him to articulate the clearest defense of mandatory difference to 
appear in a PMC report.  He insisted that his statement be published verbatim.  Then, 
citing exhaustion, he too left Geneva.73 
 It was left to Lugard to marshal the rump of the Commission and get the majority 
report written.  It was still a near-censure of the South West African regime.  True, the 
Commission declined to implicate Smuts (as opposed to the local administration).  Yet, it 
also stated that no local circumstances could justify the kind of treatment of natives that 
Herbst had disclosed.74  Unsurprisingly, the report enraged the South African 
government, which retorted bitterly that white settlement was the only means through 
which natives could be gradually civilized.  The report then had to go to the League 
Council, and Lugard worried that, once there, the British would intervene to protect 
Smuts and South Africa.  As he wrote to Rappard privately, the Council would probably 
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just refer their report to South Africa itself, which would express itself mystified by the 
criticisms and insist they were doing their best.  The matter would then die for another 
year, after which the Council likely would just ‘thank General Smuts for his promises and 
express complete confidence in his high ideals.  And pigeon-hole the papers.’  Lugard 
thus tried privately to get Lord Robert Cecil to push Smuts on the matter but Cecil just 
wasn’t interested.  Instead, the question ended as Lugard foretold:  indeed it was Cecil at 
the League Council who silkily proposed the necessary form of words that referenced 
those ‘high ideals’ but promised nothing at all.75  British imperial collusion at the Council 
level thus prevented matters from going further. 
 So what were the consequences of this very public scandal?  In those grasslands 
north of the Orange River, it had very little impact at all.  The dog tax was, for a time, 
lightened, but the Bondelswarts remained impoverished and threatened by steady 
encroachments on their land.  The South West African administration held to its policies:  
white settlement expanded; Africans’ ability to survive outside the labor market 
narrowed.  True, the administration grew cannier.  When the Rehoboth Basters, a mixed 
race community to the North, petitioned the League, planes were sent over their reserve 
but did not drop bombs. 
 But if consequences on the ground were slight, for the League regime and what 
we might call the international public sphere radiating out from Geneva, they were 
profound indeed.  The scandal had trained the eyes of humanitarians and internationalists 
on the mandates system, and they would never entirely avert their gaze.  The Geneva-
London axis forged between the Anti-Slavery Society, the League of Nations Union and 
Secretariat officials grew stronger.  And the Mandates Commission emerged as the 
linchpin of the whole system.  The fact that it had virtually censured a mandatory power 
enhanced its reputation, with the Assembly congratulating it on its ‘zeal’ and 
‘impartiality.’ 76  Even the German Foreign Ministry, up to this point prone to think of the 
system as nothing more than a cloak for annexation, took notice.  Internationalism 
perhaps meant something after all. 
The Commission shared that estimation.  Theodoli’s and Freire d’Andrade’s 
dissents notwithstanding, those grueling sessions had created an esprit de corps.  
Appointed (albeit only with their governments’ consents) as independent experts and not 
as government representatives, they began to think that they were in fact independent, 
that they sat (as Theodoli put it) as free men.  To some extent, of course, the Commission 
members simply performed impartiality, for whatever their public stance, as colonial 
ministry archives make clear, all members from mandatory powers routinely strategized 
with their governments on policy.  Yet for some, that stance of impartiality was sincere 
and heartfelt.  And for no-one more than Lugard. 
 For Lugard emerged from the Bondelswarts affair with a new mission and 
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purpose.  He could imagine nothing more important than to set colonial policy across the 
globe along what he thought were right lines.  Having shown that he – the British 
member – didn’t mind shaming a British Dominion, he had emerged as the Commission’s 
authoritative voice.  Now, he pressed home that advantage.  He did so especially by 
challenging and isolating the Portuguese member Freire d’Andrade, an insistent defender 
of forced labor and the only Commission member to take the South African side.  Friere 
d’Andrade’s views alarmed his colleagues, but as the only ex-African governor on the 
Commission for the first two years (a qualification of which he boasted), the other 
members found it hard to challenge him. 
But Lugard’s appointment had shifted the balance of power, for with his string of 
colonial governorships and the prestige of the world’s largest and richest empire behind 
him, he easily outranked Freire d’Andrade.  Lugard also had the lowest possible opinion 
of Portugal’s colonial record and little patience for his Portuguese colleague’s views.  In 
1924 and 1925, the two men clashed sharply over whether Africans should control their 
own affairs through native councils and courts (Freire d’Andrade thought not), whether 
ambitious development projects should be restricted if they burdened the African 
population heavily (Freire d’Andrade thought not), and, of course, whether Africans 
were, in Lugard’s words, on the whole ‘industrious and hard-working’ (Freire d’Andrade 
most emphatically thought not).77  In the summer of 1925, perhaps wearying of the 
wrangling, Theodoli asked both men to put in writing their understanding of that crucial 
passage of Article 22 enjoining mandatory powers to promote the ‘well-being and 
development’ of the population.  A battle through memoranda ensued.78 
That there was a tension between ‘well-being’ and ‘development’ (or between 
what Lugard termed the ‘philanthropic’ and the ‘utilitarian’ approaches to policy) the two 
men could agree.  In other respects, however, they were far apart.  It wasn’t just that 
Lugard thought ‘well-being’ should take precedence over ‘development’ and Freire 
d’Andrade thought the reverse.  It was also that they had very different ideas of just 
whose ‘well-being and development’ they were charged to protect.  Lugard assumed that 
those defined as ‘not yet able to stand alone’ were non-white natives, and that they were 
the mandatory power’s first charge.  As a result, while he agreed that public 
infrastructural projects were necessary, he thought governments should limit European 
economic concessions and land grants and also that African labor should remain ‘free’ 
and not compelled. Freire d’Andrade, by contrast, took the fact that the Covenant had laid 
stress on ‘development’ as clear evidence that Africans could legitimately be forced to 
work and that any restriction on white settlement and capital was out of the question.79  
Struggle between the races was simply nature’s law; if African populations were mowed 
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down by that onslaught, that was because nature dictated the survival of the fittest.  
Perfectly content to see racial mixing (or rather, unions between white men and black 
women), Freire d’Andrade hoped a robust creole population would supplant the 
continent’s declining African peoples. 
For Lugard, this was a nightmare vision and one paternalistic administration 
should work to prevent.  African populations could become ever stronger and more 
populous, Lugard retorted – but only, he believed, if the races were kept apart, African 
institutions preserved, and Africans themselves shielded from European settlers’ and 
companies’ exploitative demands and carefully guided by sympathetic European 
administrators.  Freire d’Andrade disagreed, not only because he thought African 
institutions incapable of political evolution but also because he was so certain that in any 
level playing field Africans would be – culturally, economically, biologically – swiftly 
submerged.80  That Africans might flourish under a regime of equal rights was, to both 
men, unthinkable. 
There is no question but that Lugardian paternalism was more attractive to the 
Commission than Freire d’Andrade’s Darwinian fantasies.  The more ‘independent’ and 
internationalist members rallied to the kind of attentive scrutiny of native conditions, 
sympathy for ‘traditional’ authority, and skepticism of aggressive plans for settlement or 
investment that Lugard favored.  Such paternalistic oversight went down well with the 
Assembly and won commendation from scholars and from humanitarian organizations. 
Equally importantly Lugardian ideals offered the Commission a kind of yardstick or 
standard to which to refer as they moved from land laws in Cameroon, to race relations in 
Samoa, to economic concessions in Rwanda or Palestine.  The Commission, one might 
say, began to grade on a Lugardian curve – but actually, it did more than that, for it also 
published the grades, in the process shaping how the newspaper-reading European public 
viewed and ranked not only the different mandate regimes but also, importantly, the 
imperial powers governing them.  Virtually all the architects of the mandates system had 
anticipated just such an effect:  Cecil, remember, had thought that League oversight 
would pose no problems for the British Empire, but would expose maladministration in 
the territories of other imperial powers.  Cecil was right to predict that France and 
Belgium would face problems.  Where he was wrong was in predicting that the 
dominions would be spared. 
For as the commission began that work of comparative examination, the 
Dominions – and especially South Africa – looked worse and worse.  South Africa never 
washed off the stain of the Bondelswarts affair; for fifteen years its relations with the 
Commission were tense and antagonistic.  The Commission repeatedly criticized the 
mandatory power’s harshly punitive treatment of Africans and solicitude for settlers; the 
South Africans responded with truculence and sometimes defiance.  But Australia’s 
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settler-oriented regime and harsh system of indentured labour in New Guinea also came 
in for sharp criticism, especially since Lugard had a private source of information about 
its deficiencies.  This was Sir Hubert Murray, the reform-minded governor of the 
Australian colony of Papua next door, brother of none other than the Oxford Professor of 
Greek and League of Nations Union stalwart Sir Gilbert Murray.  Hubert Murray strongly 
disapproved of the mandated territory’s administration, and was happy to pass along 
accounts of flogging and labour coercion to his brother – who duly passed those accounts 
on to Lugard.  The luckless Australian High Commissioner in London, who had no such 
inside information and knew little about mandated territory, found his annual 
interrogation in Geneva an exercise in ritual humiliation. 
 But Lugard’s growing hold over the Commission didn’t just wrongfoot the 
settler-oriented Dominions administrations; it also placed the less paternalistic French 
West African regimes on the defensive.  This was not a foregone conclusion, for if 
Britain had the advantage of having engineered most of the rules of the League game, 
France’s colonial establishment made a strong bid for international leadership in the 
immediate post-war years.  Colonial Minister Albert Sarraut’s massive 1923 tome, La 
Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises, laid out a comprehensive plan for colonial 
development that put the backward-looking pieties of The Dual Mandate to shame.  
Colored and creole intellectuals in the twenties found France’s republican rhetoric and 
less segregationist practices more appealing than Lugard’s deference to tribal chiefs,81 
and as Michael Callahan has shown, the French also made a serious effort in the early 
twenties to conform to international principles devised, after all, to suit British ideals.  
Although the French had forced British acceptance of a clause allowing the West African 
mandated territories of Togo and Cameroon to be administered jointly with neighboring 
colonies, France dutifully maintained separate administrations anyway and refrained from 
recruiting soldiers in their mandated territories.82 
Yet the French found themselves hamstrung not only by the postwar budget crisis 
and by serious unrest in their territories but equally by their inability to use the 
Commission to good effect.   The first French member, a career diplomat, could not rival 
Lugard’s claims to expertise, and while his successor, the eminent African Governor 
Martial-Henri Merlin, ought to have been able do so, in fact Merlin proved too pompous, 
indolent and transparently partisan to make any friends.  And Lugard, who had been 
battling French influence in Africa on Britain’s behalf since the 1890s, let no opportunity 
pass to accentuate supposed differences between British and French practices and to 
denigrate the latter.  Nor was this just because he – together with the Anti-Slavery 
Society – wished to safeguard African land rights and prevent forced labour; it was also 
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because he disliked the French administration’s less segregationist racial ideals.  In 
discussions in 1925 with Paul Bonnecarrère, who had come to Geneva to impress the 
Commission with his progressive French Togoland administration, Lugard went out of 
his way to disparage not only Bonnecarrère’s use of labor levies but equally his ambitious 
educational and cultural plans.  Bonnecarrère’s claim that one could of course ‘convert 
[the native] into a civilized man’ raised Lugard’s hackles; educated natives, the British 
member retorted, were ‘imbued with foreign ideas and did not in any way represent’ the 
native population.83  Chastised for policies that seemed directly in line with the principles 
of Article 22, the French must have felt they could do nothing right. 
By contrast, League oversight elevated British prestige, for Lugard could point to 
the British mandate of Tanganyika as the poster child for League ideals.  Partly to make 
this point, the Colonial Office had drafted a stringent land law for Tanganyika – one that 
declared the community of Tanganyika, and not the Crown or the British Empire, the 
owner of the land.  It helped too that both the Conservative and Labour governments 
willingly appointed Ormsby-Gore as ‘accredited representative’ and posted him regularly 
to Geneva to answer the Commission’s questions. Unsurprisingly, Ormsby-Gore had 
little trouble persuading his former colleagues of Britain’s good faith.  The Labour 
government’s appointment of Sir Donald Cameron as Governor of Tanganyika also won 
the enthusiastic endorsement of the PMC.  For Cameron had worked under Lugard in 
Nigeria and spoke ‘Lugardian’:  he intended, he insisted, ‘to develop the native on lines 
which will not Westernise him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European.’  
Cameron thus sought to limit white settlement and to safeguard African use-rights to land 
while barring individual ownership; he also created a system of ‘indirect rule’ by native 
chiefs – a system that educated and urban Africans resented (and that historians have 
sharply criticized) but that the Mandates Commission unambivalently praised.  
Tanganyika, the Commission concluded, was the diametric opposite of South West 
Africa, the territory in which African interests were recognized as paramount and the 
‘spirit’ of the sacred trust fulfilled.  Even though many British colonies looked nothing 
like Tanganyika, Britain and Lugard reaped a reputational bonanza.  Officials in London, 
tracking Lugard’s work, had the wit to understand that it was precisely his seeming 
impartiality and willingness to criticize British (or rather Dominion) practices as well that 
made him ‘very valuable.’  Of course, one wrote in 1926, he was self-referential, and 
tended ‘like all ex-Governors…to forget that there were stout men after Agamemnon,’ 
but none could imagine anyone could represent Britain better.84 
 
Let me pause, though, to clarify this picture.  Lugardian paternalism genuinely 
was close to the spirit of Article 22.  It is important to remember, however, that this 
vision of trusteeship was neither ‘egalitarian’ nor democratic nor even particularly 
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progressive.  Indeed, in two crucial respects – in its attitude towards self-determination 
and in its racial assumptions – Lugardianism was if anything a retreat from the principles 
articulated in 1919.  Only in the most remote sense, first, did Lugard think colonial policy 
should be oriented towards eventual self-government.  In this respect, he was very unlike 
Ormsby-Gore, who had told Rappard in 1920 that he thought Tanganyika could quite 
readily become ‘an independent African native State.’85 Lugard, by contrast, thought that 
‘the danger of going too fast with native races’ was much greater ‘than the danger of not 
going fast enough’; one of the advantages of ‘indirect rule’ was that it could slow down 
the pace of change.86   
And racial assumptions, too, undergirded Lugardian thought.  Africans – having a 
distinct culture but not Europeans’ capacities – would require white guidance for a long 
time to come.  Once again Ormsby-Gore, a generation younger, had not thought in such 
terms.  ‘I feel that in the coming century Europeans will have to alter very substantially 
their fundamental attitude towards the colored peoples,’ he had told Rappard; white 
prejudices, not black aspirations, were the problem.87  Lugard disagreed, and his 
paternalistic creed saved the Mandates Commission from embarking down this self-
flagellating road. 
It is these aspects of Lugardian paternalism, indeed, that help us understand why 
the response to the Bondelswarts affair was, in a sense, the Commission’s finest hour, 
and why other instances of state violence against inhabitants elicited much less 
condemnation.  For the crucial point for the Anti-Slavery Society and indeed the 
Commission, the judgment on which they based their whole response, was that the 
Bondelswarts had not rebelled.  Today, when Namibians claim this incident as an early 
battle in the liberation struggle, it is crucial to the narrative that the Bondelswarts did 
rebel:  for J.H. Harris and Lugard, however, it was absolutely critical to agree that they 
had not.  For their right to protection turned on their status as dependents; if they were 
rebels against the mandatory power’s authority – which the League had already declared 
legitimate – their repression would be entirely justified.   
Hence the Commission’s response – and, still more, Lugard’s own crucial role – 
when populations in the mandated territories made clear that they were not content with 
protection and demanded rights.  In the mid and late twenties the Commission confronted 
just that situation, first in Syria, where France put down a massive rising that had begun 
in the Jebel Druze in 1925 through bombardment, exemplary terror and the use of human 
shields, and second in Western Samoa, where a passive resistance movement by virtually 
the whole population was met by New Zealand with incomprehension and then 
repression, including police firing on unarmed demonstrators.  In both cases these 
rebellions and their repression ‘internationalized’, with massive petition drives by exile 
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communities or (in the case of Samoa) the population itself, and ended up before the 
Mandates Commission.   
In both cases, however, the Commission ended up defending the mandatory 
power and justifying the repression.  Why?  They did so because these movements called 
into question the foundational assumptions of the regime itself.  That is, Syrians and 
Samoans appropriated the claim to ‘civilization’ and insisted squarely on their capacity 
for self-government, sending petitions and representatives to Geneva to argue their case.  
But the mandates system was founded on the argument that such peoples could not 
represent themselves; when they claimed that they could, those appeals were – in the 
Commission’s eyes – themselves in violation of the Covenant and hence inadmissible.  
The Mandates Commission could not, and did not, entertain such arguments.  They 
refused to receive the representatives who had travelled halfway round the world to see 
them.  They dismissed the Syrian petitioners as unscrupulous agitators and the 8000 
Samoan male petitioners (that is, 90% of the territory’s adult men) as simple natives led 
astray by ‘half-castes’ out for material gain.  (In the Samoan case, Lugard was especially 
offended by the wealth and political demands of the ‘half-caste’ population, and insisted 
on the need to keep races strictly separate.)  In both cases, then, the Commission 
concentrated less on criticizing the mandatory power than on teaching the French and the 
New Zealanders how to play the mandates game.  So long as those states cooperated – 
that is, sent full reports, replied to petitions, and assured the League of their devotion to 
the ideals of the sacred trust – the Mandates Commission would uphold their authority.  
The League’s publicity apparatus sent those deceptions winging around the world. 
These incidents bring out clearly the centrality of Lugard’s role in the 
management of the mandates system; in brief, he made it possible for that system to be 
used at once to reconcile European interests, to turn Lugardian principles into a European 
standard, and to reinscribe civilizational and racial hierarchies.  But precisely because of 
his centrality, I want to close by spending a few moments on his part in managing the 
League’s response to the great Syrian revolt of 1925-7. That role, indeed, caused him 
pangs of conscience.  For Lugard, along with the British authorities in the Middle East, 
disliked the French approach in Syria, thinking it too sympathetic to the Maronites and 
too harsh on Arab nationalists.  The Commission resented, too, that the French 
administration had not yet drafted a basic law (a requirement under the mandate) and 
insisted – unbelievably, given the depute of protests against French rule from a diasporic 
Syrian population around the globe – that its administration had received no petitions 
from the territory’s inhabitants at all.  Syria in 1925 was a powder keg, and no-one was 
too surprised when it exploded.   
No-one had much sympathy for the French response either.  The French 
bombardment of Damascus, an undefended and historic city, became a cause célèbre, 
making headlines and drawing protests across the globe.  French behavior had upended 
civilizational assumptions, for it was the French who had acted barbarically, whereas the 
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city’s sizable European population had only escaped harm, so the Times reported, 
‘because Muslim notables had defended the Christian quarter and protected its 
inhabitants from molestation.’88  That bombardment happened on October 19th, as luck 
would have it, the very day the Mandates Commission convened in Geneva for their 
seventh session.  Daily, as they sat reviewing the annual reports from the mandated 
territories, frantic telegrams arrived from Arab organizations and simply interested 
bystanders; daily, ever more harrowing reports from Damascus appeared in the Times 
(the paper with the best coverage, as the French papers were censored).  Early in the 
session, the Commission had agreed that, as they had no report on the situation from the 
French Government, they could not comment on the crisis, and had agreed instead to hold 
a special session in Rome in six months to examine it.  Yet Lugard chafed under that 
decision.  On October 28, not coincidentally the day after a full report on the French 
bombardment of Damascus appeared in the Times, he confronted his colleagues.  Their 
silence was being taken for consent, he said; at least they should alert the League Council 
to what seemed a widening humanitarian crisis.89  The Commission did not – clear 
evidence that they had come to see their role as reviewing, and not directing, policy – but 
all observers expected Lugard to take a prosecutorial stance when the Commission 
convened for that special session in Rome. 
Yet he did not.  In part, this was because, for the first and only time, the British 
government restrained his actions.  Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain had in fact 
been quite shocked at France’s behavior, calling in the French Ambassador to read out 
the most damning reports from the British Consul in Damascus and warning that the 
British intended to press for compensation for their nationals.  But Chamberlain also 
thought that the whole sorry mess needed to be contained as quickly as possible, and that 
the British needed to help the French do that.  French Prime Minister Aristide Briand was 
perfectly straightforward about what he wanted:  Chamberlain had to muzzle Lugard at 
the forthcoming Commission meeting in Rome.  That request caused much hand-
wringing in the Foreign Office, for Lugard, as an independent ‘expert’ wasn’t supposed 
to be under their control, and as Chamberlain told Briand, it was alien to ‘traditions of 
English public life and service’ and ‘injurious and derogatory to the League’ to seek to 
influence Sir Frederick in any way.  Yet, he also let Briand know that he had met Lugard 
for lunch, ‘as a personal friend and not in any sense as a Minister,’ and had there spoken 
of French sensitivities.90  Lugard, unsurprisingly, experienced this as pressure, especially 
when Leo Amery, now Colonial Secretary and a personal friend of Lugard’s wife, called 
him in to repeat the lesson.  He became thoroughly uneasy – he left the Colonial Office, 
Flora told Amery, ‘murmuring to himself, “Thou shalt not muzzle the ass that treadeth 
out the French!”’91 – and was tempted to plead illness and skip the session entirely.  
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Flora’s convictions and his own sense of duty made shirking impossible.  ‘Of course he 
realizes,’ Flora wrote Amery, ‘that higher issues must take precedence over lower’ – one 
might say, great-power comity over Syrian rights – ‘and he determined with your 
warnings in his mind to go and do his best.’92 
So Lugard was, at first, uncharacteristically quiet at that Rome session, prompting 
jibes from Theodoli and puzzled questions from the press.  Yet, in the end, he played a 
central role in the Commission’s work of imperial rehabilitation.  This was not because 
he doubted the harrowing reports coming in of French atrocities – indeed, as he told Flora 
privately, he believed them, ‘because I know what they have done in similar 
circumstances in Africa93 – but rather because he was certain that ‘there is no alternative 
to the French mandate.’  Lugard took it as axiomatic that Syria could not govern herself, 
which meant that some other country would have to do so.  And, as he told Flora:  ‘We 
do not want it and we do not want to see the Turks back again.  I would like to see Italy 
burn her fingers over it but there is no possibility of that.’  The French must therefore stay 
– and that meant that ‘we must not make [their] position impossible.’94   
What that meant in practice is that Lugard worked hard, did his promised ‘best,’ 
to bring France into the formal compliance with the mandates regime.  Having elicited 
the statement that France fully understood its obligations under the mandate and saw its 
task as to ‘enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors to educate 
themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government,’95 Lugard helped draft the 
report that instructed those rebellious ‘minors’ to collaborate with the tutor the League 
had assigned them, since failure to do so ‘far from hastening the day of complete 
emancipation, can only postpone it.’96  Discussion of petitions alleging widespread 
atrocities – of bombardment of undefended villages, use of human shields, rape as a 
weapon of war, massive looting – were pushed off to a later session, a decision that gave 
the Foreign Ministry time to instruct officials in Syria to produce a report rebutting every 
charge – to rebut, I repeat, not to investigate them.  That report received, the 
Commission, at their next session, happily confirmed that they now knew that ‘no 
atrocities had been committed’97 – indeed, that it was impossible that a nation like 
France, which had shown such ‘glory and prestige in the history of civilization’ could 
have used ‘methods such as murder, burning, pillage and rape.’98  Henceforth, the 
Commission would assume – to the surprised relief of the French representative, who 
noted privately that some evidence of atrocities came from letters from French officers 
themselves99 – that all such allegations were calumnies.  More strikingly, they would 
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agree that bombing of civilians, the very method they had condemned in the 
Bondelswarts case, was allowable when repressing a genuine rebellion, provided the 
officers in charge were French and not ‘colonials.’100  This was the reimposition of 
civilizational and racial hierarchies with a vengeance. 
  
The period of the early twenties was thus of considerable significance for 
imperialism, as the mandates system, under Lugard’s entirely sincere leadership, worked 
to stabilize a highly contentious imperial settlement.  As we have seen, the system 
enhanced Britain’s reputation in particular, while forcing the system’s skeptics – France, 
South Africa – into at least rhetorical compliance.  Those efforts reassured the Western 
newspaper-reading public that was the League’s main audience; they did not persuade the 
populations under mandate, but amid the torrent of language generated by the League, 
those peoples had difficulty making themselves heard.  So how did a regime, which 
worked so well for Britain in the 1920s, come to bite the hand that fed it?  How did the 
mandates system come to constrain, rather than promote, Britain’s room to maneuver?  I 
shall begin to tell that story next week. 
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At Odds Over Sovereignty 
Lecture 3 (Feb. 14, 2014) 
 
 My first lecture traced how a group of British internationalists and humanitarians 
banded together to create an apparatus of imperial oversight at the League of Nations.  
We then looked last week at how Sir Frederick Lugard used that apparatus to promote a 
distinct set of norms and bring the imperial powers behind the League regime.  
‘Trusteeship,’ as Lugard conceived it, would shield non-European peoples from 
European exploitation, allowing them to develop, slowly, along ‘native’ lines.  Lugard’s 
moralism, as we’ve seen, sometimes irritated the colonial officials sent to answer his 
questions in Geneva, but his relentless focus on practical administration shielded them as 
well.  Why?  Because it pushed questions of sovereignty to the side. 
Sovereignty – where it lay, who held it – was the great unanswered question of 
the League’s imperial oversight regime.  It should be clear why sovereignty mattered.  
The sovereign can own and alienate the land and its resources; it can conscript the 
subject; it can change borders and boundaries; it can relinquish territory to another.  But 
were the imperial powers sovereign in territories under League oversight?  They held 
those territories under mandate, yes:  but did that mean merely that they had made 
promises to observe certain rules of conduct in those territories, or that they were actually 
administering those territories on behalf of someone else? 
Woodrow Wilson, certainly, had thought of the mandates regime as an alternative 
to, and a barrier to, imperial sovereignty.  Conquest, he thought, would no longer confer 
sovereignty.  Something else would be needed:  the free choice of the people involved or, 
failing that, international agreement.  But then the Americans withdrew, and a kind of 
hush descended.  It wasn’t simply that the legal issue was complicated (although it was).  
It was also that the imperial powers wanted to leave the question alone.  They thought 
time was on their side.  ‘You will see what these mandates will develop into in ten years,’ 
one French official had said in 1919, certain that their distinction from colonies would 
disappear.101  When the League Council established the system’s rules in 1920, it 
conferred ‘a full exercise of sovereignty, in so far as such exercise is consistent with the 
carrying out of the obligations’ of the Covenant on those holding B and C mandates, but 
explicitly declined to state where sovereignty – apart from its ‘exercise’ – actually 
resided.102  On this point, even the League-friendly British were evasive and inconsistent.  
One junior minister assured the Commons in 1922 that mandated territories were 
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‘no…part of His Majesty’s Dominions,’103 but that same year A.J. Balfour stated that 
mandates were only ‘a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty 
which they exercised over the conquered territory’ –a far less restrictive formulation.104  
Which was it? 
 Absent political clarity, the jurists went to work.  They could not agree either.  
When the University of Chicago Law Professor Quincy Wright published his classic 
study, Mandates under the League of Nations in 1930, he was able to identify ten 
separate theories about where sovereignty over the transferred territories lay.  Wright was 
canny enough to notice the correlation between nationality and legal argument.  Thus, 
British and American scholars tended to argue that sovereignty was held by the Allied 
and Associated powers, an alliance the US and Britain had dominated, and French 
experts to say it was shared between the mandatory power and the mandated population, 
a formula that wrote those troublesome allies out.  German and Austrian jurists, by 
contrast, usually argued for League sovereignty, the only formula under which Germany 
could aspire to a share in their rule.  No-one referred the question to the Permanent Court, 
so the theories kept coming.105 
 
 In the mid-twenties, that argument became politically fraught and consequential.  
There are three reasons for this.  First, the Mandates Commission had encroached on the 
question, and by 1925 had made clear that they believed, wherever sovereignty lay, it was 
not with the imperial powers.  Second, and even more importantly, in 1926 Germany 
joined the League, and was determined to prevent any power from claiming full 
sovereignty over territories it wished to reclaim.  But the third reason the question of 
sovereignty blew up was because of the appointment as colonial secretary of the British 
politician most determined to safeguard British sovereignty from the Cape to Cairo.  This 
was Leo Amery. 
 The question of whether and to what extent international oversight restricted 
imperial sovereignty was thus fought out on the field of British imperial policy, and 
especially over Amery’s plan to federate Kenya, Uganda and mandated Tanganyika, a 
project known as ‘closer union.’  I’m going to anatomize that fight today, first briefly 
sketching out what was at stake and then traveling to Geneva and Berlin to recover the 
how international mobilization affected that argument.  As we shall see, a proscription on 
imperial sovereignty was strengthened, but not without some cost both to comity within 
the League and to Britain’s international reputation. 
 
I 
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 I assume you remember Leo Amery, the Milnerite imperialist whom we met in 
the first lecture.  Since the Edwardian period, Amery had wished to see a new British 
dominion in East Africa, one stretching from the Zambezi to the border of Ethiopia.  The 
war was for him a chance to realize that dream, and as Milner’s under-secretary in 1919 
urged his chief to incorporate Tanganyika into an East Africa federation.  Milner thought 
that premature; he did, however, allow Amery to insert a clause into the Tanganyika 
mandate allowing ‘a customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation’ with 
neighboring British colonies. It’s worth noting that the words ‘political union’ were not 
included – but Amery was not the sort of man to let this stand in his way.  As he wrote in 
his diary, the mandate ‘really makes no difference as long as we actually get our flag up 
and our administration in.’ Possession, for Amery, was the whole of the law. 106 
Amery hoped to succeed Milner as Colonial Secretary, but it was not until the end 
of 1924, when he was over fifty, that he claimed this prize.  His personality surely had 
something to do with that delay.  Amery had some real strengths:  he was energetic, 
fearless, a talented linguist, and probably the most original geopolitical thinker to sit in 
cabinet between the wars.  But he was also prickly, combative, outspoken to the point of 
belligerence, and lacking in political skill.  He didn’t listen, and, sure he was in the right, 
he didn’t compromise either.  It’s telling that Amery thought of himself as the champion 
of Kenya’s white settlers, who were agitating for responsible government and access to 
Tanganyika’s highlands, but his young fellow-Conservative , our old friend William 
Ormsby-Gore, who was actually in Nairobi when Amery’s appointment was announced, 
reported that Kenya’s whites were anxious about Amery and would have preferred ‘a 
steady sort of man.’107 
Ormsby-Gore might have preferred that too, for he returned from East Africa to 
find himself Amery’s under-secretary.  They might seem a particularly incongruous team.  
Amery was determined to flout the League; Ormsby-Gore had helped build it up.  Amery 
was on the right of the Conservative Party; Ormsby-Gore on the soft left.  Amery shared 
Smuts’ belief in white superiority; Ormsby-Gore was unusually open-minded and 
optimistic about Africans’ capabilities.  Their personalities were different too, for 
Ormsby-Gore was emollient, consensus-oriented, good with staff, and impossible not to 
like. Even the last German governor of South West Africa, in London in June 1927 to 
press German colonial claims, found Ormsby-Gore sympathetic, but reported that while 
Amery ‘spoke German like a German,’ he had made it clear that, as far as he was 
concerned, there was no German colonial question at all.   Germany had lost the colonies 
in war, and that was the end of it.108   
                                                
106  For Amery’s role, see, L.S. Amery, My Political Life, vol. 2, War and Peace, 1914-1929, (London:  
Hutchinson, 1953), 360. 
107 National Library of Wales, Brogywtyn MSS, PEC 10/1/12 Ormsby-Gore to his mother, 8 Nov. 1924. 
108 Auswaertiges Amt, R29434, Seitz to Schubert, 4 July 1927. 
 43 
And yet, from 1924 until 1929, Amery and Ormsby-Gore jogged along.  Amery 
was busy setting up the Dominions Office and the Imperial Conferences, and left 
Ormsby-Gore plenty of room.  Ambitious travels kept them apart.  Amery went to the 
Middle East in spring 1925, Ormsby-Gore to West Africa in 1926, Amery on a seven-
month Dominions tour in1927 and early 1928, Ormsby-Gore to Singapore and Malaya 
later that year.  Moreover, the two genuinely shared common ground.  Both were early 
advocates of what would become the project of colonial development.  The 1924 East 
Africa Commission, appointed by Labour and which Ormsby-Gore had chaired, proposed 
an ambitious plan of public health and infrastructural development, and Amery had no 
trouble agreeing with it. 
And yet, the two men did disagree sharply on one thing:  the constitutional future 
of East Africa and, in particular, of Tanganyika Territory, the largest area under League 
mandate.  For if Ormsby-Gore thought Tanganyika’s land and future belonged to its 
African population, that was not Amery’s view.  Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika should 
be bound together in a single federation; Tanganyika’s fertile highlands reserved for 
white settlement; and political authority devolved, with the white population granted a 
measure of self-government.  East Africa could, Amery hoped, become another white 
dominion – that is, it might still have a mostly black population, but one under white rule. 
This was what Kenya’s settler community wanted too, but two prior pledges stood 
in the way.  The first was the Devonshire declaration of 1923, which had ruled out equal 
representation of Indians in Kenya on the grounds that Kenya was primarily ‘an African 
territory,’ one in which ‘the interests of the African natives must be paramount.’109  The 
second was Tanganyika’s status as a mandated territory.  Amery was determined to 
knock over both hurdles.  In the spring of 1925, he told Tanganyika’s governor Sir 
Donald Cameron to expect rapid movement towards federation.110  
A year later, he went public.  In June 1926, Ormsby-Gore was slated to speak at 
an ‘East Africa’ dinner held at the Savoy, but he came down with a bad case of flu.  
Amery stepped in, and used the opportunity to make clear exactly how committed he was 
to closer union and how little he cared what the League might say.  ‘Our mandate for 
Tanganyika,’ he told a receptive crowd: 
was in no sense a temporary tenure or lease from the League of Nations.  It was 
rather what might be called in lawyers’ language ‘a servitude,’ that was to say, an 
obligation to observe certain rules of conduct with regard to our administration in 
that territory….  The foundations of the East Africa of the future were as sure and 
as permanent in Tanganyika as they were in any other East African territory. 
British rule in Tanganyika, Amery added, was not ‘based on …West African principles’ 
but rather on that same ‘dual policy’ applied in Kenya.  Britain might be responsible for 
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African well-being, but she was also responsible to the whole world ‘for the fullest 
development of those territories’ and especially to ‘those in particular of our own race 
who had undertaken the task of helping that development.’111  As plainly as possible, 
Amery signaled his support for white settler rule.  Lord Delamere, in England to 
represent the Kenyan settlers, was delighted. 
 But Amery’s speech wasn’t only heard in Britain:  it echoed in Geneva and Berlin 
as well.  Writing in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung one week later, Germany’s last 
East African governor and now its main colonial campaigner Heinrich Schnee retorted 
that Britain held Tanganyika Territory only in trust – and, indeed, that when Germany 
entered the League, Britain might be expected ‘to return the territory for which she was 
trustee to its original owner’ – that is, to Germany.  Was Amery speaking for the Cabinet 
as a whole, Schnee asked?  If so, ‘Great Britain, while talking about a peaceful League of 
Nations policy, would actually be pursuing a policy of annexation.’  Amery stood by his 
words.112 
 The controversy over Closer Union in East Africa, which lasted as a live issue 
from 1925 until a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee decided against it in October of 
1931, was one of the most significant stories in interwar British imperial history.  No 
question save the six-year argument over Indian constitutional reform so dominated 
parliament and exercised public opinion.113  Imperial and African historians have of 
course studied this important conflict, but mostly as an argument over the substance and 
principles of colonial policy – as a quarrel, let’s say, between those who supported white 
settlers’ claims and those who believed in ‘trusteeship’ ideals.  The argument, seen from 
this perspective, was about administrative practice – that is, about how Africans would be 
ruled. 
But what has been less noticed is that the conflict was not only about that.  It was 
also, let’s say, about whether Britain – its parliament, its government – had the authority 
to set policy at all.  It was, in other words, about sovereignty.  To an extent, Lugard 
understood this.  That is, he understood how jealous of British imperial holdings other 
powers – especially Italy and Germany – were.  But he thought trusteeship was the 
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defense against those complaints.  Thus, as he wrote to his co-conspirator J.H. Oldham of 
the International Missionary Council at the height of the ‘Closer Union’ controversy:  
‘Unless we can show that our rule is disinterested, & that we are faithful to our pledges of 
Trusteeship it is difficult to justify our position; especially the immense area over which 
we hold control under mandate since the war.’114  What Lugard was slow to realize, 
however, was that other countries might wish to limit British sovereignty whatever 
policies she pursued:  good government was not the only criterion.  Let me move first to 
Geneva and then to Berlin to track how the Mandates Commission and the German 
government came to think about imperial sovereignty, before turning to how that 
international mobilization affected Amery’s campaign. 
 
 Let me begin in Geneva, where the Mandates Commission by 1925 had been at 
work for five years.  Each year, the Commission examined the reports submitted by each 
mandatory power; each year they debated whether government policies accorded with the 
principles laid out in the Covenant and mandate texts.  Inevitably, they came up against 
questions of sovereignty – and, as they did so, they came to rely for legal advice on one 
member in particular, the former Dutch colonial official, Daniel François Willem Van 
Rees. 
 Pedantic, socially-awkward, and with apparently few other ties, Van Rees was by 
some distance the Commission’s hardest working member.  Most of the PMC members 
came to Geneva twice yearly for the month-long sessions.  Not Van Rees.  When 
appointed, he rented a house in nearby Montreux, went to the Secretariat to meet the 
Mandates Section Director William Rappard, and instructed him to have all laws, 
administrative degrees and government reports relating to mandates sent to his new 
home.  He then spent what were for him clearly many happy hours poring over 
documents, ringing up the secretariat for clerical help, and writing memoranda on one 
tricky issue after another in his almost illegible hand.115  Van Rees was a great nuisance 
and no doubt a great bore, but no-one did more to establish the principle that imperial 
powers were not sovereign in mandated territories.   
Van Rees did not come to this conclusion because he was in any way a critic of 
empire.  The son of a governor of the Dutch East Indies, he had been in the Dutch 
colonial service his whole life.  But like several other Commission members he was a 
lawyer and approached all questions not from the standpoint of ethics or administration 
(as Lugard tended to do) but textually, in light of those principles laid out in the Covenant 
and the mandate texts.  Van Rees thought those documents clearly indicated that the 
mandatory power possessed, not sovereignty, but only administrative rights, and while 
his fellows may not have welcomed his conclusions they could not fault his reasoning.116  
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Reluctantly, and usually guided by Van Rees’s reference to chapter and verse, the 
Commission built up a case against sovereignty. 
 Consider the following determinations.  First, when France passed a law defining 
the public land of Cameroon as ‘state land’, the Commission suggested such language 
amounted to a claim to sovereignty, and asked all mandatory powers to make clear that 
land belonged to the territory and not the mandatory power (France did so).117  And with 
land, so too with people:  asked by the Council to advise on the ‘national status’ of the 
inhabitants of these territories, the Commission recommended that mandatory powers 
create a national status – such as the British category of ‘protected persons’ –which 
would make clear inhabitants were not imperial subjects, 118 a request with which all but 
South Africa complied. Third, the Commission asked all administering powers to keep 
entirely separate financial accounts for the territory; once again all mandatory powers 
complied.  True, the Commission did rule that contracts agreed and property rights 
acquired would hold beyond the mandate’s end – a decision that, one might argue, 
clawed back through economic entanglements the limitations placed on political 
sovereignty.119  Yet when it came to sovereignty, the Commission was clear:  it did not 
reside with the mandatory power. 
 The Commission might have had text on its side, but by 1925 it had annoyed one 
imperial power after another.  France was irritated by that tussle over land laws, and 
Belgium by the Commission’s adroit evisceration of a law intending to incorporate 
Rwanda and Burundi into Congo, but the Commission’s worst arguments, predictably, 
were with South Africa.  In 1922, South Africa passed a law claiming that it held the 
territory’s ports and railways ‘in full dominion’ – language that Van Rees thought hardly 
compatible with the trusteeship regime.  Every year, Van Rees asked the South Africa 
representative to confirm that South Africa meant only that it had full management of the 
territory’s assets and not that it owned them; every year, that representative simply 
refused to answer that question.  In 1926, the frustrated Commission asked the League 
Council to tell South Africa it had to revise its laws.  At the same time, they expanded 
their questionnaire and asked the Council for permission to hear petitioners in person. 
 But when Van Rees walked into a meeting of the League Council that September 
(he was there to represent the Mandates Commission while its report was discussed), he 
found himself under attack.   British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain led off.  The 
Commission seemed to be trying ‘to extend its authority to a point where the government 
would no longer be vested in the mandatory power but in the Mandates Commission,’ 
Chamberlain charged, a move that was ‘not the intention of the Covenant.’  
Representatives from the other mandatory powers all jumped on the bandwagon, the 
South African representative telling Van Rees that the PMC had no business investigating 
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what was done in South West Africa at all.  Van Rees, visibly stunned by the wave of 
vitriol, retorted that the Commission had never gone beyond the duties entrusted to it and 
had done nothing to deserve such a rebuke.120  
This was the most vituperative attack on its work the Commission ever suffered.  
It was coordinated in advance, and by Britain – hitherto the Commission’s patron and 
friend.  Certainly Amery’s hostility to the League and the irritation of the Dominions had 
a role in driving Chamberlain to act.  But Chamberlain was genuinely shocked by the 
independence the Commission was showing and by its seeming willingness to interfere 
not only in questions of native policy but equally in matters bordering on sovereignty.  
The whole mandates system, he wrote in a private minute, seemed to be headed down the 
wrong path.  The allies had never intended ‘to create a superior Council of 
Administration’ over the European empires, but rather ‘to assure the world that the 
abuses of King Leopold II’s personal exploitation of the Congo are not being repeated 
elsewhere’ – a narrow description of their duties that would certainly have shocked the 
Commission.121 The Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, Sir Cecil Hurst, then drafted a 
note, approved by the Dominions premiers and then sent to the League, which insisted 
that the mandatory powers were to enjoy ‘a full exercise of sovereignty’ in their territory.  
While the Council was to oversee their work, it was ‘not called upon to check and 
examine every minute detail of administration, nor can it have the means to discharge 
such a Herculean task.’122  Every mandatory power agreed, France even suggesting that it 
might be possible to stop publishing the Commission’s minutes and reports. 
And yet – and this is the important point – Chamberlain’s attack backfired.  For it 
took place in public.  Newspapers across the globe covered the quarrel, the Washington 
Post, L’Humanité, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and the Indian Social Reformer all 
agreeing that it exposed the imperialist powers’ annexationist desires.123  The Germans 
were especially certain that the main aim was to neuter the Commission before Germany 
could join.  British internationalists were appalled and ashamed.  The Anti-Slavery 
Society, the League of Nations Union, and the Union of Democratic Control condemned 
Chamberlain’s behavior in the press and planted questions in Parliament.124  Revealingly, 
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those critics deplored his attack not only because they wished to defend the League but 
also because they took for granted that Britain should ‘set the standard’ for colonial 
practice and ‘show the way’ to more ‘backward’ or ‘hesitating’ powers.125  Domestic 
criticism on this scale forced a retreat.  Lord Robert Cecil in the Lords and William 
Ormsby-Gore in the Commons were authorized to proclaim, as good League men, ‘that 
the British Government have no desire in the world to hamper, or interfere with, or do 
other than support to the utmost of their power, the work of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission.’126 
But the damage – or, from the standpoint of internationalism, the good – had 
already been done.  The League Council did not expand the Commission’s powers but it 
did not restrict them either, and the Commission would never be so deferential to the 
British again.  Instead, it developed a new sense of solidarity and power.  At the public 
meeting that opened the Commission’s next session, Van Rees’ colleagues warmly 
applauded his stand – and the watching journalists perceptively noticed that the even 
members from the mandatory powers joined in the tribute.  Rappard then delivered a long 
speech defending the Commission’s actions, and the Italian chairman thanked the public 
and the press for their ‘assiduity and interest.’127  The Commission had come to stand for 
the principle of international control.  This was a body Germany wanted to join. 
 
So let me now turn to Berlin, to examine Germany’s growing interest in the 
mandates regime.  On one level, that interest is easy to explain, since the mandated 
African and Pacific territories had been German possessions.  At the Peace Conference, 
British and French statesmen told themselves that Germany had been a latecomer to the 
colonial game and probably didn’t care much about their territories’ loss.  They could not 
have been more wrong.  Those seizures – and still more the charge that Germany had 
forfeited its moral claim to take part in the civilizing mission (a charge that became 
known as the Kolonialschuldlüge, the colonial guilt lie) – won popular support to the 
colonial project as never before.  All parties save the Communists insisted on the 
territories’ return, and after 1920 the colonial associations regrouped and expanded.  At 
first they could only harp on the injustice of the expropriations, hold revivalist meetings 
for old soldiers and settlers, and paint dire portraits of the incompetence of mandate rule, 
but in 1924, when the pragmatic Gustav Stresemann determined to bring Germany into 
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the League, they found their moment.  The return of the German colonies must be a 
condition of German entry.128 
Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, head of the German Foreign Ministry’s League of 
Nations section, had the good sense to realize this demand was, as he put it, ‘not to be 
taken seriously and unrealizable anyway.’129  But if the mandatory powers had been able 
to listen in on the discussions going on in the Wilhelmstrasse, they would not have been 
reassured.  The colonial lobby wanted their territories back, but the Foreign Ministry’s 
goal was rather different:  to rebuild Germany’s position as a great power in a globalizing 
world.  In the past, colonies had been essential to that effort, but if colonial restitution 
was not possible, they would find another path.  Between 1924 and 1926, officials 
hammered out their strategy. 
That strategy was an economic one.  Even before Germany joined the League, the 
Foreign Ministry had collaborated with the big Hamburg-based shipping consortia to 
rebuild the colonial trade and had provided loans to enable German owners to repurchase 
plantations in British mandated Cameroon.  (The French colonial office was disgusted 
that the British let the German owners return.)  But the German strategy was a League 
strategy as well, for German interests coincided nicely with the ideals of trade 
liberalization Geneva was seeking to promote.  The mandates for Togo, Cameroon, 
Tanganyika and Rwanda and Burundi all contained clauses guaranteeing all League 
states equal economic rights – clauses that would enable German firms to establish local 
branches, bid for contracts, send settlers, possibly even buy land.   
Now, that economic strategy might in time become a territorial one, for with 
equal economic rights Germany might well be able, as one ministry official put it, ‘in 
short order to so economically penetrate our unreturned former protectorates…that the 
later transfer of their mandate to Germany would not be out of the question.’130  But the 
Ministry did not intend to bank on that outcome:  instead, cleverly, rather than reclaim 
sovereignty, it would try to make sovereignty matter less across the board.   Annexations 
of all kinds had to be resisted, the realm of the international widened, and the autonomy 
and even future independence of the mandated territories safeguarded as much as 
possible.  Having unwillingly become the first post-imperial great power, it was in 
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Germany’s interests to lessen the benefits of empire, and expand international control, as 
much as possible. 
 To carry out these goals, however, Germany needed a seat on the Mandates 
Commission.  At Locarno, Stresemann had raised Germany’s claim to colonies but 
without any real conviction.  When it came to the Mandates Commission, however, he 
made it clear he would not back down.  Belgium, France and the dominions were all 
entirely opposed; as was so often the case, however, the British were already changing 
sides.  Germany was ‘likely to be less dangerous if represented…than if excluded,’ the 
Colonial Office minuted, and League secretary-general Eric Drummond was in favor as 
well.131  Privately, Stresemann agreed not to force the intransigent ex-governor Heinrich 
Schnee down the Commission’s throat.  Thus, with British support, in 1927, Ludwig 
Kastl, forty-nine, a lawyer, formerly of the German South West Africa administration and 
now the salaried Managing Director of the Federation of German Industries, joined as the 
German member. 
 Kastl’s appointment was not popular with the German colonial lobby,132 which 
had relished the prospect of pitting Lugard against one of their own ex-governors.  But 
the Foreign Ministry found Kastl excellent, and rightly so.  His presence strengthened the 
non-mandate bloc on the Commission, but his correct manner, good English, and entirely 
conventional views on ‘native policy’ shielded him from open attack.133  Although 
intensely busy, Kastl prepared scrupulously for each session, challenged any aspersions 
on Germany’s colonial record, fought to get German doctors into Rwanda and German 
archeologists into Iraq, scrutinized trade agreements and concessions to make sure they 
didn’t exclude Germany and met regularly with Foreign Ministry officials and the ex-
governors in Berlin to coordinate responses to any annexationist moves.  And of those 
moves, none worried the Foreign Ministry more, or took more of Kastl’s time than 
Amery’s plans for ‘Closer Union.’ 
 
By 1927, Amery was moving ahead.  ‘East African Federation from the frontier 
of Abyssinia to the Zambezi is…definitely on the map,’ his under-secretary Ormsby-
Gore told Lugard privately in April, ‘and Amery means to achieve it if he can.’134  That 
summer Amery recalled the East Africa governors to London, intending to hammer out 
legislation.  The Governor of Kenya Sir Edward Grigg was a staunch ally; indeed, he was 
looking forward to being named Governor General of the new Federation. 
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But there was plenty of opposition as well.  Lugard, who insisted that British 
policy was founded on the principle that ‘native populations ought not be placed under 
the rule, direct or indirect, of a local oligarchy of alien nationality,’ felt (as he told 
Ormsby-Gore) ‘very depressed’ about Amery’s plans.135  Ormsby-Gore, although unable 
to openly oppose his chief, was very anxious as well.  Fortunately, they had one strong 
ally:  the Tanganyika Governor Sir Donald Cameron.  Cameron immediately made clear 
his own opposition to federation. ‘I care little,’ he wrote to Lugard, ‘as I am prepared at 
any moment to resign from Tanganyika if I consider that the interests of the natives are 
being made a pawn in any political game.’136  Cameron also made a bid for international 
support, stopping off in Geneva to assure the Mandates Commission that Tanganyika 
‘will always remain a predominantly native country, like Uganda’ and was not actually a 
British possession anyway.137  Amery, assuredly, would not have said anything of the 
kind. 
Cameron’s opposition delayed Amery’s plans.  Another East Africa commission 
would have to be sent out to examine the question.  But in a White Paper Amery laid out 
his own view that the claim of the settler communities ‘to share progressively in the 
responsibilities of government’ could no longer be ignored; indeed, their ‘share in the 
trusteeship for the progress and welfare of the natives must be developed.’ In other 
words, political control over Africans should be devolved onto white settlers.  Amery 
insisted that no international obligations stood in the way.  ‘The fact that we have 
undertaken mandatory responsibilities in respect of Tanganyika creates no difficulty or 
complication.’138  Amery appointed a trusted confederate, Hilton Young, to head the new 
Commission, and then left for his Dominions tour. 
That four-person Commission, which traveled through East Africa in the winter of 
1928, had not been constituted simply to rubber-stamp Amery’s plans.  It included, most 
importantly, the missionary official J.H. Oldham, a confidante of Lugard who had 
worked with Ormsby-Gore on an Advisory Committee on African Education in the mid-
twenties.  Oldham was known as a strong defender of ‘trusteeship’ ideals, and it seems 
fair to conclude that he had been placed on the Commission to counter Hilton Young’s 
pro-settler views.  But Oldham’s position on Closer Union – and, for that matter, 
Lugard’s position – was not so antagonistic as might be supposed.  In the spring of 1927, 
Oldham had made a bid to be involved in planning for East Africa by telling both Amery 
and Ormsby-Gore that he favored Closer Union provided some safeguards for native 
rights could be worked out.139  Amery and Grigg favored Closer Union in part as a 
vehicle for devolving authority to white settlers, although Amery’s main concern was to 
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create an efficient structure for fostering imperial security and economic growth. 
Oldham, by contrast, thought Closer Union could be crafted to limit local whites’ 
authority over Africans by placing any new representative body for settlers under the 
authority of a High Commissioner or Governor-General exercising control over all three 
East African territory.  On its return from East Africa, the Hilton Young Commission 
proposed a bizarre compromise under which Kenya’s white population would be granted 
further constitutional rights, but within a broader federal structure with a High 
Commissioner holding veto power over their decisions and controlling certain key 
questions, including native policy. 140 
 No-one knew quite what to make of that recommendation.  The Kenyan settlers, 
thwarted in their desire for responsible government, hated it.  The Colonial Office, aware 
that it would devolve power away from Whitehall and onto a new local commissioner, 
disliked it as well.  Anyone but Amery would probably simply have given up, but Amery 
– aware that an election was coming, and determined to push a version of Closer Union 
through if he could – once again recalled the East African governors and asked them, 
Ormsby-Gore, and his officials, for their views.  That request elicited a remarkably 
hostile set of memoranda and finally brought Ormsby-Gore into open dissent.  He and 
indeed most of the officials thought the three territories could indeed collaborate on 
questions of transport and communication, but they objected to any Governor-General 
being appointed in East Africa to exercise power without being directly answerable to 
Parliament, and, equally, to the Commission’s proposal to have a consistent native policy 
across the three territories.  That idea, Ormsby-Gore said bluntly, was one that ‘I have 
spent my whole energies for six years in combatting.’  Kenya’s native policy was 
‘regrettable’ but now entrenched; ‘and the one thing I care about is to prevent Uganda 
and Tanganyika Territory become Kenya or like Kenya.’141  And if any attempt were 
made to unite the three territories, that would be the most likely outcome. 
It’s fair to say that is what Amery wanted.  In the margin of Ormsby-Gore’s 
memo, he scrawled that he supported just that plan to standardize native policy that 
Ormsby-Gore had denounced – and he meant to standardize in a ‘Kenyan’ and not 
‘Lugardian’ direction.  The combined opposition of Cameron, Ormsby-Gore and the 
Colonial Office officials did drive Amery to compromise, and he then sent out a trusted 
official to East Africa to work out the details of a scheme to unify key services under a 
new High Commissioner while leaving native policy, at present, decentralized.  That was 
not at all what Oldham and Lugard had wanted.  They thought Closer Union could be a 
good idea if it finally forced Kenyan native policy down a new track.  Much too late they 
realized what Ormsby-Gore had understood all along:  that Amery would seize upon any 
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version of Closer Union, certain that time was on his side.142  By early 1929, Oldham and 
Lugard were thus searching for some means – any means – to slow Amery down and to 
ensure that any scheme be submitted to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament.  It took 
all Lugard’s connections to extract a promise from Amery to allow such discussion.  This 
was the state of play when the 1929 election removed the Conservatives from office; in 
June, Sidney Webb, now Lord Passfield, replaced Amery as Colonial Secretary.  That 
change of government surely made the prospect for the kind of political devolution to 
white settlers that Amery and Delamere desired more remote.  But, thanks in part to 
Lugard and Oldham’s machinations, ‘Closer Union’ was still on the table. 
 
What Lugard, Oldham, Passfield, and indeed all the apparatus of pro-League 
sentiment in Britain failed to grasp, however, was that neither the Mandates Commission 
nor (still more) the German government would be reconciled to Closer Union if it could 
be made compatible with the principles of trusteeship. ‘Geneva’ and still more Berlin 
would oppose Closer Union tout court.  Why?  Because these actors were concerned, not 
principally about native policy, but rather about sovereignty.  Germany especially wanted 
to prevent any move that would bind Tanganyika more closely and irrevocably to the 
British Empire.  Whether Tanganyika was governed in the interests of settlers or natives 
was a distinctly secondary concern.  Indeed, insofar as former German settlers were now 
returning to Tanganyika under the policy of equal access and an ‘open door’ to 
investment from all League states, sympathies in Berlin lay rather with the settlers.  
By the time the Labour Government took office, the German campaign against 
Closer Union was already far advanced.  The Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft mobilized to 
combat British plans before the Hilton-Young Commission was even sent out, and 
Heinrich Schnee told Kastl to his face that he needed to be more outspoken on the 
PMC.143   In February of 1929, after the Commission had reported, Stresemann called in 
the British Ambassador to tell him that the German public viewed Closer Union as an 
affront to the mandates system and as veiled annexation; in the Reichstag, he promised to 
resist the move.144  Yet, in his conversations with the British, Stresemann stressed not 
German resentments but rather League ideals, telling the Ambassador that German 
colonial claims were not the issue here.  What was at stake was the integrity of the 
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mandates system itself.145  The Ambassador responded that Britain too was committed to 
uphold the mandate and was submitting the Hilton Young report to the PMC to see 
whether it conflicted with its requirements – a move that Britain, as the League’s most 
committed member, was constrained to make, but that played nicely into German 
hands.146 
 For the whole of the Mandates Commission, Kastl had assured the Foreign 
Ministry more than a year earlier, were agreed that the mandatory powers were ‘not 
sovereign’ and could be brought to oppose not only Amery’s but equally Lugard’s and 
Oldham’s plans.147  Through the spring of 1929, Kastl diligently worked up his case.  
That July, his argument that the plan to appoint an East African Governor-General was 
‘fundamentally incompatible with the character of the mandates system’ was read into the 
record.  Lugard disagreed.  As long as Closer Union would not ‘deprive Tanganyika of its 
status as a constitutional unit’ or deprive it of the PMC’s supervision, there could be no 
objection; indeed, Closer Union might serve as a vehicle ‘to extend the principles of the 
mandates system’ to the adjoining territories.  Yet the Commission’s vocal 
‘independents’ now agreed that even innovations that were technically allowed but might 
compromise Tanganyika’s independence in the future should resisted.148  It was not their 
job to do good to some neighboring territory.  It was their job to safeguard the autonomy 
and integrity of the territories under their oversight. 
 After that July session, Kastl met with the colonial lobbyists and officials at the 
Foreign Ministry to plan the next step.  The ex-Governors urged a formal German protest, 
but Kastl demurred.  The Commission was likely to oppose the project, and rather than 
face that censure, he thought the British might choose to retreat.149  At the League 
Council that September 1929, Stresemann thus contented himself with the statement that 
since the mandated territories were ‘international and independent units for the 
administration of which the mandatory Powers were responsible to the League’ (hardly a 
definition Amery or even Lugard would have accepted), any development that would 
damage that independence was of course inadmissible.  ‘For the moment,’ he concluded 
rather ominously, ‘he would say no more.’150 
  If Stresemann intended to put the new Labour government on warning, however, 
Passfield didn’t get the message.  True, the Labour Government endorsed the principle of 
‘native paramountcy’ and promised that there would be no move towards settler self-rule, 
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but in a White Paper issued in June 1930 Passfield also proposed to appoint an East 
African High Commissioner and unify key services.151  Few of those involved in the 
Closer Union controversy felt much enthusiasm for this plan.  Kenya’s settlers were 
interested in Closer Union only if it put East Africa’s lands and peoples at their disposal; 
Cameron and Grigg, both in the last days of their governorships, disliked one another and 
had no desire to collaborate anyway.  True, Lugard and Oldham approved this new 
Labourite Closer Union plan, but their erstwhile collaborator Ormsby-Gore most 
emphatically did not.  He had always thought that Kenya should simply be isolated and 
not allowed to infect other territories152 and had become – as he told Lugard – ‘more than 
doubtful about Oldham’s political, administrative, and financial judgment on these East 
African matters.’153  And, though he didn’t say so here, he didn’t think much of Lugard’s 
obsession with racial segregation and separate development either.  Lugard and Oldham 
both thought racial segregation the only alternative to the kind of settler rule Amery 
favored, while Ormsby-Gore, most unusually, thought that a cross-racial unitary state 
might be hard to build but the only possible choice.154  Lugard, Amery, Oldham, Ormsby-
Gore, and virtually everyone else who had had anything to say on the question over the 
past four years would all find themselves on the Joint Select Committee set up to resolve 
the ‘Closer Union’ question.155   
 Since that Joint Committee had not started meeting, the Mandates Commission 
deferred discussion at their July 1930 session – although they did extract a promise that 
Britain would make no final decisions without consulting them.156  In Germany, however, 
Labour’s plans met with an immediate response.  Passfield’s White Paper was denounced 
strenuously in debates in the Reichstag and the German press.157 That September the 
German Ambassador delivered a formal note to the Foreign Office, and Stresemann’s 
successor as Foreign Minister reiterated those concerns in the League Council.158  Two 
massive memorials sent to Geneva – one signed by economic and colonial associations 
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across Germany, the other by some 74 German women’s organizations – charged Britain 
with a violation of the Covenant.159 
 While the German colonial lobby mobilized, Kastl carried on behind the scenes.  
The November 1929 session of the PMC had been Kastl’s last – very overworked, he had 
resigned and been replaced by an economist much like him.  Nevertheless, before he 
turned his brief over, he wrote privately to Lugard, with whom he had been on good 
terms. Unifying administrative services under a High Commissioner necessarily would 
compromise Tanganyika’s autonomy and was thus a violation of the Covenant, Kastl 
argued, but damage was being done to Anglo-German relations as well.  Lugard replied 
politely that while he entirely agreed that Tanganyika’s separate identity must be 
preserved, he thought the safeguards built into the Labour White Paper did ensure that 
autonomy.160  Yet, Kastl had struck a nerve.  Lugard was an administrator and not a 
lawyer, and had simply accepted the claim – made by Amery, and unthinkingly repeated 
by Labour – that Closer Union would not violate the mandate.  But Kastl’s conviction 
that he had international law on its side unsettled Lugard.  First privately, and then on 
behalf of the Joint Committee, Lugard drafted a series of pointed questions for the 
Foreign Office about the legality of the plan.161 
 The answers that came back in early 1931 – albeit from the Colonial Office’s own 
law officers rather than from the Foreign Office, which might well have disagreed – 
shocked Lugard, Passfield, Oldham, and the Joint Committee alike.  A High 
Commissioner who exercised any legislative authority would be in breach of the 
mandate, and Germany would be within its rights to bring the issue to the Permanent 
Court. 162  Michael Callahan, who first followed the trail of Lugard’s international ties 
and established the importance of the law officers’ decision, thus concludes – rightly – 
that Closer Union in its political form was dead by 1931:  Passfield could not introduce a 
High Commissioner over his own department’s legal ruling.     
But if the law officers took Closer Union off the table, it is also true that the 
Colonial Office declined to publicize that judgment, allowing the Joint Committee to 
carry on, and leaving the PMC and the Germans on tenterhooks, for another nine months.  
Moreover, when that Committee finally reported, it went out of its way to repeat that 
Britain’s mandate over Tanganyika was ‘absolute and not revocable,’ that the formation 
of a ‘customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories’ 
was explicitly allowed, and that cooperation and coordination of economic and scientific 
services should be enhanced.  True, the Committee also reported against political union, 
which the members now knew was open to legal challenge, but the form in which they 
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made that recommendation – ‘this is not the time for taking any far-reaching step in the 
direction of formal union’ – did not acknowledge that it was off the table forever.163 
 Indeed, the fact that the new National Government after 1931 went ahead with the 
more modest administrative collaborations, institutionalizing a regular governors’ 
conference and introducing a common postage stamp and a customs union among the 
East African territories without waiting for the Commission’s consent suggested that the 
British were inching towards Closer Union by stealth.  The Commission had been assured 
that no changes would be made without consulting them, Rappard said angrily at the 
1932 session.  When the British Colonial under-secretary responded that he had 
understood British assurances to apply only to political and constitutional union and not 
to such purely administrative changes as postal unification, Rappard retorted that that had 
not been the Commission’s understanding.  ‘Closer political and constitutional union 
would always strike the Commission as not even debatable,’ he said.  ‘It would upset the 
mandate which it was the Commission’s business to defend.’164  The danger, the new 
Governor, Stewart Symes, was told the next year, was that even minor administrative 
reforms might lead to Closer Union by degrees and hence endanger the sovereignty or 
economic well-being of the territory.165 
Lugard, still in the room and well aware that Closer Union had been shelved, 
thought such fears exaggerated and politically motivated.  Bitter debate ensued, and in 
one of their rare acts of public discord, members from the European mandatory powers 
dissented from the majority’s condemnation of Britain’s moves.  Yet the ‘independent’ 
members of the Commission kept a beady eye on any contacts between Tanganyika and 
neighboring British administrations as the years went on.  In 1937 Rappard was still 
haranguing British officials about the possible pernicious effects of the common postage 
stamp.166 
The story of international involvement in the Closer Union debate is thus replete 
with ironies, for while the proscription on annexation was upheld and indeed 
strengthened, the resentment generated by the controversy persisted as well.  The 
vigilance of the PMC and the German Foreign Ministry, Kastl’s adept personal 
diplomacy, and the genuine opposition of much of the British establishment (including, 
notably, his own under-secretary Ormsby-Gore) to Amery’s pro-settler plans, were all 
crucial to bringing the proposal down.  But, since the British never publicly conceded, as 
the Commission put it, ‘that the mandate in itself, so long as it exists, may constitute an 
insuperable legal obstacle,’167 those international critics never knew they had won.  
Privately, British officials admitted as much, but saw no need to humble themselves in 
Geneva.  Accustomed to view the mandates regime as a lever to force lesser nations to 
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live up to British standards, they would not acknowledge that those ‘lesser nations’ had 
kept them from placing Tanganyika under the thumb of a Kenyan white settler class.  
Much goodwill was lost thereby; that common postage stamp came at a high price.  
Amery may not have created an East African Union, but the movement he unleashed 
seriously weakened Britain’s standing within the PMC and lowered Germany’s already 
shaky confidence in the robustness of the mandates regime.  The proscription of 
annexation had been strengthened, but not in a way that strengthened the League. 
 
 Establishing that mandatory powers were not sovereign in the mandated 
territories, and forcing those powers to accept, however grudgingly, that norm, was the 
mandates system’s most significant achievement.  By the time the later stages of the 
Closer Union controversy were playing out, ‘Geneva’ had declared itself.  After further 
controversy with South Africa, with a Labour Government now in office, and with 
Germany now in the room, the League Council finally backed the Mandates Commission 
up.  It was quite clear ‘that sovereignty, in the traditional sense of the word, does not 
reside in the mandatory power’ (my emphasis), the Council’s rapporteur stated in 
September 1929.  The Council drew the attention of South Africa to that ruling. 168   
 One might argue that this norm was established by the Covenant itself – that that 
text, and not the controversies I have detailed here, truly mattered.  I think that misses 
something crucial about how such norms work.  Many international agreements exist on 
paper only.  They become meaningful, and gain force, through iteration and concession, 
when states, against a narrow conception of their interest but in order to gain legitimacy 
and repute, profess their allegiance and change their course.  This is what happened here.  
For a variety of reasons – to safeguard its international reputation, to avoid conflict with a 
hyper-sensitive ex-enemy, even to live up to its own cherished image of itself – Britain 
decided to submit to a probably unenforceable norm.  Publicity provided the context, 
German entry into the League the catalyst, and the PMC’s dogged persistence the fuel, 
for that decision. 
 But did it come too late?  In the mid-twenties, under Stresemann’s leadership, 
Germany gambled on a pro-League strategy – on a campaign less to reclaim its territories 
than to use the League to make political sovereignty (as opposed to economic power) 
matter as little as possible.  Germany’s strategy, in this respect, seems strikingly modern.  
But by 1931, when Closer Union was finally rejected, the global economy was in crisis 
and virtually all powers, including Britain, were re-imperializing as quickly as possible.  
Through the late twenties, the revisionist powers – Germany, Italy – had tried to use the 
League to limit imperial sovereignty, but the benefits of that strategy were now 
dwindling.  In the early to mid thirties, Germany, Italy and Japan would all break with the 
League; giving up on deterritorialization, they would demand territories of their own.  
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My next two lectures will be about the dilemmas those revisionist claims posed for 
Britain and British internationalism.  
 60 
The Racial Order in Question 
Lecture 4 (Feb. 21, 2014) 
 
In January of 1933 the English novelist Winifred Holtby published a satire titled 
Mandoa, Mandoa – a book that I still think the most perceptive analysis of the ‘logic’ of 
the relationship between internationalism and empire between the wars.  Holtby based 
her imagined state of Mandoa on Ethiopia, then much in the news as a picturesque land 
with a modernizing monarch and a bad record on slavery.  In Holtby’s novel, remote 
‘Mandoa’ is being opened to the West by an ambitious ruler and an entrepreneurial 
package tour company, when humanitarian crusaders raise the disturbing charge that the 
country is rife with slavery.  In the ensuing battle for control of Mandoa, the forces of 
‘profit, power and reform’ – as Holtby put it – become hopelessly entangled.  And what 
is the outcome?  The local ruler is pushed aside as politicians and reformers in London 
and Geneva collude to turn Mandoa into – what else? – a mandate under the League of 
Nations. 
Winifred Holtby has been present in these lectures, although I haven’t pointed her 
out.  But she was in the press gallery, reportedly ‘clapping like a lunatic’, when Germany 
was voted into the League, and in the stranger’s gallery of the Commons as Leo Amery, 
last week, sought to push Closer Union through.  And I want to use her to introduce this 
lecture, for Holtby was an internationalist, if of a most unusual kind.   She is the only 
major figure I shall discuss in these lectures who defined internationalism primarily as 
the pursuit of racial equality, a cause to which she devoted much of her much of her too-
short life. 
It is important to recognize just how unusual this was.  True, as I discussed in my 
last lecture, there was a sharp divide between those (like Leo Amery) who thought white 
settlers should be given authority over native policy, and those (like Lugard) who thought 
settlers needed to be restrained so as preserve African institutions and land rights.  But 
neither held any brief for multi-racial development.  Even a convinced humanitarian like 
John Harris and progressives like Ormsby-Gore believed that Africans should live under 
separate ‘native institutions’ and the authority of customary law.  Holtby disagreed.  ‘The 
future is surely, whether we like it or not, with a homogeneous civilization.’  ‘I am 
looking ahead twenty, fifty, even a hundred years and seeing an African nation, black, 
white and brown, urban and rural, which by our legislation today we can either unite or 
divide.  My argument is that we should do grievous wrong to the future generations to 
encourage… any division.’169  Lugard hoped cautiously to build political institutions 
suitable to Africans by limiting interracial contact and bolstering tribal authority.  Holtby 
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thought ‘race’ had no place as a political category at all.170 
How did Holtby arrive at these views?  Her feminism, surely, had something to do 
with it.  It was ‘an advantage to be a woman,’ she told her dear friend, the anti-colonial 
activist Norman Leys, not because women had some special mission to the oppressed, but 
simply because they too had experienced the belittlement and patronage that coloured 
people routinely faced.171  But her activism was also sparked by her encounter with the 
League of Nations.  In 1925, having gained a history degree at Somerville and published 
her first novel, Holtby set off on a lecture tour of South Africa for the League of Nations 
Union.  The experience gave her a cause.  South Africa, she reported, was an explosive 
cocktail of an ‘indifferent and hostile’ white population, a Labour Party operating 
essentially as a ‘white workers’ protection agency,’ virulent and virtually unchecked 
racism and anti-Semitism, and a ‘huge mass of absolutely helpless people.’172  ‘You have 
no idea of the race feeling here,’ Holtby wrote to her family from Durban.  She had 
caused a small sensation simply by walking with an Indian down a city street.173 
‘The problem of the twentieth century,’ the brilliant African-American intellectual 
W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1903, ‘is the problem of the color line.’174  For the next ten 
years, Holtby worked to blur that line.   She and later Labour Colonial Secretary Arthur 
Creech Jones raised funds to support early black industrial unionism in South Africa;175 
with the tiny London Group on African Affairs, she fought Amery’s ‘Closer Union’ 
plans.  And, most remarkably, in 1931 she teamed up with the West Indian doctor and 
early anti-racist activist Harold Moody to battle the colour bar.176  With no resources save 
their indignation and fifty pounds from the Buxton Trust, they took on hotels unwilling to 
accept coloured guests, hospitals unwilling to accept coloured probationers, university 
halls of residence unwilling to accommodate coloured students, and Stanley Baldwin 
over his use of the word ‘nigger’ at a constituency association dinner.  For Holtby, who 
resigned in disgust from her club when asked to stop bringing non-Europeans to tea,177 
such matters were personal as well as political.  For years, she met trains, found lodgings, 
hunted out jobs and scholarships, and advanced money to African students in 1930s 
England. 
 Yet Holtby remained, through these years, primarily a novelist, and her greatest 
contribution to her cause was, appropriately, the novel Mandoa, Mandoa.  Holtby put 
everything she had into this book:  sharp wit, deft plotting, political insight.  She tried, in 
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the novel, to do two things:  first to unsettle the easy equation of whiteness and 
civilization, and second to show how bound up with other imperial motives such 
humanitarian projects as anti-slavery were.  But while the book received respectful 
reviews, it never quite took off.  Readers liked Evelyn Waugh’s less-radical Black 
Mischief better.  ‘What’s irritating me a little,’ Holtby confessed to Creech Jones soon 
after publication, ‘is that all the literary blokes only see in it a piece of fun.  Of course it 
is that…but I meant it as political satire too.’178 
I like to think that had Mandoa, Mandoa! been published two years later, readers 
would have got the message.  For in 1935 an international crisis over Ethiopia exploded 
which made Holtby’s points about the entanglements of power, profit and reform more 
directly and explicitly than a novel ever could.  Holtby couldn’t watch that terrible drama 
play out, for in 1932, at age 34, she had been diagnosed with Bright’s disease, for which 
there was then no cure.  In public she downplayed her illness; privately, she put her 
affairs in order.  In the spring of 1934, as Mussolini’s ambitions in East Africa became 
clearer, Holtby began what she probably knew was her last novel.  She was ‘loving 
it…crooning over it, as though it were a child,’ she told a friend that April.179  This was 
South Riding, published posthumously, which made her famous.  Holtby died on 
September 29th, 1935.  Italy invaded Ethiopia five days later. 
 
 I’m going to talk today about the dilemmas British internationalists faced as a 
result of Mussolini’s actions.  As I do so, though, I want you to keep in mind Holtby’s 
perceptive understanding of the role played by a kind of humanitarian racism in justifying 
empire.  As we shall see, Holtby didn’t get the outcome quite right – Ethiopia was turned 
into a colony, not a mandate – but she captured the logic that made Italy certain they’d 
get away with it.  Let me explain. 
Ethiopia was one of only two independent black states in Africa between the 
wars, Liberia being the other.  But Ethiopia was ‘free’ in a way Liberia was not, for it had 
no white protector, having electrified the world in 1896 by defeating Italy, the state that 
aspired to that role.  Emperor Menelik II then brought the country’s feudal lords and 
hinterlands under control.  Britain, France and Italy hardly expected his empire to last, 
however, and in 1906 met to settle their interests.  Their Tripartite Agreement envisaged 
that France would build a railroad running from Addis Ababa to its port at Djibouti and 
recognized Britain’s interests in the headwaters of the Nile, but gave special 
consideration to Italy.  Italy could build a railway through Ethiopia itself to link its 
colonies in Somaliland and Eritrea, and when Menelik’s empire disintegrated, the country 
would fall within Italy’s sphere of influence. 
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 Menelik, however, stubbornly failed to die.  It wasn’t until after the war that the 
three powers turned their attention back to Ethiopia.  Italy had emerged from the war 
without the huge tracts in Anatolia she had expected and without an African mandate 
either.  In private talks in London in 1919 Italian negotiators pressed for exclusive 
economic rights in Ethiopia, but with Egypt and the Middle East unstable, Britain was no 
longer willing to cede such domination.180  Ethiopia thus remained precariously 
independent, albeit with those motives of power and profit swirling around her, as the 
League began to meet.  It was at this point that a third motive came into play. 
 This was, exactly as Holtby could have told us, the motive of reform.  The anti-
slavery activist John Harris, recall, was determined to use the new mandates system to 
advance his humanitarian agenda, and thought Ethiopia the place to begin.  Armed with 
an expose of Ethiopian slave-trading in 1921, Harris told Philip Baker at the Secretariat 
that the Anti-Slavery Society hoped to put together ‘a very strong and influential 
movement…with a view to getting action by the League.’181  Ormsby-Gore raised the 
matter in the Commons,182 and Harris met with Lugard to make the case for action by the 
League.183  That September, at Harris’s urging, the New Zealand representative put anti-
slavery on the Assembly’s agenda. 
Thus began the League of Nations efforts to combat slavery, which produced the 
conventions that undergird today’s global anti-trafficking efforts.  Instructed by the 
Council, Sir Eric Drummond asked all member states to report on the incidence of 
slavery and on their efforts to repress it.  Unsurprisingly, few states owned up to slavery; 
Lugard and Harris, however, independently submitted a report exposing the extent of 
slavery in Ethiopia and making the case for administering the country under mandate 
from the League as a whole.184 
But the League didn’t take the bait.  Italy and France – and, to Harris’s irritation, 
the Pan-African Congress in Paris185 – all thought Lugard’s report nothing but a British 
ploy to secure Ethiopia for itself.  This was not quite right, for the Foreign Office actually 
disapproved of Harris’s machinations.  Multinational administration, its Ethiopia expert 
noted, would be entirely unworkable, and foreign efforts at suppressing slavery would 
likely discredit Ras Tafari, the modernizing Ethiopian regent.186  But the debate sent 
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Italian diplomats hastening to London to reiterate that Ethiopia belonged in their 
sphere,187 while the French angled for its admission to the League.  Caught in the middle, 
the British decided to support Ethiopia’s membership after all, however ‘primitive’ its 
government and fragile its borders.  In 1923, Abyssinia became a member of the League 
of Nations. 
 But the tangle of motives at work in 1922 hardly went away.  Italy continued to 
yearn for a larger empire, pressing Ethiopia in 1928 into an unwelcome Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation.  The Anti-Slavery Society continued to expound on the 
horrors of Ethiopian slavery.  Ras Tafari trod a delicate, conciliatory line.  He invited 
foreign dignitaries and the foreign press to Addis Ababa for his coronation as Emperor 
Haile Selassie I in 1930.  He brought in foreign advisors – Belgians to train his army, 
French to run his schools – and sent envoys to Japan to solicit economic investment and 
military supplies.  And, in 1931, he invited the Anti-Slavery Society to help construct a 
plan for the suppression of slavery.188  Sir Sidney Barton, British Minister in Addis 
Ababa, and indeed Lord Noel-Buxton, who headed that Anti-Slavery Society visit in 
1932, thought matters were going as well as could be expected.  ‘The desire to stand well 
with the League is very strong,’ Noel-Buxton reported.  ‘There has recently been a scare 
regarding the possible mandation of the country….  Such alarms, even if inspired by 
extreme ignorance, are perhaps wholesome.’189 
 So there matters stood in the early thirties, with all the motives Holtby outlined at 
work.  They were just as entangled as she described, and outcome she predicted – turning 
Ethiopia into a mandate – had already been mooted.   But in fact things did not work out 
that way, for by 1933 the worldwide depression and the Nazi seizure of power had utterly 
changed the framework in which foreign policy was made.  The mandates system had 
been devised to lessen imperial rivalries:  territories governd under mandate were to be 
open to all League states precisely so all could share the benefits of imperial rule.  But as 
the global economic crisis worsened, even those empires that professed free trade turned 
protectionist, while those states without large colonial possessions – Germany, Italy – 
grew more resentful.  German withdrawal from the League also strengthened Italy’s 
hand, for Britain and France now needed their Mediterranean ally more than ever. 
 We know how this story ends.  We know that French Premier Pierre Laval, 
desperately worried about the rise of Germany, would decide that he didn’t much care 
about Ethiopian independence; in January 1935 France would tell Italy that she had no 
real interests in Abyssinia anyway.  Britain did not quite say that, but at the three-party 
conference at Stresa in April of 1935 Ramsay MacDonald was too forgetful or too 
pusillanimous to raise the Ethiopian question at all, leaving Mussolini to conclude that 
Britain too had signed off.  By the time he learned otherwise, he was too reckless, to 
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change his mind.   On October 3, 1935, Italian troops struck into Ethiopia and by May 
1936 were in Addis Ababa. 
From the summer of 1935 to the summer of 1936, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict 
preoccupied European publics and foreign ministries alike.  This was the League’s ‘test 
case,’ the only incident in which the procedures laid out in Article 16 of the Covenant 
were followed – the aggressor named, a coordination committee of League powers set up, 
sanctions imposed by 51 member states.  Of course, that League action was partial, for 
great-power negotiations continued and Italy’s oil supplies were never cut off, leaving 
historians to argue about whether such action could have brought Italy to heel.190  We 
know that those great-power negotiations, which culminated in the Hoare-Laval proposal 
to give Italy a large Ethiopian zone for colonization and control, in the end aborted that 
League process, and we know why:  Britain, while willing to expand League sanctions, 
did not wish to do so without France, and France would not support a course of action 
likely to induce Italy to cast its lot with Germany.  But those Hoare-Laval proposals 
evoked such an outcry in Britain that they could not be pursued further:  in 1935, unlike 
with the Sudetenland in 1938, the British public would not allow their government to 
broker such a deal.  The result for Britain and France was, as the Foreign Office 
Permanent Undersecretary Robert Vansittart accurately put it, the ‘worst of all possible 
worlds.’  Ethiopia was destroyed, but Italy was alienated anyway.  The League was 
destroyed as a security system, but nothing was put in its place.  The world, in 1936, was 
a distinctly more dangerous place than it had been in 1934 – for the great powers, 
certainly, but also for the many small and vulnerable states who had looked to the 
Covenant to safeguard their independence.191   
The tangled diplomacy of this episode is well known.  What I want to do today is 
to delve into British handling of that crisis to show how it affected not the League’s 
collective security regime – which, as I said, was destroyed by the failure of sanctions – 
but rather that project of imperial conciliation, legitimation and reform that I have been 
tracking in these lectures.  That project, recall, had two ostensible aims:  first, to bring 
imperial rule into line with certain humanitarian norms, a project promoted by Lugard in 
particular, and second, to lessen the importance of direct imperial sovereignty by giving 
all League states some stake in the mandates regime, a project driven forward by 
Germany in particular.  It was, in other words, both to improve native administration and 
to pacify European rivalries.  But Italy’s war on Abyssinia caused what we might call 
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‘framework trouble’, precisely because it placed unbearable pressure on the claim – 
foundational to the mandates regime – that European rule would uplift backwards 
peoples.  True, Italy freely adopted that argument, insisting that her war too was a 
‘civilizing’ endeavor against a backward, disorganized, slave-trading state; she too would 
be happy to govern in line with the ‘sacred trust’.  But while British internationalists had 
helped to make the case for Ethiopian backwardness and European trusteeship, Italian 
behavior stood those claims on their head.  In the end, British statesmen and the League 
would have to choose whether white solidarity or international law mattered most.  Let 
turn now to see how British statesmen and internationalists confronted – or really, 
struggled to avoid confronting – this question.  In this journey, we will meet some 
familiar faces. 
 
Sir Eric Drummond, for instance.  By the early thirties, Drummond was 
determined to step down from the Secretary-Generalship of the League.  He hoped to be 
named Ambassador to Washington, but Ramsay MacDonald spitefully placed him in 
Rome, where he was to put up with Mussolini’s bombast and keep Italy in the League 
camp.   Sir John Simon, the uninspired Foreign Secretary in MacDonald’s National 
Government, was explicit on this point, instructing Drummond  ‘that no Ethiopian or 
colonial question should be allowed to react adversely upon the general relations between 
His Majesty’s Government…and the Government of Italy.’192  When Italy attacked an 
Ethiopian border post in December 1934, the Foreign Office tried to keep the issue away 
from Geneva, urging Drummond in Rome and Sidney Barton in Addis Ababa to press for 
direct talks. 
The problem was that Mussolini didn’t want to talk.  Italian officials insisted they 
had no aggressive plans, Drummond reported in February 1935, but troop mobilizations 
suggested ‘that ultimate Italian intentions are more far-reaching.’ Unless Britain took a 
strong League line, which would lead to ‘very strained relations between Italy and the 
League and even between Italy and ourselves,’ it looked as if Haile Selassie should be 
told to make the best terms he could as quickly as possible.193 
But how could the Emperor come to terms, Barton protested from Addis Ababa, 
when what he was being asked to concede was the independence of his country?  It was 
perfectly clear that Italy intended to absorb Ethiopia. ‘Personally,’ Barton wrote in some 
irritation, ‘I can think of only one course likely to prevent perpetration of what may be 
widely regarded as an international crime, and that would be for England and France to 
tell Italy that she cannot have Ethiopia.’194  But Britain and France did not say that.  
Through the spring, Italy moved hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of tons 
of ammunition through the British-controlled Suez Canal into Eritrea and Italian 
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Somaliland.  Not until May, when the Italian Ambassador Dino Grandi told Simon 
bluntly that Italy had territorial aims, was Drummond told to make Mussolini understand 
that Britain would stand by the League.195 
Drummond did so, warning Mussolini not to place the British Government ‘in a 
position where they would have to choose between their old friendship with Italy and 
their support of the League.’  But that warning, Drummond reported back to Simon, just 
brought Mussolini ‘completely into the open.’  Abyssinia was not a European question, 
Mussolini retorted, and collective security should be confined to Europe.  As for 
Abyssinia, it was ‘a blot on civilization…a collection of tribes, some warlike, who preyed 
on others, but all backward’ – some, he alleged, even cannibalistic.  ‘Abyssinia was not 
worthy of being a member of the League’; the League should not object if Italy tried ‘to 
bring order and progress to such a state.’  Asked whether he would settle for something 
short of conquest, Mussolini said he could accept a status comparable to the British in 
Egypt or the French in Morocco – but that, Drummond reported, was ‘the lowest point to 
which I was able to bring him.’196 
This is the imperialist argument at its most unvarnished, and Drummond probably 
didn’t enjoy listening to it.   Yet, over the next ten days, with all the mental agility his 
years at the head of the Secretariat had taught him, Drummond burnished Mussolini’s 
case. Italy, Drummond pointed out to Simon in a long and closely argued memo of June 
1, considered itself an ‘unsatisfied’ power, with a right to colonial expansion.  The British 
especially were seen as hypocrites who, satisfied with their own vast colonial holdings, 
evoked general principles to oppose Italy’s just claims.  The Italian people had also been 
prepared assiduously for war through a press campaign harping on the barbarous habits, 
slave-owning, warlordism and tribal heterogeneity of Abyssinia.  ‘It would not be too 
much to say that Italy has latterly been staking out a moral claim to be the instrument 
whereby civilization shall be brought to a barbarous anachronism.’ 
How should Britain respond to that claim?  Britain, Drummond said, had little 
interest in Abyssinia but a profound interest in the preservation of the League.  But the 
League needing preservation was not, in Drummond’s eyes, the polyglot collection of 
nations of all colours:  it was, rather, a European security compact, one that would only 
be effective if Italy remained within it and if Germany rejoined.  And since ‘all British 
statesmen…would be prepared’ to make colonial concessions to bring Germany back, 
surely Italy’s colonial claims deserved consideration as well.  Admittedly, turning, 
Ethiopia, a League member, into a dependency presented ‘peculiar difficulties’ (as 
Drummond delicately put it) but ‘I submit that the situation is so grave, and the threat to 
the League so serious, that every effort should be made to see whether, and if so, to what 
extent, it is possible to assist Signor Mussolini in the difficulties in which he now finds 
himself.’   
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‘To assist Signor Mussolini in the difficulties in which he now finds himself’:  it 
seems worth pausing on this fascinatingly indirect construction.  If anyone might be 
thought to ‘find himself’ in difficulties, it would seem to be Haile Selassie, with Italian 
troops massed on his borders north and south.  Here, however, it is Mussolini who, 
through agents never specified, ‘finds himself’ in difficulties, and deserves France and 
Britain’s helping hand.   
The rest of the memorandum explored what kind of help to offer.  What would 
Italy accept?  Nothing less than one of four things, Drummond thought:  a mandate, some 
form of hegemony similar to British control in Egypt, a protectorate, or outright 
annexation.  Drummond ruled the last two out, for after the Japanese conquest of 
Manchuria, the League could not survive another annexation.  But Britain could try 
‘overtly or covertly to assist Italy’ in gaining a mandate or some form of indirect control.  
After all, surely ‘to any impartial person it must be apparent that by no means all of the 
Italian complaints…are unfounded.’  The economic collaboration foreseen in the 1928 
treaty hadn’t materialized; Italian colonies found the Abyssinians ‘unruly neighbours’; 
and then there was that ‘question of slavery and barbarism.’  That the Abyssinians were 
‘in spite of their Christian beliefs…in essence barbaric, few, I imagine, will be ready to 
deny.’  Abyssinia was ‘an extremely backward country…far more backward than Syria 
or Iraq,’ both already mandated territories.    
Should Abyssinia then be turned into a mandate?  On balance, Drummond 
thought that option unrealistic, as the smaller League states, worrying about threats to 
their own sovereignty, had opposed such an option in the Liberian case.  But steps were 
possible – say, replacing all foreign advisors with Italians and placing Italian garrisons in 
Abyssinia – to cement Italian unofficial control.  The essential thing was to assure the 
Italian government that while Britain could not tolerate forcible conquest, it wanted to 
help Italy to achieve the influence it desired.  One part of that help would be to make it 
clear to Abyssinia that, ‘if the worst comes to the worst,’ neither Britain nor France ‘has 
the slightest intention of backing her up.’197 
Drummond’s memorandum is a document in keeping with Holtby’s clear-eyed 
understanding of how empires ‘think’, although I wonder if even she would not have 
been shocked by its unvarnished realism.  Peace was peace among the great powers; the 
League could thus preserve peace only if the great powers remained within it.  If 
Abyssinia had to pay the price for that comity, so be it:  there were hierarchies of peoples 
and claims, and it had been a mistake to place Abyssinia in the ‘civilized’ camp.  Such 
thinking echoed through the Cabinet.  As Neville Chamberlain wrote in his diary in late 
July, ‘it was not [Italy’s] colonial aspirations, but her proposal to achieve them by war, 
that we objected to.’198  But that conciliatory effort failed, partly because Mussolini 
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genuinely wanted war,199 but also because of divisions within Britain itself.  So let me 
turn to a second figure, the man who received Drummond’s suggestions – Sir Samuel 
Hoare. 
 
It is ironic that Hoare has gone down in history as the ultra-appeaser, the man who 
handed Ethiopia to the fascists, for the diplomatic record makes clear that he was the first 
person within the Cabinet to call a halt to the policy Drummond advised.  Appointed in 
June 1935 to replace the weak Sir John Simon, Hoare warned Drummond privately that 
he thought ‘we have sometimes let the Italians get away with their case more easily than 
they deserved.’  Britain could not possibly support any arrangement that would 
compromise Ethiopia’s sovereignty, 200 and Drummond must tell Mussolini so.201  Hoare 
then worked with the service chiefs to prepare the Mediterranean fleet for a possible 
Italian attack, and with Anthony Eden, newly appointed as Minister for League of 
Nations Affairs, to elicit French support.  And in memos outlining the policy to be taken 
with Laval, Hoare articulated a very different understanding of the League and indeed of 
civilization from that found in Drummond’s dispatches. 
Hoare did not describe the League merely as a European alliance or an arena in 
which the great powers could resolve their claims.  It was, rather, an ‘attempt to substitute 
a regime of law for international anarchy,’ one whose rules applied impartially across the 
world.  This was why the Italo-Abyssinian dispute was so important.  Ordinary people 
thought the Italian case nothing but ‘aggression for the purpose of annexation by a strong 
member of the League upon a weaker member,’ Hoare wrote.  If the League acquiesced 
in that, it would ‘fall into universal and lasting contempt.’  If it failed to pursue a united 
policy, it would be seen as merely a ‘theatre for the interplay of self-regarding national 
policies.’  Finally, if it were ineffectual in condemning aggression, Italy would simply 
join ‘the growing number of scoffing dissenters.’  The stakes could not be higher. 202 
Moreover, Hoare thought, British and French security and interests were bound 
up with the League’s defense.  It was the vehicle through which Britain and France 
exercised ‘the political and moral leadership of Europe.’  The League reassured the 
anxious Balkan and East European states of the great democracies’ commitment to their 
security and prevented them from sliding into the German camp.  And, outside Europe, it 
secured British and French imperial rule.  Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Hoare’s 
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dispatches and speeches is the absence of the sort of civilizational argument to which 
Drummond turned.  Instead, Hoare argued for the need to uphold international law across 
racial lines.  The war was being seen as a conflict between the white and black races, 
Hoare told Laval, and any failure to demonstrate clear disapproval of Italy would thus 
‘arouse the resentment of the coloured races.’  This was a risk neither France nor Britain, 
with their huge colonial empires, should run. 203   
In a riveting speech to the League Assembly on September 11, 1935, Hoare 
promised that Britain would uphold the Covenant.  That same day he told Laval that 
Britain considered the Abyssinian dispute a test case, and would base its response to 
future crises on its outcome.  This was a veiled threat – the threat that (as Cecil put it very 
bluntly), ‘what is sauce for the Abyssinian goose will be sauce for the French gander.’204  
If France didn’t fully support collective security in this dispute, Britain might not do so in 
disputes with Germany.205  Hitler, marching into the Rhineland to British indifference six 
months later, unfortunately proved that point. 
 
Thus Hoare, in September 1935.  Yet Italy attacked Abyssinia that October 
anyway.206  And, as we know, two months later Hoare and Laval produced a peace plan 
through which Selassie was requested to trade almost half his country for a Red Sea port 
– a proposal that slowed down the application of sanctions and cost Hoare his job.  
Historians have tended to blame Laval for this fiasco, and there is something to this, for 
certainly Laval was determined, as he said, not ‘to do anything that…would impair the 
present harmony between Italy and France.’207 He thus tried to get the British to agree to 
an Italian protectorate over Abyssinia,208 and, when the war broke out, used conciliation 
to delay League action.  Yet, it would be wrong to attribute Hoare’s vacillation only to 
French pressure, for he was caught between two other forces – ‘public opinion’ on the 
one hand, and the officials (notably Sir Maurice Hankey) who assessed British interests 
on the other.  These, too, had their views about how to reconcile imperialism and 
internationalism. 
The Italo-Abyssinian crises took place at a moment when public support for the 
League – or at least public support for the League of Nations Union, the huge cross-party 
body that cultivated internationalist sentiment – was at its height.  The LNU reached its 
peak membership of 400,000 organized into some 3000 branches in the early thirties.  In 
late 1934, it lent its support to the ‘peace Ballot’ – an enormous effort through which 
some eleven million Britons were canvassed on their support for the League and the 
Covenant.  Over 90% of respondents endorsed the League, disarmament, and the policy 
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of responding to aggression with economic sanctions; a smaller number, but still a 
majority, endorsed military sanctions as well.  On June 27, 1935, four months before 
Mussolini attacked, the LNU presented those results to Baldwin’s new Government.  
Hoare’s appointment and that of Eden as Minister for League Affairs with Cabinet rank 
were one response.  Government candidates fought and won the 1935 election in 
November, six weeks into the war, on a manifesto that placed the League at the center of 
British foreign policy. 
 But what did League support amount to?  The Peace Ballot showed that the public 
was both profoundly pro-League and profoundly anti-war.  Hoare understood exactly the 
problem this posed.  As he told one colleague in late August, the country and the Cabinet 
alike wanted Britain to ‘stick to the Covenant’ and to ‘keep out of war’ – and assumed 
those two goals could be reconciled.  People assumed, in other words, that Anglo-French 
solidarity was watertight and that if economic sanctions were applied Italy would 
concede, not realizing that both beliefs were ‘to say the least, very bold and sanguine.’  
Nevertheless, Hoare thought, given the strength of public opinion, ‘it is essential that we 
should play out the League hand in September.’  If sanctions were to be found 
ineffective, ‘it must be the League and not the British Government’ that would say so.209  
Hoare’s critics feared that his real intention was less to defend the Covenant than to 
absolve Britain of the blame for not defending the Covenant.210  This is fair, but he 
operated under constraints which were not of his making. 
 The first constraint was this pro-League but anti-war public opinion.  The second, 
however, was that both the Cabinet and key defense and foreign policy advisors ruled out 
war from the start.  This was not because Britain feared defeat, for the General Staff had 
concluded by September that Italy would be forced to withdraw if Britain closed the Suez 
Canal and that they could defeat Italy even if French help did not materialize.211  But the 
service chiefs, and even more Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary who organized 
the work of the key defense committees, feared that the conflict would weaken Britain’s 
position elsewhere to no real purpose.  Through the summer, the Cabinet was inundated 
with gloomy Hankey-authored minutes about the effects of any conflict on Britain’s 
military position and grew distinctly jittery.  On October 2, the day before Mussolini’s 
invasion, they agreed that military sanctions were not on the table.  Having strengthened 
Britain’s defenses against an unprovoked Italian attack, Britain then assured both Italy 
and France that they had no intention of acting alone.  Tensions had been eased, the 
Director of Military Operations at the War Office reported on October 24, three weeks 
into the Italian campaign, ‘so everyone is happier.’212 
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 But could Mussolini be stopped without war? True, a first set of sanctions – on 
military equipment, loans, and imports – had come into effect on November 18, and the 
more important oil sanctions were now pending.  The service chiefs thought those could 
have a serious effect, estimating in November that Italy had no more than a month of 
supplies in Africa and perhaps another six months in Italy.213  Yet Drummond in Italy, 
Vansittart at the Foreign Office, and Hankey in the Cabinet Office, all advised most 
strenuously against them.  Hankey, meeting with Hoare on November 25th, outlined their 
objections.  These were not that sanctions would be ineffective:  to the contrary, Hankey 
thought they would ‘hit Italy hard.’  Yet, precisely for that reason, they should be 
shunned:  they might provoke an Italian attack, and ‘we cannot afford to weaken 
ourselves by such a futile war, or to make a permanent enemy of a nation that lies athwart 
of our main lines of communication to the Far East.’  Put simply, the reason to oppose oil 
sanctions is that ‘we didn’t want war,’ period.  True, one couldn’t say so openly, but 
since the election was now over, the Government ‘could do what it liked.’ 
 Hankey, Hoare charged, was brushing ‘public opinion’ aside.  Hankey retorted 
that ‘official’ opinion was actually anti-sanction; for him, this was the opinion that 
mattered.  He denied he was anti-League, but argued that the League could not be a 
security arrangement – especially now that, with four of the seven great powers out or 
exiting, it was weaker than ever.  If Hoare thought of the League as a system of 
international law and Drummond as (more or less) a European security pact, Hankey 
insisted that it could only be an arena for discussion.  It should not affect calculations of 
British interests, which were based on imperial safety alone.  Hoare disagreed.  The 
Government was pledged, and Britain could not afford to back down.  He would resign if 
oil sanctions weren’t accepted.214 
 
As we know, Hoare didn’t resign over oil sanctions; instead, he was forced to 
resign over the Hoare-Laval proposal.  The Cabinet and indeed the League conciliation 
committee had proposed an exchange of territory, and the Hoare-Laval conversations 
built on that history.  When the terms were unveiled, however, they were too obviously 
unfair to be seen as anything but a reward for aggression.  There was an enormous public 
outcry, spreading well beyond liberal internationalists and through the Conservative 
backbench.215  When the Cabinet met, half the members – including, you won’t be 
surprised to hear, William Ormsby-Gore – said they would resign if Hoare did not.  The 
LNU Executive urged Baldwin to proceed with further sanctions,216 but Baldwin, briefed 
by Hankey, insisted that Britain could not risk ‘unilateral war.’  Since the LNU too 
assumed action would be collective, this argument hit home:  not even Cecil was willing 
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to urge Britain to act alone.217 But was the government just using French vacillation as an 
excuse?  ‘The truth is that when Britain leads, the others do agree,’ Philip Noel-Baker 
wrote Hugh Dalton. 218 
Perhaps:  but as countless Letters to the Editor showed, the public’s determination 
not to endorse any settlement that ‘fails to make it clear that aggression does not pay’ was 
unmatched by any willingness to use British power to prevent force from ‘paying’. 219  
Thus the Times held that Britain ‘cannot…endorse an unjust peace,’ while also insisting 
that ‘no Englishman in his senses has ever contemplated hostilities with Italy or any with 
other nation.’220  Hoare, reading these muddle-headed diatribes, clearly felt he had 
nothing to apologize for.  Sympathy unbacked by power, he suggested in his resignation 
speech, would just leave Ethiopia to a fate ‘worse than it would [have been] without our 
sympathy.’221 
He was right.  Eden’s appointment, and the fall of Laval, brought no change in 
policy.  True, in February 1936, with the Italians advancing, the Cabinet voted for oil 
sanctions, but French foreign minister Flandin – like Laval before him – consulted 
Mussolini and secured a delay.  Oil sanctions were never imposed; the option of closing 
the Suez Canal never seriously discussed.  The Ethiopians thus fought alone, 
disadvantaged by arms embargoes that hurt them but not the Italians (who had an arms 
industry). 222  If anything, sanctions made the Italians more determined to complete their 
conquest quickly.  They relied heavily on aerial bombardment and on gas, which, the 
War Office’s intelligence summaries reported, ‘caused the greatest havoc upon Ethiopian 
morale.’  Italy ‘would not have obtained success before the rains,’ the War Office judged, 
‘if they had not resorted to…gas warfare.’223  By May, it was all over but the shouting. 
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So what did it all mean, for the League, and for the relationship between the 
imperial order and internationalism that I have been exploring in these lectures?  Those 
who founded the League had thought the two mutually reinforcing:  indeed, during the 
crisis Cecil, Hoare, and Ormsby-Gore all repeated that Britain’s imperial reputation and 
stability dictated a strong League stance.  But Hankey disagreed, thinking imperial 
strategy need not take the League into account, while Drummond, seeing the League 
primarily as an instrument for European conciliation, was willing to go to almost any 
lengths to keep the Italians in the fold.  This, obviously, was Laval’s aim as well, but 
most League supporters thought placating Mussolini to strengthen the front against Hitler 
just wouldn’t work.  The League would be destroyed in the effort.224 
Haile Selassie thought so too.  In ‘fighting on until the bitter end I am not only 
performing my sacred duty to my people but standing guard in the last citadel of 
collective security,’ he told The Times in April.  And indeed, the fall of Ethiopia marked 
the end of the League as a security system.  Responses to the Spanish crises or the 
various German incursions were not organized from Geneva, nor could the institution be 
reconstructed as a European cabal.  Loyalty to the League had been a sine qua non of 
British politics, but after 1936 politicians across the spectrum no longer pretended that 
the League Covenant would somehow keep security intact. 
Some, notably Leo Amery, thought that was a good thing.  The ‘whole conception 
of the League as an instrument for the forcible maintenance of Peace, anywhere and 
everywhere, by economic and military sanctions,’ was ludicrous, he wrote in 1935.  The 
only sensible security arrangements were regional ones:  Locarno, the Monroe 
Doctrine.225  He saw no reason why Italy couldn’t have its ‘bloc’ in North Africa and 
Germany its ‘bloc’ in Eastern Europe, and to the delight of Mussolini and Hitler, told 
both dictators as much.226  Neither would threaten Britain’s real interests, which lay with 
the Western alliance and the Empire. 
Cecil, Gilbert Murray and other confirmed League internationalists wanted to 
rebuild the moral authority of the League instead.  But Murray at least was not altogether 
certain how that could be done.  The Italo-Abyssinian war taught them that the so-called 
‘have-not’ powers would resort to force to achieve their ends:  Mussolini had done so, 
and they now understood that Hitler likely would as well.  For Murray and indeed many 
others, it was that willingness to wage war, and not the territorial claims themselves that 
were the problem.  Recall Neville Chamberlain’s summary of the Cabinet’s view that ‘it 
was not [Italy’s] colonial aspirations, but her proposal to achieve them by war, that we 
objected to.’227   
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German claims, after 1936, often met the same response, for by this point liberal 
internationalists had little attachment to the territorial agreements embodied in the Treaty 
of Versailles.  Their aim wasn’t to defend them but rather to figure out how to change 
them without war.  What was needed, Murray wrote Neville’s half-brother Austen 
Chamberlain, long the LNU’s most distinguished Conservative supporter, was a serious 
effort at Anglo-German rapprochement, which would involve ‘a really drastic 
arrangement for Collective Security and an honest effort to consider Peaceful Change.’228  
Austen Chamberlain, however, thought the LNU’s demand that sanctions be continued 
against Italy as a punishment silly but considered Germany’s open revisionism a serious 
threat.229 Alarmed equally by Cecil’s increasingly strident populism and by what he 
considered a sentimental attitude to German claims, that spring he resigned from the 
LNU Executive.  The man who had negotiated Locarno, but who had hitherto thought 
such pacts could be embedded within a broader League framework, now concluded that 
that wider structure of collective security could not be rebuilt.  He came around, 
reluctantly, to Amery’s position, seeing ‘nothing for it but to try for Regional Pacts, 
though I am under no misapprehension as to the extreme difficulty of arranging them.’230  
 
But what would be the role of the empire – and, more importantly, of the non-
white world – in this project?  The League had linked collective security to trusteeship:  
with borders settled, colonized peoples would no longer be handed about to settle 
European quarrels.  The men who had been involved in building the mandates regime – 
Noel-Baker, Ormsby-Gore – denounced the Hoare-Laval plan precisely because they 
thought it violated that promise, and would create ‘a sense of rankling injustice and bitter 
anti-white propaganda throughout Africa.’231  And indeed, nothing so aroused the rage 
and despair of colonial elites and non-white diaspora populations as the Italo-Abyssinian 
war.  Demonstrations of support and solidarity campaigns sprang up from Harlem to 
Jamaica, Cairo to Natal.  In London in the summer of 1935 – before the war began – 
George Padmore and C.L.R. James formed the International African Friends of Abyssinia 
and later the International African Service Bureau.232 
For colonial nationalists, Italy’s war on Ethiopia seemed confirmation of a racism 
they already knew.  For white liberals, by contrast, the conflict shattered cherished 
assumptions, striking at the heart of those civilizational arguments that had served as the 
justification for imperial rule for so long.  The Abyssinian war, like the Spanish civil war 
that followed, was a media extravaganza:  200 Italian journalists were ‘embedded’ (as we 
would now say) with the Italian army; 170 accredited foreign correspondents were in 
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Addis Ababa when the fighting began.233  The war was photographed and filmed; rival 
charges of atrocities –Ethiopian use of dum dum bullets, Italian bombing of undefended 
town and Red Cross ambulances, and especially the Italian use of poison gas – winged 
their way around the world. 
The Ethiopians lost the real war, in large part because of these methods:  in the 
media, however, they unquestionably won.  Much pamphlet literature was produced in 
Britain during the war – by the League of Nations Union, the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, the churches – and almost all supported the Ethiopian case.234  Leo 
Amery was one of the very, very few Britons to assert that it was not in the interest of 
‘civilization’ to leave Ethiopia responsible for ‘vast regions only recently subjugated, and 
inhabited by non-Abyssinian tribes which it has enslaved, depopulated, and despoiled,’ 
and that those territories would be better off under Italian mandate.235  In most comment, 
the Ethiopians appeared as the defenders of ‘civilization,’ and once the news of Italian 
use of gas became widespread, it became hard to use the term ‘civilization’ except 
ironically.  Punch printed cartoons about ‘the Black man’s burden’ or showing 
‘barbarism’ as a peaceful village and ‘civilization’ as a bombed and blighted moonscape; 
even The Times put the term ‘civilizing mission’ in scare quotes. 
When the Italians tried to resurrect that language at the close of their conquest, 
then, it just didn’t work.  The French Ambassador had suggested to Mussolini that he tell 
the League that he would administer Abyssinia according to the terms of Article 22 of the 
Covenant,236 and Count Ciano – Mussolini’s son-in-law, air ace, the gratuitous bomber of 
Adowa, and now Foreign Minister – duly did so.  Italy saw ‘the work that she has 
undertaken in Ethiopia as a sacred mission of civilization,’ he wrote; Italy would protect 
native well-being and suppress slavery, ‘a blot of infamy on the old regime.’237  But 
against that note came the personal appearance of Haile Selassie at the Assembly on June 
30.  The Italian advance had been achieved primarily through gas attacks – a ‘very 
refinement of barbarism’ that had carried ‘devastation and terror into the most densely 
populated parts of the country.’  All the states of the world had an interest in repelling 
such brutality, for if it were allowed against Ethiopia, it would be allowed against other 
nations as well.  ‘Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord, there is not on this earth any 
nation that is superior to any other,’ Selassie insisted.238 
Italy had done everything it could to prevent Selassie from speaking.  Selassie 
was no longer a head of state and represented no-one, they charged:  he could hardly 
address the League.  But the Assembly had not recognized the Italian conquest, and when 
it became clear that the guilt-ridden delegates would not bar Selassie, Ciano distributed 
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whistles to Italian journalists in the gallery.  Selassie’s first words were drowned out in 
piping and catcalls, as the security officers bundled the Italians out.  But the response of 
the Assembly was captured well by the Romanian delegate Nicolae Titulescu:  ‘A la 
porte, les sauvages!’ – show the barbarians (that is, the Italians) the door! 
 
Should we conclude, then, that the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, for all its horrors, did 
what Holtby’s novel could not – explode the easy identification of race and civilization 
which was a sort of cultural default setting for white Europeans in the early 20th century?  
Yes and no.  Certainly, it made it harder to equate European values with ‘civilization’ 
tout court – a lesson that Gandhi and Hitler, in their diametrically different ways, were 
also teaching.  But one can push this too far.  For if some MPs and intellectuals formed 
an Abyssinia Association in 1936 to claim restitution for Ethiopia for the violence it had 
suffered at the hands of whites,239 others did not respond quite that way. 
Take, for example, the case of Arnold Toynbee.  Toynbee was at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs through the mid-thirties, producing his annual surveys of 
international relations.  The Italo-Abyssinian crisis took up a whole volume.  Toynbee 
had thought that Italian challenge to the Covenant could be easily handled – if Britain 
closed the Suez Canal, the Italians would swiftly back down – and he thought the 
Government’s prevarication reprehensible.  But he found he could not range himself with 
those liberal internationalists who condemned Hoare but refused to face the prospect of 
war.  A hedonistic calculus had replaced the strict categorical imperative, he wrote:  the 
Britons who forced the withdrawal of Hoare-Laval were ‘not moved by the will to 
vindicate a principle at the risk of being called upon to make a sacrifice, but…merely 
wished to make a gesture so long as they could be certain of being able to make it without 
seriously imperiling their own comfort.’240  If Britons really wanted peace, they needed to 
be willing to suffer:  it was as simple as that. 
Toynbee was in the midst of a religious crisis that certainly influenced his thought 
in the mid-thirties.241  But he was in Berlin in February 1936, during the worst of the war, 
and was influenced too by the views of ‘a German friend…deeply versed in the mysteries 
of international politics and intimately acquainted…with England,’ with whom he 
discussed the matter. 242  That ‘friend’ was Friedrich (‘Fritz’) Berber, Director of the 
Berlin Institute for Foreign Policy Research and sometime advisor to Ribbentrop – a man 
who, part Anglophile internationalist, part political opportunist, has kept historians 
guessing about the nature and extent of his role in Nazi foreign policy. Berber told 
Toynbee that Abyssinia would be utterly defeated but that the British would do nothing, 
since the public wanted, not to pay the price for effective action, but rather ‘to strike an 
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attitude and to discharge an emotion.’243 Toynbee concluded that Berber was right, and 
his account of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis reflects his shame and disillusionment. 
But Toynbee had a plan for Britain’s redemption.  Britain could make peace – 
earn peace – by giving something up, by supporting a process of territorial revision that 
would at once rebuild Anglo-German friendship and demonstrate British and French 
good faith.  Toynbee was in Germany to air his ideas, with Hitler among others, about a 
new ‘internationalization’ of empire, one designed to bring Germany back into the 
imperialist world and into the European fold.  These ideas would spread like wildfire 
through British internationalist circles in the late thirties.  Toynbee’s father-in-law Gilbert 
Murray, Cecil, Noel-Baker, J.H. Harris – and, ultimately, Neville Chamberlain – would at 
one time or another sign on.  Did they forget, or did they just not care, that the territories 
they planned so generously to sacrifice were inhabited by Africans, not Britons, so that 
non-whites would once again pay the price of European comity?  I shall turn next time to 
the paradoxical and often overlooked attempt at colonial appeasement. 
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The Chimera of Colonial Appeasement 
Lecture 5 (Feb. 28, 2014) 
 
 
 We are tracking, as you know, the effort to ‘internationalize’ empire, which was 
undertaken largely by British intellectuals and statesmen working with and through the 
League of Nations.  That effort had two aims:  to improve the conditions of the world’s 
dependent peoples by spreading agreed international norms, and to abate great-power 
antagonism by giving all states a stake in dependent territories’ development.  This 
project was crafted and pushed forward, I’ve argued, largely by British internationalists, 
humanitarians and politicians, who were certain that it posed no dangers to British 
imperial rule.  British colonial administration rested on those same assumptions about 
trusteeship and the open door, so the generalization of those practices could only enhance 
British prestige and power.    
 I have begun in the last two lectures to trace the process by which that happy 
assumption came into question, and British statesmen became aware that they may have 
unleashed a power they could not control.  ‘Internationalization’ meant, after all, to open 
imperial policymaking up to pressures from all sides:  from resentful revisionist powers, 
from nationalists and radicals unreconciled to alien rule, and from the bureaucratizing 
forces of the League itself.  Two weeks ago we examined how those pressures 
constrained claims to sovereignty and then political options in East Africa.  Last week, 
we saw how Italy’s Abyssinian adventure and a trenchant critique of the racial 
paternalism further discredited the imperial powers. 
 One might have thus expected the project of internationalization to fade away.  
But it did not.  Instead, the period from 1935 until 1938 saw a final attempt to promote 
the cause of internationalizing imperial rule.  This was a particularly quixotic effort, not 
only because the imperial powers were simultaneously trying to tighten imperial 
economic and security links as global relations worsened, but also because it envisaged 
offering concessions to the Nazi regime which had never been offered the Weimar 
Republic.   
 Briefly, internationalists hoped to ‘appease’ the Nazi regime and to reknit 
international ties by brokering a new colonial settlement:  one that would give Germany a 
colonial stake within an expanded system of international control.  This movement for 
‘colonial appeasement’ is usually dismissed as not very significant, mostly because it is 
clear that Hitler, while willing to use Germany’s colonial claims for propaganda 
purposes, was always primarily concerned with Eastward expansion.  I think that 
judgment simply misses the point.  The movement for colonial appeasement mattered for 
two quite different reasons – because it locked British intellectuals and statesmen into a 
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profound misreading of German aims, and because it greatly discredited the 
‘internationalization’ project itself.  Not only British statesmen, but equally British 
liberals and humanitarians, it became clear, could imagine handing Africans over to 
Nazis in order to preserve peace in Europe.  They could not do so, however, through the 
League, for such repartition would require an entire recasting of the mandates regime.  
Those most loyal to the mandates regime were horrified by that prospect:  Lugard and the 
other members and former members of the mandates commission watched erstwhile 
allies like John Harris and Gilbert Murray plan to hand territories over to Germany with 
rage and shame.  The campaign for ‘colonial appeasement’ failed.  In the process, it 
discredited the project of imperial collaboration entirely. 
 
 To track the genealogy of this particular effort, let us begin with Arnold Toynbee, 
ensconced at Chatham House in the early thirties writing the annual Survey of 
International Affairs.  At the newly-established Political Intelligence Department of the 
Foreign Office in 1919, Toynbee, like so many of his liberal friends, had promoted the 
ideal of national self-determination. With the passage of time, and as he observed one 
ethnic nationalist conflict after another – Vilna, Corfu, Bulgaria – that enthusiasm palled:  
the Wailing Wall riots in Palestine in 1929, for example, persuaded Toynbee that any 
attempt to apply the doctrine there would result in bloodshed and violence.  Instead, he 
argued in a lecture at Chatham House in 1930, the only honorable course in Palestine 
would be to build a state founded not on ‘the odious doctrine of Western 
Nationalism…that a country is the national home of one nationality only,’ but rather on 
the principle ‘that this doctrine of intolerance and fanaticism is not to prevail.’244 
 When it came to Europe, however, Toynbee could imagine no alternative to that 
‘odious doctrine.’  Indeed, he thought the Versailles settlement faulty precisely because it 
had left too many ethnic Germans outside Germany’s borders.  This is, of course, 
precisely what the Germans had been saying ever since 1919, and Toynbee was far from 
the only liberal intellectual to have come to regret the part he played in constructing that 
settlement.  What is especially significant about Toynbee’s role, however, is how hard he 
worked to promote territorial revision after the Nazi seizure of power.   
 Toynbee undertook this work partly through the International Studies Conference 
– a scholarly organization initially founded under the auspices of the League of Nations 
Institute for Intellectual Cooperation that brought together scholars of international 
politics and law.  Initially, these biannual conferences had tried to establish common 
disciplinary practices; as international tensions worsened in the 1930s, however, the 
conference became a forum through which well-connected liberal intellectuals in Britain, 
France and the United States sought to shape diplomacy and policy.  Each conference 
took two years to plan, with national think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations in 
the United States or the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Britain choosing 
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national delegations and commissioning preparatory studies on the designated topic.  The 
1933 conference addressed international trade (a topic chosen at the depths of the slump 
in 1931); the 1935 conference dealt with collective security. 
 German political scientists had been avid participants in the International Studies 
Conference, but Germany’s withdrawal from the League followed by the Nazification of 
all academic institutions threatened that participation.  Toynbee tried to keep up contacts, 
and on a visit to Berlin in 1934 entered into conversations with Fritz Berber, an 
international lawyer now at its Institute for International Law.  In the postwar period, 
Toynbee would downplay the extent of his contacts with Berber (quite possibly because, 
writing hundreds of letters monthly, he had simply forgotten them), but he took 
considerable trouble to secure Berber’s welcome as an ‘observer’ at the 1935 
conference.245  That conference also agreed that their next topic would be ‘peaceful 
change’ – or, in other words, the process by which changes might be made in the 
international order without resort to war.   
 Everyone understood just why that question was urgent.  Those states which were 
coming to be known as the ‘have-not’ powers – Japan, Italy, Germany – had made clear 
that they would resort to war if the balance of resources and territories were not shifted in 
their favor:  Japan, indeed, had already done so; Italy was massing troops on Ethiopia’s 
borders.  That fall Toynbee thus sat down to think through just how the global order 
could be changed without war.  By the time he gave that talk in December, it was too 
late:  Italy had opted for war against Ethiopia anyway, and the Hoare-Level proposal had 
unleashed a tsunami of popular revulsion.  Hoare would resign the morning after that 
Chatham House session.246  But to Toynbee and the clutch of internationalists who 
gathered to hear him, that failure just made their task more urgent.  If war was not to 
engulf the European continent, some mechanism had to be devised to adjust resources 
and boundaries to a shifting global balance of power. 
 How could that be done?  As Toynbee saw it, internationalists needed first to 
recognize that they had left Versailles with their work unfinished.  Yes, the Covenant had 
established a system of ‘collective security’ to safeguard that settlement against attempts 
to change it by force – but that was only half the battle.  For, as the world changed, the 
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international order had to change with it.  Thus, argued Toynbee, ‘we have also…to work 
out some method of ‘peaceful change’ as an alternative to the violent method of change’ 
through war.  ‘Dissatisfied’ powers were making open territorial claims, and although 
some of those were specious and exaggerated, some, like Germany’s claim for wider 
economic opportunities, were more justified.  How could those grievances be met, and 
the world rendered less dangerous? 
 What is illuminating about Toynbee’s response to that question is that he first 
sought to shift the terms of debate altogether.  International tensions and revisionist 
resentments would not be eased by nationalist moves.  Rather, the best approach would 
be to make sovereignty and territory matter less tout court.  Between the opposing but 
similar programs of colonial transfer and imperial annexation, Toynbee located a third 
alternative:  that of ‘internationalizing’ all benefits of territorial control so that they could 
be enjoyed by the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ alike.  Such had been the mandates 
system’s initial aim, and Toynbee, revealingly, looked back to that originary impulse.  
Rather than returning territories to their former sovereigns, why not bring all non-self-
governing territories under the mandates regime?  If colonial control were truly 
internationalized, all grounds for resentment would vanish.247 
 Toynbee did not see this proposal as a veiled apology for Italian or German 
aggression:  indeed, while he was crafting his argument for peaceful change, he was also 
condemning Italian aggression in Ethiopia.  His aim was to prevent such resorts to force, 
not to condone them.  It is also true however that Toynbee was far more sympathetic to 
Germany than to Italy, and while he may not have sought to stoke German territorial 
demands, his interventions had that effect. German colonial lobbyists welcomed his 
ideas, registering his sympathy for their claims while ignoring his internationalism, and 
he became one conduit by which what we might call the project of ‘colonial 
appeasement’ gained international and national traction.  But he was only one such 
conduit, so let me briefly sketch out how, over the next three years, that unthinkable 
proposal – giving colonies to Germany – became a popular cause. 
 
 To understand this, we need to return to Germany.  Two weeks ago, I explained 
how Germany used its League membership in the late twenties to press the cause of 
‘internationalization’.  No state insisted more strenuously that the mandated territories 
were something new, held under international and not imperial sovereignty; no state had 
more success in using the system’s ‘open door’ requirements to gain a share of the 
economic pie.  The Foreign Ministry was rightly pleased with these achievements:  the 
problem was, the German colonial movement hardly felt the same way.  Embittered ex-
Governors and nostalgic old soldiers were not much interested in trade balances or 
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internationalist kudos; they just wanted the German colonies back.  And there was no real 
sign, in 1933, that League membership had brought that goal any nearer. 
 Thus throughout the Weimar period, while the Wilhelmstrasse sought to cement 
Germany’s position at the League, the colonial movement worked to remind Germans of 
the illegitimacy of that very organization.  Exhibits, lectures, and articles strategically 
placed in the daily press hammered familiar arguments home – that Germany had been 
‘illegally’ deprived of her property by the ‘Diktat’ of Versailles; that charges of colonial 
brutality were lies hypocritically leveled by those responsible for the Amritsar massacre 
or the Congo regime; that, to the contrary, the German colonies had been near-utopias of 
flourishing plantations and happy, productive natives; and that those territories and 
peoples were now going to rack and ruin under brutal or incompetent French or British or 
Australian rule. 248  ‘It is no use saying that the old German colonies were only a source 
of expense and weakness, or that no German ever went to them, or that they served no 
really useful purpose in any way,’ Britain’s Ambassador in Berlin advised the Foreign 
Office as early as 1928.  ‘The fact remains that their loss is resented and their recovery is 
desired, and in the course of time the resentment is likely to become bitter and the desire 
more ardent.’249  He was exactly right, and the fact that all great powers responded to the 
deep economic crisis of the early thirties by introducing tariffs or imperial preferences 
made German complaints of being unfairly deprived of raw materials and markets more 
strident and believable.  In 1932 Heinrich Schnee, President of the Colonial Association, 
resigned from the Deutsche Volkspartei and cast his lot with the Nazis. 
His followers, too, greeted the Nazi takeover enthusiastically.  The Nazis might 
be lukewarm about the colonialists’ cause but common loathing for the Versailles 
framework made them natural allies.  The Nazis’ flair for propaganda rubbed off.  
Brightly-colored posters in train stations reminded passers-by that ‘their’ colonies could 
provide raw materials and Lebensraum; striking charts compared the huge expanse of 
territory supporting each British or Belgian man with their German counterpart’s sorry 
state; postage stamps bedecked with colonial ‘heroes’ dropped into letter boxes.  Public 
statues of colonial conquerors were rededicated, colonial exhibitions mounted, films 
about German colonies produced, and in 1934 the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of 
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German South West Africa observed in the schools.  All this did not win a mass 
following.  French intelligence estimated total membership in the raft of German 
colonialist organizations at no more than 75,000 in 1935.250  But, it nourished resentful 
fantasies about the joys of African life and turned the ‘unfairness’ of Germany’s lack of 
colonies into unexamined ‘common sense.’251 
 1936 was colonial revisionism’s high point – the year Hitler repeatedly stressed 
German colonial demands, sympathetic articles sprouted in the British press, and the 
British government began privately – and then not so privately – considering ways to 
meet them.  Yet, like so many other right-wing movements initially euphoric about 
Hitler’s rise, the colonial movement found the Nazi embrace suffocating.  1936 was also 
the year that the old established colonial associations were disbanded, a new Nazi 
colonial association founded, and Schnee, protesting, pushed aside.252  Henceforth, the 
movement would serve Hitler’s vision, which was never about restitution of some 
particular African land, but rather about Germany’s apotheosis as a racially purified self-
actualizing global power.  There was ‘no such thing as “colonial policy in itself,”’ the 
Nazi Party’s Office of Colonial Policy instructed its propagandists.  ‘Colonial issues 
should be judged exclusively from the standpoint of Germany’s national needs.’ 253  And 
in 1936 those ‘needs’ were to forge an Anglo-German alliance, disrupt the Anglo-French 
entente, and win Britain’s implicit consent to Germany’s expansion eastwards.  If 
colonial propaganda sought to make Germans ‘colonial-minded,’ then, it was also, 
French intelligence reported, ‘always directed at London.’254  
 
 There was good reason for that, for Britain was revisionism’s most fertile ground.  
It wasn’t only that so many of the bright young men behind the scenes at Versailles came 
to feel that settlement too punitive, nor only that British statesmen across political lines 
were eager to avoid commitments in Eastern Europe, nor even that strong cultural 
prejudices against slippery Latins and primitive Slavs made many resist the close French 
alliance or prefer Germans to Poles and Russians.255  Of course those factors mattered; 
more important, however, was the fact that Britain had a democratic political culture in 
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which foreign as well as domestic policy was scrutinized and debated by a vigilant 
parliament and press.  So unlike in France, where the Foreign Ministry worked hard to 
keep policy out of sight and in expert hands,256 in Britain a great number of ordinary 
people fell into the habit of thinking of themselves as policymakers, unselfconsciously 
using the word ‘we’ – just as Toynbee did – when they discussed Britain’s world role.  
And those volunteer ‘world-orderers,’ while anything but pro-fascist, nonetheless 
provided the grounds on which revisionism could flourish for the simple reason that they 
instinctively favored conciliation and sought internationalist responses to conflicts 
between states. 
Take, for example, the treatment of German colonial claims in Headway, the 
house organ of the League of Nations Union.  Headway printed a letter in March 1935 
supporting the return of Germany’s ex-colonies, and for more than a year every issue 
contained correspondence on this question.  First came the retorts that territories could no 
longer be handed about without regard to the interests of the inhabitants.  Those then 
produced several interventions (including one from Heinrich Schnee) pointing out that 
African views hadn’t been considered when the mandates were distributed either.257  
What is striking, however, is how quickly correspondents tried to move the issue away 
from rival national claims.  ‘A lasting solution of the whole problem will not be achieved 
until the Great Powers of Europe admit that two standards of behavior towards subject 
peoples are incompatible – the “Colonial Possession” standard and the “Mandate” 
standard,’ the former Iraq intelligence officer Philip Mumford argued; ‘the Mandates 
system must become universal.’258  Although some correspondents contended that 
Germany’s ‘marauding instinct’ and loathsome racial policies disqualified her from 
ruling Africans at all,259 others held out the hope that a universal system would induce her 
to adopt international humanitarian norms.260 
Toynbee’s position, in other words, was widely shared, as League supporters 
looked to a new international agreement to ease European tensions.  Indeed, the level of 
popular enthusiasm for various ‘world-ordering’ proposals greatly worried Lugard, who 
in September 1935 and January 1936 laid out his own views in four closely-argued letters 
to The Times.  Lugard defended Britain’s colonial record and challenged the German 
case, but his main aim was to expose how impractical the proposals for international 
administration (as opposed to oversight) really were.  Whether Britain held its own 
territories under sovereignty or under mandate was a matter of supreme indifference to 
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Germany or Italy, he pointed out, while the idea that inexperienced powers or, still less, 
committees of international bureaucrats could do a better job administering dependent 
territories than experienced colonial officials was downright absurd.  Lugard, an old free-
trader, did think the ‘open door’ should apply to all African colonies, but he viewed 
proposals to ‘internationalize’ all dependent territories as so much moonshine, and said 
so.261 
As the debate heated up, die-hard imperialists mobilized as well.  When Lloyd 
George blurted out in the Commons that he ‘did not believe they would make peace in 
the world until…the British Empire was willing to reconsider the question of mandates,’ 
he was sharply rebuked by Leo Amery, who retorted that Germany had lost her territories 
in a war she had herself provoked and should look to the ‘great markets of Central 
Europe’ and not to Africa for an economic zone.262  Like some others concerned above 
all about Soviet expansion, Amery didn’t think Britain should object to German 
dominance in Central Europe (in August 1935 he had told Hitler so263), but he insisted 
that Britain’s security rested on tightening imperial ties.  Five days later, Amery, 
Churchill’s son-in-law Duncan Sandys, and a dozen other MPs gave notice of a motion 
opposing the transfer of any British colonies or mandated territories.264  As an issue, 
‘colonial revisionism’ had well and truly arrived.  The Times would publish 160 articles 
on the subject in 1936 alone.265 
 What was new about this public discussion?  First, it preceded Cabinet 
consideration; ‘public opinion’ raced ahead of official plans.  Second, virtually all policy 
options were on the table from the start.  There were, after all, only three possible 
responses to German colonial demands: to surrender the ex-German territories, to 
incorporate them more fully into the empires, or to try to find a ‘third way’ by tying the 
issue to other internationalist goals – economic liberalization, say, or the crafting of a 
‘general settlement.’  Of these three, however, in Britain ‘internationalist’ arguments 
predominated.  They were clever, interesting, and appealed equally to well-connected 
liberal intellectuals and a public desperate to avoid war.  Over the course of 1936 and 
1937, a network of liberal intellectuals, loosely coordinated by Toynbee and the Labour 
peer Noel-Buxton, promoted the plan to conciliate Germany by redistributing colonies 
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under an expanded system of international control.  Both men made trips to Germany, 
and in late February 1936 Toynbee – through Fritz Berber’s mediation – was granted a 
90-minute audience with Hitler, during which Hitler insisted on the need for a restoration 
of German colonies and told Toynbee ‘very explicitly’ that he had no ambition ‘to 
conquer a great empire for Germany in Eastern Europe.’  Toynbee gave an account of 
that meeting a week later to some like-minded politicians at Blickling, the estate of the 
pacifist peer Lord Lothian, and its substance was transmitted to Eden as well. 266  British 
revisionists were, of course, hardly willing to turn over colonial territories without 
conditions:  all powers administering dependent peoples were to enforce principles of 
trusteeship and the ‘open door’; no transfers were to be made without the inhabitants’ 
consent.  But the crucial point is that, for more than a year, those who sought conciliation 
with Germany dominated the airwaves, and a new colonial settlement was central to their 
plans. 267 
These internationalist proposals were hardly what German colonialists had in 
mind, and they quickly grew frustrated with their self-referential British counterparts.  
Theodor Gunzert, former head of the Foreign Ministry’s Colonial Bureau, told a French 
informant in late 1936, and again in January 1937, that he had lost all confidence in 
Toynbee.  British revisionists seemed unable to grasp what to the French was crystal 
clear:  since the Germans were interested in less international constraint rather than more, 
expanding the mandates system was no longer a basis for discussion.  But if British 
liberal intellectuals were deluded to think the Nazis might be interested in their 
internationalist fixes, the Nazis were equally deluded to think the British might accept 
transfers outside an internationalist frame.  Once the negotiations started, that 
incompatibility would become apparent. 
 
 The British government’s consideration of German claims can be divided into 
three episodes:  the secret review conducted by a subcommittee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defense between March and June 1936; the intermittent Anglo-French 
consideration of the economic case for transfer during the winter and spring of 1936-7; 
and finally the period leading up to Chamberlain’s colonial offer of early 1938.  Prior to 
those investigations, when asked about German claims, British ministers had stated 
bluntly that no such transfers could be contemplated.  When Hitler raised Germany’s 
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‘moral and legal’ claim to colonies with Sir John Simon in March 1935, Simon said flatly 
that he could not hold out hope of concessions.268 
 But there was cautious movement behind the scenes.  In early1935 the Foreign 
Office conducted a long review of the question,269 for some ministers and officials 
thought that, if peace could be bought by handing over one of the ex-German colonies, it 
would be cheap at the price.  Sir Robert Vansittart, the powerful Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office, for example, thought Britain would have to allow 
German expansion either in Eastern Europe or Africa and much preferred the latter.   
That would come, he said, ‘at our own expense’, while concessions in Eastern Europe 
would be ‘absolutely immoral and completely contrary to all the principles of the 
League.’270  Neville Chamberlain and J.H. Thomas (then Chancellor and Colonial 
Secretary respectively) also told a Cabinet subcommittee in February 1936 that they’d be 
happy to trade Tanganyika for a lasting settlement.271  A European peace was well worth 
a few African territories. 
This should not surprise us:  this is how empires think.  They often buy good will 
by handing dependent bits and their inhabitants around.  But could they do so in this 
case?  Vansittart recognized that ‘League principles’ might make it hard to hand Hitler 
the Ukraine; he failed, however, to realize that they might make other territorial transfers 
tricky as well.  For if Britain was not ‘sovereign’ in (say) Tanganyika and took 
trusteeship seriously, how could transferring African populations to Germany be a 
private, even a generous, act?  British consideration would founder, over and over, on this 
question. 
 Britain’s first examination of the German claim was sparked by Hitler’s so-called 
‘peace offer’ of March 7, 1936, the day German troops reoccupied the Rhineland – and, 
interestingly, exactly one week after Toynbee’s meeting with Hitler.  That document laid 
out the conditions under which Germany might return to the League and referred to the 
hope that ‘the question of colonial equality of right’ could be settled ‘through friendly 
negotiation.’  If Hitler’s aim was to throw sand in the eyes of the Locarno powers he 
achieved it, for the next day Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden told Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin that the time had come to consider the question of transferring a mandate or 
mandates to Germany.  One day later, Baldwin turned over that task to a secret 
subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense with representatives from the 
service ministries, the Colonial, Dominions and Foreign Offices, and the Board of 
Trade.272 
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 Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Office representatives were the most favorable to 
transfer, thinking restitution worth doing if it contributed to a general settlement.  The 
service ministries, although pessimistic, were not obstructive, with the Admiralty stating 
that German overseas possessions would not pose any problems Britain hadn’t faced 
before.273  It was the Colonial Office, now under William Ormsby-Gore, that objected, 
arguing that the very notion that one could transfer people was ‘obsolete.’  But the more 
the committee talked, the more problems arose.274  A June 1936 report laid all those out.  
Terminating a mandate would require consent of the League, and since Germany was not 
even a League member, raising this in Geneva might destroy the mandates system 
altogether.  It would be a retrograde step, ‘a retreat from the enlightened principles 
enshrined in the mandates which the United Kingdom Government have always claimed 
are applied already throughout the Colonial Empire.’  And inevitably, it would be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness, not only by Britain’s imperial allies and the British 
dominions, but equally by colonial peoples themselves. 
 Yet, the committee didn’t feel able to abandon the question.  Instead, since ‘wider 
considerations’ might necessitate concessions anyway, they took it upon themselves to 
lay out the minimum requirements such a transfer must meet.  These were, first, that it 
should not endanger the principles of trusteeship; second, that it should not be achieved 
through a German fait accompli; third, that it should be conditional upon Germany’s 
continued good behavior; and finally, that it should be part of a wider global settlement.   
Loosing some speculative hares that would never be run down, they also suggested that if 
some concession had to be made, Togo and Cameroon would be much more easily 
relinquished than Tanganyika – unsurprisingly, since those territories were largely in 
French hands.275  While insisting that territorial transfer was a terrible idea, the 
Committee thus went quite far towards making it imaginable. 
 This was especially so because its deliberations could not be kept quiet.  On April 6, 
1936, MPs on the Conservative right asked for reassurances that no territorial transfers 
were contemplated.  Neville Chamberlain prevaricated.  Although the surrender of British 
colonies was unthinkable, ‘mandated territories were not colonies’ and their disposition 
was, in part, a matter for the League.276  The sound barrier had been broken.  Eden would 
inform the Commons that July that the Government had decided that transfer of mandates 
raised too many problems, but his regretful tone revealed how much the Foreign Office at 
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least wished otherwise.  The government could see no way forward but refused to shut 
the door. 277 
 As a result, for the next year, proposals for colonial restitution proffered by an 
assortment of real and would-be diplomats piled up on Whitehall desks.  Some reached 
for the panacea of a ‘general settlement,’ but the most serious – which sparked a second 
round of official consideration – sought to reknit frayed European economic ties.  Liberal 
economists within the League’s Economic and Financial Organization and advising the 
British government were by the early thirties very worried about how protectionist 
policies had deepened global antagonisms and guiltily aware that the United States 
Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 and the Ottawa agreements on imperial protection in 1932 
had been among the worst offenders.  They knew Germany, a trading power without a 
dependent empire, had fewer options, and now tried to use international organizations to 
promote trade liberalization.278    
The man who did the most to insert German colonial claims into these economic 
discussions was Reichbank President and Nazi regime’s Minister of Economics in the 
mid-thirties, Hjalmar Schacht.   Schacht was one of Germany’s most powerful men, 
having not only helped orchestrate its economic recovery from the nadir of 1934 but done 
so in such a way as to lessen its dependence on American loans, hold down domestic 
consumer spending, and make possible the hothouse arms build-up to which Hitler was 
absolutely committed.  Schacht refused to allow Germany’s choices to be constrained by 
its serious foreign exchange problems, taking a hard line with its creditors and 
negotiating clearing arrangements that drew Southeastern Europe ever closer into its 
economic orbit.279  Always on the lookout for ways to aid Germany’s growth, Schacht 
updated the colonial case to fit a protectionist, bloc-oriented world.  The prewar world 
had enjoyed free trade, ready credit, open emigration, long-term commercial treaties, and 
a universal gold standard, he pointed out in a much-cited article in Foreign Affairs, but 
the great trading powers were now throwing protection around their empires.  Germany 
thus needed colonies not to recover the products those territories had once supplied, but 
rather to build up comparable markets within its own currency area.280 
 That move towards move towards imperial protection that Schacht noted was 
quite real.  The proportion of French exports going to its colonies rose from just over a 
fifth in 1931 to almost a third in 1935, by which point just under half of British exports 
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went to imperial destinations.281  But it was less that economic shift than the advent of the 
Popular Front government in France that won Schacht a hearing.  Beset by domestic 
difficulties, the new Socialist Prime Minister Leon Blum told Schacht he would 
contemplate concessions if Britain would as well, and in early 1937 Chief Economic 
Advisor Frederick Leith-Ross met with Schacht.  That March and April, the British 
cabinet reviewed Schacht’s proposal to Blum offering arms limitations and Germany’s 
reentry into the League in exchange for Togo and Cameroon, a reduction of interest on 
debt, and other economic concessions.  The Cabinet then decided that if France wished to 
enter into negotiations, Britain would go along.  Yet, this proposal went no further, for 
there were numerous practical impediments.  Timing was a major problem.  By the time 
the British government considered Schacht’s case, the Blum government was in crisis (it 
would fall in July 1937), and Schacht’s star was in decline as well.  Divisions within the 
French and British governments also mattered, for if the Foreign Ministries wanted to 
make a deal, French Colonial Minister Marius Moutet was horrified and his British 
counterpart Ormsby-Gore felt much the same way. 
Had negotiations proceeded, they would also likely have quickly foundered, for if 
Schacht and his Anglo-French interlocutors had similar understandings of the ways in 
which the global economy had changed, they had diametrically opposite ideas about what 
to do about it.  Liberal economists at the League and advising the Western Governments 
tended to argue, as the economist J.B. Condliffe put it, that the grouping of nations into 
empires or trading blocs was itself the problem, not only because that move limited 
global investment and trade, but also because it increased the risk of inter-bloc war.  As a 
result, ‘the most promising road to lasting peace and fruitful co-operation among the 
nations is not the further aggrandizement of great states, but the limitation of state rights 
in a world community….  A first step in that direction might well be a reversal of the 
recent tendency to close colonial markets for the benefit of the governing power.’ 282  The 
problem was that this was just the liberalizing program in which Schacht had no interest 
– and, it is worth adding, that the British government (as opposed to British liberal 
internationalists), proved unwilling to pursue either. 
 But the final reason why Schacht’s proposals could not succeed is simply because 
they were not what Hitler wanted.  Yes, Germany needed Lebensraum and subject 
territories to provide raw materials and agricultural supplies, but those territories should 
directly adjoin the Reich.  In a now-famous meeting on 5 November 1937, Hitler made 
clear that Eastern Europe and the Balkans were to be Germany’s ‘colonies.’  Those states, 
thanks to Schacht’s hard-driven bargains, were already bound to the Nazi economy, and 
Hitler instructed his military chiefs to prepare for the Drang nach Osten that would soon 
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follow. 283  But if Schacht had helped secure that economic hinterland, by doing so he had 
worked himself out of a job.  One month after that meeting, he was dismissed as Minister 
of Economics. 
If Hitler’s eastern plans were set, however, he managed to keep the British and 
French in the dark.  In public, he still harped on colonies, and British internationalists fell 
lemming-like into line.  On October 7, only days after his bitter attack on those powers 
who insisted that colonies were only a burden but nevertheless refused to share them, 
Toynbee, Gilbert Murray, Noel-Buxton and Vernon Bartlett (liberal internationalists all) 
published a collective letter urging some effort to satisfy German colonial claims.284  
Amery and other anti-appeasers swiftly mobilized in response:  as Amery wrote Murray 
privately, the only statement he thought the Germans would understand is, ‘we took your 
colonies in war and we have kept them for our security and mean to keep them, and 
anyhow we object to surrendering people for whom we have once become 
responsible.’285  This plain-spoken view was, however, the minority.  Three weeks later 
the Times called for ‘a genuine attempt to find for Germany some acceptable field for 
development,’ and two weeks after that the Manchester Guardian, usually a fierce critic 
of the Nazi state, published a self-flagellating argument for concessions as well – one 
reprinted, the French Ambassador reported, in every Berlin newspaper.286  In the House 
of Lords an odd alliance of progressive peers and isolationist or Francophobe 
backwoodsmen joined together to urge the government to consider German claims in the 
context of a ‘general settlement,’287 while the Council of the League of Nations Union 
called for the transfer of all non-self-governing territories to the mandates regime.288  
This was the high-water-mark of British colonial revisionism, the enabling context for the 
British government’s third and final initiative – that pursued by Chamberlain himself. 
 
On November 19, 1937, Chamberlain’s closest ally Viscount Halifax met with 
Hitler at Berchtesgaden to test the ground.  Hitler was alternately aggrieved and self-
justifying, complaining of the attacks upon him in the British press, and showing very 
little interest in Halifax’s suggestion of a four-power conference.  Yet, perhaps because 
Hitler said that ‘there was only one difference, namely the colonial question,’ marring 
Anglo-German relations,289 and perhaps because he met the colonies-obsessed Schacht 
the next day, Halifax left Germany persuaded that ‘a colonial settlement on broad lines’ 
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might be used, as he inelegantly put it, ‘as a lever upon which to pursue a policy of real 
reassurance in Europe.’290 
This was what Neville Chamberlain wanted to hear.  Ignoring Eden’s warning 
that ‘Germany clearly did not now wish to connect Central Europe with the colonial 
question,’ Chamberlain speculated that the ‘quid pro quo for colonies’ might include ‘not 
only Central Europe but also some agreement on the League of Nations and on 
armaments.’291  He met immediately with the French Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister and, buoyed by a surprisingly restrained reception in the Commons, began to 
sketch out a plan.  His plan was ‘imperial’ in that horse-trading over Africa was to do the 
work of European reconciliation.  The whole of Central Africa – essentially everything 
below the fifth parallel (including Cameroon but excluding the Sahara and most of West 
Africa) and above the Zambezi – would be put in a common pot and then distributed 
among all interested European powers.  Yet, the plan was also ‘international’ in that all 
powers would be obliged to administer their territories under common economic and 
humanitarian norms.  In other words, Chamberlain was planning to reform the mandates 
system to reflect the realities – and, he hoped, abate the dangers – of the shifting 
European balance of power.292 
Chamberlain’s colleagues reacted cautiously at the Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
Policy on January 24, 1938.  Eden doubted ‘that we could get away with this question on 
the backs of other powers,’ and indeed, British machinations worried and angered the 
Portuguese and Belgians.  Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore, once again the only member 
with any sensitivity to non-white feeling, also warned that ‘the whole of the coloured 
world…would intensely resent the idea of our handling over native populations to 
another Power.’293  But if Chamberlain was playing fast and loose with the interests and 
loyalties of Britain’s European allies and the inhabitants of the African territories alike, 
he was also willfully ignoring what the Nazis were saying.  Von Ribbentrop, convinced 
(like Hitler) that the eastern settlement could only be undone by force and determined to 
do nothing to restrain Germany’s freedom of action, had told Halifax and Chamberlain 
point-blank in mid-December that the German colonial claim was not a bargaining 
point294 – a message that Neurath repeated to British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson 
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in the most explicit way in late January.295  Yet, Chamberlain proceeded anyway, 
recalling Henderson to London in early February to discuss the proposal and then 
instructing him to request an early audience with Hitler to present it.  On March 1, when 
Henderson asked for that meeting, he was again told that Germany’s colonial demands 
were non-negotiable.296 
 Henderson dutifully met with Hitler on 3 March 1938 anyway.  ‘There was no 
question of a bargain,’ he (implausibly) insisted, ‘but rather of an attempt to create the 
basis for a real and sincere friendship with Germany.’  German co-operation on arms 
agreements and on Czech and Austrian politics was essential to European peace, but the 
British Government was also ready to make progress on the colonial question; indeed the 
Prime Minister ‘had devoted his personal attention to this matter.’  With the aid of a 
globe, Henderson explained Chamberlain’s proposal, assuring Hitler that while all 
powers would be asked to subscribe to common principles about demilitarization, free 
trade and native welfare, Germany would hold some territory ‘in sovereignty’ – a term 
worth noting, given that, as I explained in my third lecture, in the Locarno period all 
imperial powers had agreed that they were not, repeat not, sovereign in territories held 
under international mandate.  Effectively tossing away that agreement, Henderson asked 
Hitler whether Germany would be ready to take part is such a regime. And, if so, what 
contribution would she make ‘for general order and security in Europe’? 
Hitler responded truculently.  Central Europe was no concern of Britain at all.  
Just as Germany ‘would never think of interfering in the settlement of relations between 
England and Ireland,’ so too ‘Germany would not tolerate any interference by third 
powers in the settlement of her relations with kindred countries or with countries having 
large German elements in their populations.’  As for Chamberlain’s cherished colonial 
plan, Hitler failed to see the point.  ‘Instead of establishing a new and complicated 
system,’ he asked Henderson, ‘why not solve the colonial problem in the simplest and 
most natural way, namely, by returning the former German colonies?’  That was all 
Germany wanted, and if France and Britain were not interested, Germany would prefer to 
wait quietly ‘for 4, 6, 8, or 10 years’ until they might change their minds.  Henderson 
patiently ran through the whole thing again, adding that that if Germany were interested, 
he believed that the other colonial powers would come round.  Hitler made no reply, but 
promised a written response. 297 
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That missive never arrived.  German troops marched into Vienna instead.  Hitler, 
Chamberlain learned the hard way, would not be deflected from his eastern plans; indeed, 
the Munich accords were built on that realization.  Yet, Hitler’s response signaled not 
only a refusal to trade eastern for African ‘colonies.’  It was also an absolute rejection of 
the international order the British had been trying desperately to reconstruct.  From 1936 
until 1938, British politicians and the British public had tried to use the colonial issue to 
lure Germany into a program of trade liberalization, ‘de-territorialization’ and ‘peaceful 
change.’  That effort failed in part because Britain was now protectionist as well, but also 
because Germany was never interested.  The whole purpose of colonies, for Schacht as 
well as Hitler, was to limit German dependence on an Anglo-American international 
economic and political order. 
After this debacle, the British government gave up on colonial conciliation.  
Instead, that October, Chamberlain forced the Czechs to play the Africans’ role.  Since 
Hitler kept harping, public interest lasted a little longer.  Indeed, distressingly, on the 
night of November 9, as mobs rampaged through German cities attacking Jews and 
sacking their properties, the Mandates Committee of the League of Nations Union was 
putting the finishing touches on their proposal for drawing Germany into a system of 
international colonial control.298  Those pogroms shattered those illusions.  As the French 
Ambassador to London reported with some relief, Left and Liberal opinion was now 
strongly opposed to turning native peoples over to a totalitarian state.299  ‘Don’t let 
Neville underestimate the profound change…caused by the revelation of the Nazi 
character,’ Amery wrote Halifax on November 15; ‘“appeasement” had better lie low for 
some time to come.’300  The French had always been less optimistic about colonial 
Danegeld anyway, and on November 16 Daladier stated, firmly if mendaciously, that ‘no 
cession has ever been considered, nor can it be.’301  But by that point, the mandates 
system was coming apart at the seams. 
 
 This was the case partly because internationalism was everywhere in retreat by 
the late thirties.  The European empires had turned protectionist; now, they began 
tightening their security arrangements as well.  But the debate over colonial appeasement 
worsened matters, for it sowed discord among the mandatory powers and threw almost 
every territory under League supervision into crisis.  Mandatory administrations that had 
allowed German settlers to stay on after 1919 or had welcomed them back in the Locarno 
period now found themselves with irredentist Nazi movements on their hands.  Nervous 
non-German populations began to appeal to the imperial power for direct annexation, 
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although Germanophile South Africa muddied the waters by saying they’d be happy to 
see Germany back on the continent, just not in South West Africa.  That beggar-my-
neighbor response was all too common:  British officials too tended to offer up French 
Cameroon whenever they were asked for a concrete proposal.  Unsurprisingly, French 
mandate governors dissented and stepped up surveillance of German and British agents 
and visitors alike.  Indeed, colonial governors across the board made clear how entirely 
they disapproved of their governments’ seeming willingness to barter away the very 
ground beneath their feet. 
 They had metropolitan allies too, not least among the Colonial Ministers and 
League officials who ran the mandate regime.  Lugard and the Belgian chairman of the 
Mandates Commission Pierre Orts both spoke out against any possibility of territorial 
transfer; so too did French colonial minister Marius Moutet and British colonial secretary 
Ormsby-Gore.  Unsurprisingly, Lugard and Ormsby-Gore sprang to the defense of 
Tanganyika in particular, the territory that had always been the flagship for mandatory 
trusteeship, the territory cited by those who claimed to put ‘native paramountcy’ first.  
For anyone who took that language seriously (as Lugard did), to turn five million 
Africans over ‘like cattle’ to a formally racist state was ‘simply unthinkable.’302  Yet 
what the ‘colonial appeasement’ debate exposed – including to a growing educated 
African population – was that turning over Africans to Nazis to solve European problems 
was ‘thinkable.’  And that fact, more than anything else, discredited internationalism and 
brought the ghosts of 1919 back. 
 
 Let me close, then, by looking at what happened when that International Studies 
Conference convened in June of 1937, before this denouement, for that discussion of 
‘peaceful change.’  Much work had been done – preparatory studies of population 
pressures and raw materials written; memoranda from the various national coordinating 
committees submitted; delegations of economists, political scientists, lawyers and 
politicians chosen.  An astonishingly distinguished phalanx of liberal academics – Henri 
Labouret, Hersch Lauterpacht, James Shotwell, Quincy Wright – attended; statesmen 
who had led some of the League’s most high-profile efforts at ‘peaceful change’ – Count 
Paul Teleki of the Mosul Commission, Lord Lytton of the Manchuria Commission – 
showed up as well.  And thanks to Toynbee’s intervention, the maverick Nazi law 
professor Fritz Berber represented Germany. 
 Territorial transfer, at that point the hottest of hot topics, was discussed by the 
round-table on colonial questions.  Revealingly, however, when the debate opened, 
another option had been added to the agenda.  As the chairman explained, while at the 
outset only two models for colonial ‘peaceful change’ had been envisaged, ‘the transfer 
of the territory of a colonial Power to some other national sovereignty, and of a colonial 
Power to an international sovereignty,’ it had later been thought worthwhile to consider a 
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‘third solution, which consists in the progressive disappearance of the colonial status as 
the result of the emancipation of the tributary populations.’  Rather than transferring 
sovereignty, sovereignty – or, we might say, a form of sovereignty – would be conferred 
on the native population itself.303  ‘Self-determination’ was back on the table. 
 With an almost audible sigh of relief, many of the conference’s Anglo-American 
scholars and statesmen swung behind this ‘third way.’  Already in 1936 the American 
professor of international law Quincy Wright had written to Toynbee to say that ‘since 
the so-called ‘dissatisfied’ powers are both economically and politically better-off than 
three-quarters of the states of the world’ it was hard to see just why their grievances were 
so pressing; indeed, it seemed to him ‘that international change should be in the direction 
of general limitations of sovereignty’ not territorial transfers.304  At the conference 
Wright rose to argue that since there was no reason save ‘historical accident’ and rapid 
Western technological advance for the current distribution of colonies anyway, the fifty 
or sixty countries who lacked them found the empires’ rhetoric about their ‘burden’ 
unpersuasive at best.  ‘There is something inherently unnatural in the government of a 
people of very different culture by a metropolitan center,’ he insisted.305  Professor 
Richardson from the University of Leeds eagerly agreed, but worried that process might 
take a long time.  Labour’s former colonial under-secretary Drummond Shiels demurred.  
If a real effort at education were made, ‘the period need not be so long as is sometimes 
thought.’306 
 No one invited W.E.B. Du Bois or now exiled Haile Selassie to the conference.  It was 
a very white event indeed.  The colonized populations whose interests were so freely cited 
were not represented either; in the eyes of the conference-goers, they were clearly peoples still 
unable to stand – or indeed speak – on their own.  But buried in League of Nations and 
Colonial Ministry archives in Geneva, Paris and London we find plenty of evidence of ‘voice.’  
Just before the conference gathered, members of the Negro Welfare Association in Port of 
Spain wrote to denounce ‘the plotting of British, Italian and French imperialism for the 
handing over of African colonies to the Fascist Nazi gangs of Germany,’ while making clear 
they were not so thrilled with the current regimes either.  ‘The Negro people of the former 
German Colonies who are struggling against their present British and French exploiters must 
be given the right to determine their own form of Government.’307 Right after the November 
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pogroms, the West African Students Union in London passed a resolution saying much the 
same thing.  For those nationalists-in-formation, the haggling over colonial transfer was a 
shock, but also an illumination. 
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The Limits of International Turns 
Lecture 6 (Mar. 7, 2014) 
 
 Like everyone who prefers a quiet life, I would rather these lectures ended with a 
whimper than a bang.  But historians who work on the interwar years don’t have that 
privilege.  I know I left you, last week, at a depressing and disillusioning moment – for 
Britain, for Europe, and for the liberal internationalist project.  Of the three ‘Leagues of 
Nations’ that I tracked in the first lecture, only that League to promote international 
cooperation over issues ranging from infectious diseases to radio waves was still going 
strong.  The second League, which looked to collective security and sanctions to enforce 
the principles of the Covenant, had expired with the Italo-Ethiopian war:  none of the 
major European crises of the late thirties were handled through Geneva.  And the third 
League, the League to manage the dispositions over sovereignty reached at Versailles and 
Lausanne – that too was in crisis. 
It had begun well, with the euphoric emergence of a swathe of new states from the 
rubble of the great European land empires and with the construction, largely under British 
auspices, of an oversight regime for the transferred German and Ottoman territories.  As 
we’ve seen, for ten years, first under the leadership of Sir Frederick Lugard, and then 
under pressure from Germany, that oversight project worked to enhance ideals of indirect 
rule and the open door favored by most British imperial statesmen.  And yet that project, 
too, reeled under the twin onslaughts of economic crisis and the strident territorial claims 
made by the revisionist states.  The move to internationalize European imperialism 
foundered as Europe turned protectionist and as the so-called ‘have not’ powers claimed 
subject territories of their own. 
 
But that project hadn’t quite died in 1938, for two reasons.  The first was that 
oversight had become a routinized part of international practice, involving mechanisms 
that persisted even as the League spun into crisis.  But the second reason was because it 
still had, in 1938, the protection and support of the imperial power that had done most to 
craft it.  Japan withdrew its Commission member only in 1938, and the other mandatory 
powers continued to send reports and representatives – partly out of habit, but partly 
because Britain sheltered the League regime. 
In 1939, however, that alliance finally shattered.  It broke down over Palestine.  
The political history of interwar Palestine is too often seen, I think, either through the 
presentist optic of rival Israeli and Palestinian claims, or simply as an arena of British 
colonial activity.  But Palestine was not a colony:  it was a mandated territory under 
League oversight.  And it was, in fact, the mandated territory in which policymaking was 
most thoroughly internationalized and League oversight had the greatest effect.  Thus, it 
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was also where Britain statesmen came to understand that ‘internationalization’ had 
become a force they could not control.  Today I’m going to use Palestine as an optic 
through which to track the end of Britain’s Geneva project.  I’ll begin by noting some 
practices routinized by the League.  I’ll then sketch briefly how those came to affect 
British policy towards Palestine.  Finally, I’ll look more closely at the conflict between 
Geneva and London over the handling of the Arab Revolt of the late thirties.  You won’t 
be surprised to learn that William Ormsby-Gore, Colonial Secretary from 1936-38 and a 
constant presence in these lectures, will accompany us.  Whether his experiences over 
Palestine would confirm or confound his earlier convictions we have yet to discover. 
 
So let me begin with the effects that the turn to Geneva had had on international 
relations.  I want to note the significance of three practices, which we might call public-
ness, legalism, and routinized consultation.   
Certainly openness or publicness was a League aim from the start.  Publicity, the 
early League official Philip Noel-Baker wrote in a memorandum for Secretary General 
Sir Eric Drummond in October of 1921 was important for two reasons:  first because full 
discussion was likely to lead to the right outcome (precisely the argument that John Stuart 
Mill made in On Liberty, and one that remained a tenet of liberal internationalism), and 
second because publicity would mobilize people behind the League.308  Running against 
the inclinations of the secrecy-obsessed Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey, British 
internationalists like Robert Cecil, Philip Noel-Baker, and William Ormsby-Gore wrote 
stipulations requiring publication of League documents and the right of petition into the 
oversight regime.  Cecil spent two decades building up the League of Nations Union, 
which tried to ensure that the governments meeting in Geneva kept ordinary but 
mobilized citizens in view. 
I hope you’ve noticed the many ways in which that publicness enhanced the 
League’s capacity and prestige, with European newspaper-reading publics raising their 
voices against South Africa’s repression in South West Africa or British plans for Closer 
Union in East Africa.  But it’s important to note that publicness created problems as well, 
especially as European relations worsened.  Indeed, in the mid thirties, publicity-
defending Cecil, secrecy-obsessed Hankey, and Drummond, the man fated to manage 
their quarrel, argued bitterly about whether excessive publicity or excessive secrecy was 
responsible for the League’s various failures.  When Cecil blamed the failure of the 1933 
disarmament conference on secrecy, Hankey disagreed.  The disarmament negotiations 
held in Washington in 1921 and in London in 1930 had produced real agreements, he 
stated, but only because negotiations had been conducted in private; by contrast, 
Geneva’s open processes had led all to play to their domestic audiences and produced 
nothing at all.309  Publicness just led governments to say things they didn’t mean, and in 
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any case public opinion was more variable, more easily manipulated, and often more 
nationalist, than British internationalists were willing to admit.  Drummond understood 
that, and had earlier mildly reproved Cecil for thinking that Japanese ‘public opinion’ 
would surely force Japan to comply with League directives about Manchuria.310  As 
Ambassador to Italy, watching Italian matrons strip the rings from their fingers to support 
the fascist cause, he would warn his government that British internationalists did not 
represent the ‘public opinion’ of the world.  This was a lesson Cecil never learned. 
And if publicity turned out to have ambiguous effects, the same proved true of a 
second practice, which we might call legalism or textualism.  League politics turned on 
words:  on the carefully drafted communiqué, the painstakingly agreed convention, the 
minutes checked by each speaker before released to the press.  The sensitive nature of so 
much League business deepened textualism, for vulnerable experts or squabbling states 
defended their authority by citing chapter and verse.  We’ve seen that textualism, like 
publicity, mattered.  The League’s ruling that imperial powers were not sovereign in 
territories held under international mandate, the British Law Officers’ ruling that Closer 
Union in East Africa would violate the Covenant, Hoare’s argument that Britain was 
pledged to sanctions against Italy:  all of these were enabled by careful textual scrutiny. 
And yet textualism, like publicity, created problems, for the British in particular.  
Intense public scrutiny and strong-state administrative traditions made Britain reluctant to 
make pledges it had no intention of honouring, but especially because they thought the 
League biased towards Britain anyway, not all states had such scruples.  In 1924 
Drummond discovered that his French Under Secretary thought Council decisions only 
recommendations, which member states were free to comply with or not.  Drummond, 
cautious as he was, disagreed: Council decisions certainly bind member states.311  But 
plenty of Britons disagreed:  Amery, certainly, did, and Hankey, the spider at the center 
of the Cabinet web, did too.  Geneva, Hankey insisted, was only an arena for discussion; 
if Britain would come to binding agreements it would do so through diplomatic channels 
and in lockstep with its imperial partners, not with the motley assortment of countries 
that, by the late thirties, made up the membership of the League. 
Which brings me to the third consequential and hard-to-manage practice 
instantiated by the League:  regular meetings of the Council.  This was not ‘summitry’, 
great-power collaboration to address particular crises.  It was, rather, regular consultation 
among selected states to manage the routine business of the world.  Initially, the British 
government had let its League enthusiasts – Balfour, Cecil – represent it on the Council, 
but from the mid-twenties, Britain was represented by the Foreign Secretary himself.  
Prime Ministers often came for the smaller European states, and in its heyday, the period 
of German membership, the Council did act as a venue for pragmatic international 
conciliation and problem-solving. 
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But that consultation also created problems.  Nothing discussed in the Council 
could be kept secret; worse, as Japan, Germany and Italy exited the League, the Council 
ceased to be a venue through which the great powers, usually having first met privately, 
could manage global relations.  Instead, it became a space where small states formed 
alliances and where medium-sized states bid for a larger role.  British officials found 
Poland especially vexing.  The Poles were ‘impudent’ and full of ‘fantastical jealousy,’ 
Cecil fulminated in 1926 when Poland demanded a permanent Council seat.  ‘The Poles 
are the champion bluffers and beggars of Europe, and the more you give them, the more 
they ask.’ ‘They make me perfectly sick.’312  When Germany left, Poland – quite 
understandably, given its vulnerable position – became still more demanding, but Cecil 
no more sympathetic. 
 
But how did those practices of publicness, legalism and consultation affect 
Palestine?  Briefly, they constrained British policy, first by shifting debate and scrutiny 
from London to Geneva, second by proliferating the groups involved in that oversight, 
and finally by making it possible for European interests to trump imperial and local 
interests.  Let me explain. 
That policymaking would be especially ‘public’ and especially international for 
Palestine should not surprise, for no other transferred territory had quite the range of 
vocal states and communities interested in its fate.  The United States, virtually all 
European states, various diasporic Jewish  Zionist and non-Zionist organizations, Sharif 
Husayn and the Hashemite interest, a host of pan-Arab and Palestinian Arab 
organizations, the Catholic church, various Christian organizations and missions, and 
simply interested parties of all stripes, claimed the right to be heard.  The fate of Palestine 
was a major subject of contestation in Paris in 1919, at San Remo in 1920, at the July 
1922 meeting of the Council in London at which the Palestine mandate was finally 
approved, and that strife recurred at League Assemblies and conferences thereafter.  The 
balance between rival Arab and Jewish claims to national self-determination within this 
territorial space was always the most hotly contested issue, but other controversies 
proliferated as well. 
Over time, that international ‘publicness’ came to work to the Zionist advantage.  
Initially, that was not the case.  Once the Balfour declaration had been incorporated into 
the mandate, the Zionist Organization had concentrated on building up the Jewish 
presence and Jewish institutions; it worked in collaboration with the British government 
and not the League.  Only in late 1924 did the Organization’s president Chaim Weizmann 
wake up to the fact that, as he put it to a friend, ‘We have neglected Geneva, and the 
Arabs have been hard at work there.’313  Arab nationalists organized in a Syro-Palestinian 
Congress had established an office in Geneva, headed by the Syrian Druze politician, 
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Shakib Arslan; they were also inundating the League with petitions.  The Mandates 
Commission appeared pro-Arab at their first serious review of Palestine in 1924. 
What is striking, however, is how effectively the Zionist Organization responded 
to this political challenge.  After using Weizmann’s excellent private networks to bring 
Britain to reaffirm its support for the Jewish national home in the Council, the 
organization too established a Permanent Office in Geneva, appointing the convivial and 
well-liked Victor Jacobson and then the highly capable Nahum Goldmann to handle 
relations with the League.  Henceforth, Jacobson would keep the Commission, the 
Council and sympathetic journalists well-supplied with the Zionist Organization’s 
comprehensive memoranda and his own advice, would apprise colleagues in London and 
Palestine about upcoming Geneva meetings, and would induce the Secretariat to treat 
him, as it did not treat Arslan, if not exactly as the delegate of a member state, then at 
least as the representative of an organization textually entitled to the League’s benevolent 
support.  Weizmann too cultivated the Commission members and some became personal 
friends, especially William Rappard, who was initially sympathetic to the Arab position 
but who, by his own admission, entirely changed his mind after attending the opening 
ceremony of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem at Weizmann’s invitation.  The 
members of the Commission and the Zionist leaders were, after all, men of much the 
same type.  Cultivated, cosmopolitan, liberal and European, they shared a common 
culture and orientation – a common habitus, one might say – that made collaboration easy 
and natural. 
 Of course, Arslan and the Syro-Palestinian Congress were trying to influence the 
League too, but the Zionist organization was more effective. It had better political 
networks and skills:  strong organizations, a raft of law professors skilled at drafting 
memoranda, sympathizers in key official positions, an intelligence network as effective 
as that any state deployed.  Historians have long known that the Zionist organization had 
access to Palestine High Commission documents, including the Commissioner’s private 
correspondence, as they were written; records in the Central Zionist Archives in 
Jerusalem make clear that they gained access to uncorrected Mandates Commission 
minutes and memoranda as well.  Importantly, they used such secret information to 
inform their public diplomacy without ever letting on that they held it:  thus, as with the 
Anti-Slavery Society, confidential correspondence underwrote public activity and made it 
more effective.  Weizmann, for example, routinely sent Commission members both 
‘official’ and ‘confidential’ letters about the same matters; over time, the Commission 
came to be guided by that ‘private’ advice.  And much of that advice was about the 
meaning of texts. 
 
 For textualism was crucial to mandate administration:  every territory was 
administered, in theory, according to a mandate text.  And the Palestine mandate was a 
particularly thorny document.  True, as the great historian J.C. Hurwitz noted, it was 
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‘framed unmistakably in the Zionist interest,’314 with precise clauses stipulating Britain’s 
obligations towards the Jews, and the Arab population referred to only as ‘existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine.’ But it was ambiguous nonetheless. Britain was to place 
the country ‘under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure 
the establishment of the Jewish national home’ (Article 2), and thus to ‘facilitate Jewish 
immigration’ and to encourage ‘close settlement by Jews on the land’ (Article 6).  Yet it 
was also to foster ‘the development of self-governing institutions’ (also Article 2) and to 
ensure ‘that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced’ 
(also Article 6).  From the start, those clauses elicited a riot of interpretation.  Natasha 
Wheatley, in a recent study of all of the Palestine petitions, has shown just how hard Arab 
and Jewish interpreters worked to force the mandate to speak on their behalf.315 
For the Commission and for the British, however, the heart of the matter was how 
those pledges to facilitate the Jewish ‘national home’ and to protect the local population’s 
rights could be reconciled.  Initially, the Commission had worried they could not be, but 
once Britain stated categorically that they could, the Commission was forced to accept 
that claim too as ‘text.’  It then had to ‘interpret’ how that reconciliation might happen. 
It would be wearying to trace every twist and turn in the Commission’s thought.  
Briefly, it first followed the joint British and Zionist argument that Jewish immigration 
would promote economic development, which would benefit the Arab population too.  
The problems began in the late twenties when the Labour government concluded that 
Jewish immigration had caused land hunger among the Arab peasantry, and proposed 
restrictions on immigration and land sales, and moves towards representative 
government.  Those plans, as we know, were reversed, but they led the Commission to 
issue its own interpretation of how the mandate’s dual obligations might be reconciled. 
Hitherto they had simply endorsed both Arab aspirations to self-government and Jewish 
aspirations to a national home; now, however, they distinguished between immediate 
obligations and ultimate goals.  Maintaining Jewish immigration, the Commission 
decided, was an immediate obligation; introducing self-government, however, was an 
ultimate goal – a ruling that made it possible to imagine ‘reconciling’ the two obligations 
simply by putting representative government on hold until the demographic balance had 
swung in the Jewish favor.  Weizmann had always argued that since the Balfour pledge 
had been made, not to the Jews of Palestine but to the Jews of the world, Palestine’s 
existing inhabitants could not ‘be considered as owning the country in the sense in which 
the inhabitants of Iraq or of Egypt possess their respective countries,’ and that any form 
of self-government that would privilege their claims over those of the Jewish world 
population was thus out of the question.316  The Commission’s redefinition of self-
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government as only a remote object did not endorse that interpretation, but it kept it on 
the table.317 
And in 1932, the PMC finally (if narrowly) agreed to put self-government 
indefinitely on hold.  By a 6 to 5 vote, the Commission declined to support a British 
government plan to introduce a Legislative Council, even though it had endorsed 
progress toward self-government only the previous year.  It had been hard to bring them 
round, Jacobson in Geneva wrote to the Zionist Executive in London, but the majority 
had come to accept that, since democratic institutions might endanger the national home, 
they could not yet be introduced.318  British officials were dismayed:  great effort had 
been put into cultivating Arab support, and moving towards self-government was, after 
all, one of the obligations of the mandate.  But that was no longer the way Geneva saw it.  
By 1933, the point at which the world changed, under the Commission’s close scrutiny, 
the mandate text had come to mean, above all, the requirement to facilitate Jewish 
immigration. 
 
Now, there is a menacing international context for this shift, and it is crying out 
for acknowledgement.  The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 utterly transformed the 
situation of European Jews and with it the politics of Palestine.  Once a magnet for 
convinced Zionists, the territory now became a potential refuge for hitherto unanticipated 
numbers of Jews.  Jewish immigration to Palestine, stagnant in the late twenties, now 
rose rapidly.  Between 1931 and 1936 the Jewish population more than doubled, from 
175,000 to 370,000 (that is, to 27% of the population); and the Jewish share of the 
economy topped 50%.   
But if that immigration dramatically altered the composition and character of 
Palestine, as a response to the European crisis it was a drop in a bucket.  For, the Nazi 
revolution not only imperiled Germany’s own relatively assimilated Jewish population 
but unleashed a wave of copycat and competitive anti-Semitism, as other East European 
states scrambled to show how eager they too were to rid themselves of their (much 
larger) Jewish populations.  Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Jews found their 
civic status eroding, discriminatory measures and practices proliferating, and 
demagogues blaming them for everything from the economic depression to the 
deteriorating international situation.  In Poland, where the government became explicitly 
anti-Semitic in May 1935, the Socialist party and the Jewish Bund put up a brave fight 
against the ethnic nationalist tide, but the Zionist argument that Jews could never achieve 
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full freedom except in a state of their own began to seem incontrovertible.319  Even 
hitherto critical European and American liberal and assimilationist Jews moved into 
sympathy with Zionism.320 
 Which brings me to my third practice:  the practice of regular inter-state 
consultation.  I have said that no major European political crisis was handled through the 
Council after the Italo-Ethiopian fiasco, but that is not quite right, for British handling of 
the Arab Revolt in Palestine – in so many ways a European political crisis – was open for 
comment.  Britain’s loyalty to the mandates regime meant that Commission reports, and 
hence Palestine policy, were reviewed regularly at Council meetings.  And here the 
composition of the Council mattered very much.  It wasn’t that Palestine’s Arabs had no 
international allies, for some Indian leaders and the formally independent Arab states of 
Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and (from 1937) Egypt all sympathized with the Palestinian 
cause.  But those states were not represented on the Council. 
By contrast, an array of European states always were.  Some European Council 
members – horrified, like the Mandates Commission, by the worsening situation of 
European Jews – supported League efforts to find refuge, including refuge for some in 
Palestine.  More ambiguous is the role played by Poland and Romania, states reborn 
under the sign of ethnic nationalism, eager to reduce their ‘minority’ populations, and 
both on the Council for much of the interwar period.  Very much for their own reasons, 
they too were staunch supporters of the Zionist cause.  During the communal violence in 
Palestine in 1929-30, both had pushed Britain to restore order so that Jewish immigration 
could continue; during the Arab rising in the late thirties, they said the same.  Palestine 
must have ‘a maximum capacity of absorption,’ Poland’s Colonel Beck said in 1937.321  
Immigration to Palestine, Romania’s Nicolas Comnene added the following year, not 
knowing the future resonance of his language, would ‘assist appreciably in relieving the 
congestion in the Central and Eastern European countries, and would thus make it 
possible to look forward to a final solution’ to Europe’s Jewish Question.322  Now 
shamelessly aping both Germany’s demand for colonies and its drive to purge itself of 
Jews, Poland also put in a bid for membership on the Mandates Commission and 
advertised its willingness to take over the Palestine mandate.323  On the Council, states 
concerned to save Jews and states eager to rid themselves of Jews together pressed 
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Britain to keep the Arab population under control so that Palestine could take in as many 
Jews as possible. 
   
But if the League’s oversight regime, and especially its publicness, textualism and 
consultation, applied within the context of the rise of the Nazi state and of worsening 
anti-Semitic violence, worked to define Palestine in terms of Europe’s so-called ‘Jewish 
question’, by the thirties imperial interests were pushing Britain in the other direction.  
For the global balance had shifted.  There were now a host of independent states in the 
Middle East.  They were monarchies under British patronage, but their populations were 
anti-Zionist.  Nor had the Arab population in Palestine ever become reconciled to the 
Jewish national home:  if anything it had become more bitter.  In 1936, that anger would 
explode.  As fate would have it, the Colonial Secretary during that crisis was William 
Ormsby-Gore, who, recall, had been at the Arab Bureau when promises of Arab 
independence were made to Sharif Husayn, who had been at the Colonial Office when 
the Balfour declaration was delivered to Chaim Weizmann, and who had been one of the 
architects of the League’s oversight regime.  Now, Ormsby-Gore would have the job of 
making peace in Palestine with the international tools he had forged.  How well did he 
manage, and what did it teach him? 
 
The Arab revolt which began with a general strike in April 1936 and lasted until 
British troops mopped up the last pockets of rural resistance in 1939, did not 
‘internationalize.’  It was international from the start.  Born of Arab disillusion after the 
failure of the Legislative Council proposal, and drawing heart from the successful 
example of the general strike in Syria next door, the revolt was seen across the Moslem 
world as an anti-imperialist cause.  Volunteers arrived from Iraq, Transjordan and Syria; 
neighboring Arab governments, who negotiated the strike’s end, claimed an interest in 
the matter.324  The Arab Revolt was fought as an insurgency, against the British Army 
and not primarily against the Jews, but the status of the Jewish population of Palestine 
was at stake from the start.  And that made the Revolt an international question for the 
whole of Europe as well. 
Britain tried to restore order.  Ormsby-Gore, taking over as Colonial Secretary 
two months into the crisis, swiftly introduced censorship, curfews, collective 
punishments, the destruction of houses found harboring weapons, and the death penalty 
for bombing.325  Although it took years, harsh counterinsurgency techniques, a massive 
troop presence, and ultimately the unwillingness of the exhausted rural population to 
tolerate the exactions and bloodletting of increasingly out of control bands any longer, 
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finally drove the rebels to the wall.326  If anything, the revolt weakened the Arab 
population; by contrast, the Yishuv emerged more productive, better armed, and more 
‘state-like’ than ever. 
 Yet the Arab Revolt achieved one thing:  it finally convinced the British that the 
Arab population would never be reconciled to Zionism.  A Royal Commission appointed 
under Lord Peel which visited Palestine in the winter of 1936 surveyed virtually every 
aspect of the territory’s life, but only two conclusions in its massive report truly mattered.  
The first was that the mandate was unworkable and would have to be abandoned.  As the 
report put it bluntly, ‘we cannot – in Palestine as it now is – both concede the Arab claim 
to self-government and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home.’  The 
argument that the Arabs would grow reconciled to Jewish immigration had been proven 
false; to the contrary, economic improvement had merely deepened communal 
antagonism.   Both communities had become irredeemably ‘national’; violent outbreaks 
had become common.  Moreover, things were only likely to get worse,’ for Palestinian 
Arab claims to sovereignty and pressures to grant refuge to Europe’s hard-pressed Jews 
could only grow stronger.  Peace of a sort could be maintained through repression, but, as 
the report put it, ‘the moral objections to maintaining a system of government by constant 
repression are self-evident.’ Practically, too, repression would lead nowhere.  It would 
further exacerbate relations between Arabs and Jews; it would damage British interests in 
the world; it would alienate ‘two peoples who are traditionally our friends.’  No more 
devastating indictment of the mandate could have been imagined.327 
Indeed, so desperate was the situation, so deep the wound, that a more drastic 
remedy – what the report called a ‘surgical cut’ – might be necessary.  This was the 
second conclusion.  As there was no hope of peace under the mandate, ‘the Government 
should take the appropriate steps for the termination of the present Mandate on the basis 
of Partition.’  That alone offered some chance of meeting both communities’ national 
aspirations.  A further inquiry on the ground would work the details out; provisionally, 
however, the Commission suggested that the northern coastal areas and Galilee become a 
Jewish state, the interior and the Negev be joined to Emir Abdullah’s Transjordan as an 
Arab state, and a final region around Jerusalem with a corridor to the sea remain under 
mandate.  Adjustments and inducements would be necessary.  Since the Jewish 
population was better off and the Jewish state would contain the better land, it should 
provide a subvention to the Arab state.  Some economic benefits would need to be shared 
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and trade relations regularized.  Most critically, since there were some 225,000 Arabs 
within the proposed Jewish state and the much smaller figure of some 1250 Jews in the 
proposed Arab state, those populations would need to be transferred.  ‘In the last resort 
the exchange would be compulsory.’328 
Partition had been in the air for some time and was after all a tried and true 
imperial method of abating communal strife through ‘territorialization.’329  In Ireland, 
however, partition had been used to give territorial expression to a communal division 
that was three hundred years old, while in Palestine it was proposed to create a state for a 
community that, while possessing an indisputable historical connection, had in 1919 
made up no more than 10% of the population.  True, that population was now rapidly 
expanding, but because Jews needed refuge from European – not Arab – violence and 
hatred.  The Peel Commission admitted this, but pointed out that while the sacrifice 
demanded of Palestine’s Arabs might be great, ‘it is not only the people of that country 
that have to be considered.’  For: 
The Jewish Problem is not the least of the many problems which are disturbing 
international relations at this critical time and obstructing the path to peace and 
prosperity.  If the Arabs at some sacrifice could help to solve that problem, they 
would earn the gratitude not of the Jews alone but of all the Western World.330 
That the Peel Commission would in the end conclude that Arabs should ‘sacrifice’ to 
solve a ‘problem’ of European invention should not surprise; this was the logic of the 
colonial appeasement plan I discussed last week as well.  But nor should we be surprised 
to learn that the Arab national movement rejected this call to sacrifice. 
 British colonial policy was usually made in Cabinet and in confidence, and then 
discussed in Parliament.  But Cabinet discussion and Parliamentary review of the 
partition proposal was brief and inadequate.  This was because the Mandates Commission 
had called a special session, and Geneva trumped London.  As Ormsby-Gore later 
complained, he knew he needed Cabinet support, but ‘the parties at Geneva 
had…demanded…an immediate statement.  I had to go hot foot to Geneva…in order to 
produce something.’331  And in Geneva, policymaking turned into an international free 
for all.  Ormsby-Gore found rival Jewish and Arab delegations – as he put it, ‘the Jews 
bad and the Arabs impossible’ – and an avid crop of journalists.332 
For three weeks, in the summer of 1937, Ormsby-Gore, an advocate of self-
determination for both Arabs and Jews since his days at the Arab Bureau, did his best to 
muster support for partition. 333  For seventeen years, he stated, the British had sought to 
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reconcile Arab and Jewish aspirations but had failed, and current conditions – that is, the 
urgent search for Jewish refuge in the face of European anti-Semitism, and the growing 
force of Arab nationalism – made any prospect of success recede further.  Partition was 
‘the best and most hopeful solution’ to this deadlock.334 
And what did he learn from that grilling?  Essentially, as he wrote to the High 
Commissioner, that Palestine ‘has become an ‘international’ problem, and Geneva will 
treat it as such.’  It was not seen as a British territory, or placed in the context of imperial 
interest or even regional security; indeed, the Commission greatly resented the Arab 
princes’ claim to be heard on Palestine.  For they thought of Palestine as international – 
really European – property, as a ‘refuge for persecuted Jews of Central Europe.’  They 
were ‘vividly conscious’ of Poland’s desire to get ‘as many Jews out of Poland and into 
Palestine as possible’ – and indeed, precisely at that moment, the Polish Foreign Ministry 
was busy calculating the number of Jews that could be shoehorned into the proposed 
Jewish area.335  The Commission was making the same calculations:  indeed, the day 
before the session had opened, its chairman Pierre Orts was in intense discussions with 
Nahum Goldmann about precisely how many Jews could be brought to Palestine if the 
proposed Jewish state were enlarged to include the whole coastal area and the Negev, and 
if those 225,000 Arabs could be transferred to Transjordan.336 
Yet, except for the prospect it offered of granting refuge to Jews, Ormsby-Gore 
found the Commission very grudging about the partition plan.  It had no real faith in the 
capacity of either Arabs or Jews to govern themselves, and preferred continued British 
and League control.  Its main concern, indeed, was to contest the British conclusion that 
the mandate was impossible.  What had caused all the trouble, the Dutch member 
insisted, returning to textualism, was simply the view that there was a ‘dual obligation’ 
when the mandate’s purpose had clearly been to create a Jewish state – a declaration of 
‘original intent’ in keeping with Zionist interpretations and the humanitarian needs of the 
thirties but at odds with virtually every official clarification Britain had made.  What had 
failed, the Commission insisted, was simply Britain’s policy of ‘extreme conciliation.’  
Had the mandatory Power supported the Zionist project more strenuously, violence might 
never have broken out.  The administration should have imposed martial law 
immediately; it should have replaced Arab policemen, imported more troops and armed 
Jews; it should have exercised stricter censorship and shut down opposition newspapers; 
it should have arrested and tried Arab officials who criticized government policy; it 
should have imposed the death penalty more readily; it should have threatened to bomb 
villages that harbored rebels.337 
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Ormsby-Gore, clearly unhappy with the harsh measures he had already imposed, 
denied that such repression would have been effective.  Most likely, he said, it would 
spread Moslem-Jewish antagonism beyond Palestine, and was in any case unjust.  There 
genuinely were two communities in Palestine, and no amount of legalistic interpretation 
of an inherently ambiguous founding text could make one disappear or reconcile their 
conflicting, but equally legitimate, claims.  Nor could that be done by force – at least, not 
by a democratic government.  ‘For better or worse, the people of Great Britain were a 
liberal and democratic people,’ Ormsby-Gore insisted, and would not ‘for long be 
persuaded to use military force to settle a conflict between right and right.’338 
 And yet, Ormsby-Gore remained a League loyalist, accepting that the British 
government could not impose partition without the League’s approval.339  His attempt to 
win international backing made sense, for with strong support Britain could perhaps have 
forced partition through.   But it was not successful.  The opposition of the Arabs, the 
hostility of the League, and the carping response from Weizmann and liberal 
internationalists in Britain itself, doomed the proposal.  Nahum Goldmann, who was 
presciently and strenuously supportive from the start, always saw this as a lost 
opportunity, believing the plan offered the only real prospect of refuge in Palestine for a 
considerable number of Jews; Zionist leaders were also eager to have Britain, and not the 
new Jewish state, bear the opprobrium of forcible population transfer.  But there was no 
groundswell of support for a plan that, at least in some measure, recognized and sought to 
reconcile both Jewish and Arab claims.340 
 The failure of the partition plan spelled the end of Ormsby-Gore’s career as a 
front-rank politician.  ‘A broken reed,’ in Blanche Dugdale’s words,341 in May 1938 he 
went off to the Lords as Lord Harlech.  Ormsby-Gore, who has been with us through 
almost every one of these lectures, was, I would argue, not only the most capable and 
imaginative Colonial Secretary of the interwar period but also the only one willing to 
gamble on the international ideals and practices that grew out of the Wilsonian moment.  
Now angry and humiliated, in a speech in the Lords he placed the blame on Geneva.  The 
mandate text had been ‘the bane of all administration by successive governments in 
Palestine,’ he said, while the oversight apparatus had usurped parliamentary prerogatives 
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and made government impossible.  What Ormsby-Gore could not bring himself to say 
was that he had hung his noose himself. 
But if the failure of the partition project meant the defeat of Ormsby-Gore, it also 
spelt the end of British deference to the League.  In Geneva, at first, no-one quite realized 
that.  The Mandates Commission, determined for humanitarian reasons to keep the gates 
of Palestine open, ruled that the suspension of Jewish immigration to Palestine amounted 
to a partial suspension of the mandate – further evidence of the way that text’s meaning 
had narrowed.342  The anti-Semitic states were blunter.  Jews would have to suffer a good 
deal if the Western powers failed to arrange their emigration, the Polish representative to 
the League told the Zionist Organization’s representative after the November 1938 
German pogroms.  Poland too was prepared ‘to make the situation of the Jewish diaspora 
in Poland as difficult as possible’ in order to force the Western powers to act.343 
Britain, however, was no longer inclined to listen.  And this was not simply 
because Malcolm MacDonald, who succeeded Ormsby-Gore as Colonial Secretary, also 
found the prospect of indefinitely ‘slaying Arabs’ (as he put it) intolerable.  Nor was that 
just because, as David Ben Gurion grasped, Britain would see the Polish threat of copycat 
persecution as ‘a case of pogromists preaching morality.’344  It was also that, if war was 
genuinely coming – and it looked as if it was – Britain could no longer afford to tie up 
troops, and alienate Arab opinion, to placate Geneva.  Thus in 1939, for the first time, 
Britain made policy for Palestine without worrying what the League would say.  Arab 
and Jewish leaders were brought to London for a fractious Round Table conference; 
MacDonald then issued a White Paper.  Following one final allowance of 75,000, further 
Jewish immigration would be contingent on Arab consent, and Britain would, within ten 
years, build a unitary state based on the existing, that is majority Arab, population.345  A 
wave of domestic and international protest against these plans, and the explicit 
condemnation of a majority of the Mandates Commission, had no effect.  The 
Government did not believe their policy in violation of the mandate, the Colonial Office 
spokesman stated in the Lords, but if the League Council did not agree, the Government 
would ask for a revised mandate.  There was not ‘a shadow of a hope that this policy will 
not go through.’346  Publicness, legalism and consultation would have to bend to imperial 
security after all. 
 
I am coming to the end of my story, but it resists conclusion, for its ramifications 
are as extensive and weblike as the patterns of causation I’ve traced here.  So let me 
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offer, briefly, four endings, which trace out some implications. 
 
The first has to do with Palestine.  At the time, and later, the White Paper policy 
was seen as a cruel betrayal of promises Britain made to shelter the Jewish nation-
building project.  Ironically, in retrospect, that project itself has been seen as a form of 
British imperialism through surrogacy.  I think both of these rather miss the point.  For, 
viewing this from the standpoint of Geneva, what is striking is how very deferential to 
League views and European public opinion Britain was, and how belated its break with 
the Zionist program.  For Britain held to this policy through the thirties, essentially 
against the advice of every High Commissioner on the ground. Its patronage of the 
Zionist project, maintained through international pressure long past the sell-by date of 
British interest, did not create a Jewish state – that state made itself – but it made that 
outcome possible.  It also enabled some European Jews to find refuge in Palestine from 
the hatred of non-Jewish fellow Europeans, if against the will of an existing population 
afire with those same ideals of self-determination.  How one evaluates that complicated 
history depends, I should imagine, partly on where one stands in relation to what 
Ormsby-Gore so presciently called the ‘battle between right and right.’  But there is room 
for contextual understanding, and tragedy enough to go around. 
 
My second ending, more central to these lectures, is about the consequences of 
Britain’s sponsorship of the League project, and especially the project of overseeing 
empires.  The government’s bitter quarrel with the members of the Mandates 
Commission over Palestine mattered, because it finally prompted a shift back to what one 
might call entirely Whitehall-centered policy-making, and indeed a repudiation of the 
oversight regime itself. 
None of you will be surprised to hear that Sir Maurice Hankey was the tool of that 
attack.  For in the spring of 1939, when the Colonial Office had to recommend a new 
British member for the Mandates Commission, they asked the League Council to appoint 
Hankey, newly retired from his Cabinet post and hence eligible.  The appointment was 
fiercely criticized in the Commons, for Hankey had no experience of colonial 
administration:  he had been chosen, MPs charged, simply to defend the government over 
the White Paper.  That was of course quite right, and at Geneva, through days of 
unrelenting private wrangling, Hankey battled the Commission’s liberal majority.  He 
would not concede that the White Paper was in violation of the mandate but that, he 
insisted, was hardly the main point.  The point was the mandate had been written to be 
flexible, precisely because effective administration required flexibility.  Legalism was no 
basis for government.   
Hankey returned from Geneva, a month before the Second World War broke out, 
with the lowest possible opinion of Rappard, Orts, and what he called ‘the whole narrow-
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minded, legalistic crew.’347  The Colonial Office, smarting from their treatment, turned 
against the Commission as well.  They took part in the fall 1939 session only reluctantly, 
telling the Foreign Office that the Commission was now a ‘feeble and unrepresentative 
body’ of no significance.348  When plans for a spring 1940 meeting began, they could see 
no point.  The Foreign Office, aware that the Colonial Office was now trying to ‘pay off 
old scores against the Mandates Commission,’ insisted that planning continue, but the 
session was aborted by the German invasion of France.349  ‘The Mandates Commission 
was a wholly redundant piece of international machinery more calculated to create 
friction than to do any good,’ Hankey advised when the question next came up.  ‘I should 
like to see it abolished.’350  By 1944, the Foreign Office was of the same mind. 
Yet, the British government did not get its way.  It did not get to abolish the 
regime it had created.  This was because – as I’ve repeated too many times – international 
ideals and practices are hard for a single power to control.  The period of the Second 
World War, like the first, saw a great outburst of publicness on this question of the future 
of the international order, with claims for self-determination once again coming up 
against imperial desires; this clash would generate new plans for universalizing 
trusteeship.  The British government, this time, held back, but since the Americans were 
interested, in the end, Britain had to go along.  The oversight regime thus reemerged as 
the United Nations Trusteeship system, run from New York.  But the United States 
turned out to be a cannier patron than Britain had been, for while the oversight regime 
was applied to almost all the former mandated territories not granted independence, the 
Americans made an exception for themselves.  The Japanese mandated islands they had 
seized would be put in a separate category, that of the ‘Strategic Trust,’ not subject to the 
Trusteeship Council’s scrutiny.  Some of those islands were used for above-ground 
atomic testing that rendered them poisonous and uninhabitable. 
 
So Britain handed over to the Americans, and certainly some thought the effort to 
mitigate imperial antagonisms through international oversight and collaboration had 
failed.  But I hate to end on this note, with – we might say – the triumph of Sir Maurice 
Hankey over William Ormsby-Gore.  For that international project did have a lasting 
impact on the global order, bringing the world of normative statehood nearer, albeit 
because of the difficulty of administering empires under international oversight and not 
because that was the intended outcome.  And if it didn’t prevent war, it’s worth noting 
that Hankey’s program of limiting Britain’s foreign policy commitments and binding its 
empire closer together – which was closer to the policy actually followed – hardly 
achieved its goals either.  In the summer of 1939, Hankey seems to have suddenly 
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realized that.  So, as a third ending, let me tell you what Hankey did when he saw war 
coming. 
What he did was stay up all night, the night of August 28, 1939, drafting an 
appeal to ‘public opinion’ for the British and the German papers.  After all, he had met 
lots of Germans, and he was sure they didn’t want to go to war.  So why not have all 
Britain’s manifold civic organizations – the Boy Scouts, the Mothers Union, the 
churches, the trades unions – contact their German counterparts and appeal for peace?  
The next morning, Hankey trotted around to the Foreign Office to talk to someone about 
it. 
That person was the inescapable Sir Eric Drummond, now Lord Perth, now 
handling publicity for the government.  Drummond had someone look at Hankey’s plan, 
or at least he said he did, and in his usual imperturbable way told Hankey that it just 
wouldn’t do.  The Foreign Office thought the time for such appeals had past, and it was 
inconceivable that they would pass the German censor.351 
I hope you appreciate the multiple ironies of this episode.  For twenty years 
Hankey had disparaged public opinion and insisted on secrecy.  The public was ignorant:  
it should be educated, but not allowed to impinge on policymaking.  Its advice should be 
discounted; institutions that magnified its voice – that megaphone of Geneva – should be 
kept in their place.  And yet, faced, finally, with the prospect of war, Hankey came up 
with a plan that was, frankly, exactly what Robert Cecil would have written or the 
League of Nations Union proposed.  And it had the very flaw that beset that otherwise 
admirable group.  That is, it spoke too readily, and to unselfconsciously, for the universal.  
Hankey, like Cecil, like so many of the men we’ve met, assumed he had the imagination 
and capacity to speak for ‘the public’ across the world. 
 
This could be my fourth conclusion, one about the particular culture of British 
internationalism.  For, working on this subject, I was struck over and over by my 
subjects’ propensity to confuse national and international interests, their assumption that 
British norms and values were universal, their readiness to speak for the world.  This was 
not only true of men like Cecil and Toynbee; it was also true of the thousands of 
individual citizens who joined League of Nations Union chapters and who wrote to the 
papers.  I found that orientation both admirable and infuriating, for the League experience 
would teach these men a hard lesson about the variety of ‘publics’ in the world.  I think, 
however, that you’ve got that point.  So instead, as a fourth ending, I’ll offer one brief 
historiographical reflection. 
For as I listened to British internationalists speak I also seemed to hear something 
else – odd echoes of discussions that were going on in my field, that is, in British history, 
today.  Now, as you probably know, in the United States at least, British history is a field 
under pressure.  It is not really where the action is, and has seen its share of department 
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posts and undergraduate courses diminish.  This decline has been reasonable and 
inevitable, a consequence of America’s pivot towards the Pacific, the change in the 
composition of its student body, and the erosion of its reflexive Anglophilia.  But for 
British historians, it has caused much anxiety and soul searching.  For this is a field, 
rather like the culture it studies, long accustomed to seeing itself as central and 
indispensable, its moves and preoccupations as universal and not particular.  As pressure 
for resources and jobs mounted, although for good intellectual reasons as well, British 
historians made an ‘imperial turn’ – and, once that happened, it was a short step to an 
international one.  British historians, a North American Conference on British Studies 
report stated as long as decade ago, were well placed to move into world and global 
history; because of their reach, they could save themselves by teaching the global surveys 
universities wanted.  Our shelves fill up with books by British historians writing 
international history. 
I know I’ve done that too.  But I want to register my discomfort with the form that 
turn has sometimes taken.  For international history is not just the history of Britain’s 
projection into the world; indeed, as I’ve shown, even an international institution shaped 
heavily by Britain became one it could not control.  We can only understand such 
international arenas by approaching them on their own terms, seeing them whole, with 
other states and actors fully in view.  This requires languages and comparison and a 
certain humility towards other fields.  In my recent work, I’ve thus tried to show how that 
might be done, writing a book centered on Geneva, and not on London; one that tracks 
whatever blew up there, and not whatever Britain or any other state cared about or 
happened to pursue.  Any other approach struck me as replicating that core hubristic 
belief:  that British preferences were universal norms; that its empire was the global order 
in embryo.  Britain played a part in shaping the international order in this era, yes, but 
only a part – and relativizing its claims strikes me, for anyone who genuinely would like 
to do international history, as the indispensable beginning of wisdom. 
 
 
 
 
